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1. Energy Policies and 
National Agendas 
In recent years, the topic of energy has captured the atten-
tion-if not the imagination-of policymakers in the ad-
vanced industrialized countries of the West. The reason is 
obvious. Energy considerations have become central to the 
most pressing problems ofmodern society: economic growth, 
employment, and inflation. Economic growth in particular is 
intimately linked with energy consumption. Over the past 
thirty years, economic expansion in Western Europe, North 
America, and J apan has been fueled by an exponential 
increase in the consumption of oil. As long as oil supplies 
remained abundant and cheap, this development occasioned 
little concern. Once supply became problematical and prices 
skyrocketed, however, the implications for economic growth, 
employment, and inflation were forcefully brought home to 
policymakers and general public alike. 
More recently, questions of environmental degradation 
have become prominent on political agendas. The most im-
mediate worry has been the pollution of air and water, 
largely caused by current energy production and consump-
tion practices. Y et, the already tangible impact on the West-
ern quality of life pales heside predictions of environmental 
catastrophe if present practices are continued. Accordingly, 
on an ecologically finite earth, the consumption of fossil 
fuels must be drastically reduced and traditional patterns of 
economic growth eschewed. 1 
2 Politics and Nuclear Power 
At one point, nuclear power was widely seen as the al-
ternative to polluting, diminishing, and politically unreli-
able energy sources; but the promise of clean, abundant, 
and inexpensive nuclear energy now appears to have been 
ephemeral. Misgivings about the carcinogenic and genetic 
dangers attending the production of nuclear energy and 
the disposal of radioactive waste are increasingly being re-
flected in government policy. The result has been spiraling 
costs for the nuclear industry as it has faced more strin-
gent safety standards, construction delays, and plant shut-
downs. 
Even if nuclear power were without environmental risk 
and considerably less costly than other fuels, however, its 
widespread use would stiil be problematic because of the 
danger of nuclear proliferation. Governments in the indus-
trialized West are not eager to see fissionable materials in 
the hands of less stable regimes. Consequently, issues such 
as international safeguards and the transfer of peaceful 
nuclear technology have become subject to intense interna-
tional negotiation. 
Thus, energy can simultaneously affect decisions in dis-
parate areas of policy such as military security, environmen-
tal protection, and economic welfare. Increasingly, energy 
appears to be defining many of the limits of political action 
in modern society. 
In the following pages, I will examine the energy strate-
gies of the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the 
Netherlands. More specifically, I want to analyze the rise of 
energy policy to the top of national political agendas by the 
mid-1970s; and, within this context, the efforts of energy 
officials to formulate and implement ambitious nuclear 
power programs. 
In general, the policies proposed by the energy officials 
of each country at the recognition of the energy crisis were 
remarkably similar. Traditional fuels such as coal and nat-
ural gas were to help hold down increases in oil consump-
tion. Conservation, likewise, was to be stressed, although 
the commitment, at least initially, was largely rhetorical. 
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But nuclear power-the commercially available light wa-
ter technology for the immediate future, the fast breeder 
reactor over the longer term-was to be the primary means 
of reducing dependence on imported oil. In the execution, 
however, national policy outcomes have been very differ-
ent. 
To understand why, we must go beyond the specific con-
tent of government energy policy to study the decision-
making process itself. In the chapters that follow, close 
attention will be paid to policymaking. Several closely as-
sociated analytic concepts will be used to provide a common 
frame of reference for the comparison of the three countries' 
energy strategies. Let us take a brief look at these concepts 
before turning to a consideration of international energy 
policy. 
COMPLEXITY, UNCERTAINTY, & CONSENSUAL POLITICS 
In a groundbreaking work on comparative energy policy, 
Leon Lindberg deserihes the recent transformation in the 
type of actors and issues defining energy policy: 
Most policymakers and analysts have traditionally de-
fined energy policy as having to do with government 
and industry activities relative to the several stages 
(prospecting, mining, refining, transforming, trans-
porting, marketing, and research and development) of 
the supply of the various forms of energy (coal, natural 
gas, petroleum, electricity) needed for individual and 
collective consumption and for industrial production. 
Increasingly, however, the boundaries of energy policy 
are expanding to include: 
• The environmental and safety effects of producing 
and consurning energy; 
• The capital requirements of various energy options 
and the complex interrelationships among economic 
growth, energy consumption and income and wealth 
distribution; 
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• The implications of various energy supp ly technolo-
gies for the structure of economic and political power 
within nations; 
• The implications of existing and proposed patterns of 
energy production and consumption for national 
power and security, for international conflict, and 
for the future evolution of an increasingly interde-
pendent global political and economic system. 
[And withinthis expansion of energy policy boundaries 
are] new organizational actors (new governmental 
agencies and new elites) with somewhat different per-
ceptions of the problem and responsibilities. More and 
more sectors of industry and more and more public 
agencies are involved and the problems of intergov-
ernmental management ... become more pressing. 
And since energy involves complex interdependencies, 
the policymakers of many other nations become de 
facto participants in any other nation's energy policy 
system ... The environmental, employment, health, 
and safety consequences of one or another proposed 
energy technologies and foreign and security policy 
implications of import dependency have in the liberai 
democracies mobilized a variety of "outside" groups 
and previously inattentive publics ... Ad hoc advocacy 
groups multiply, royal commissions and legislative 
commissions are established, antinuclear initiatives 
are placed on the ballot; court cases are filled. 2 
This seems to me a relatively accurate assessment of present 
energy policy. The implications for the political process are 
considerable. 
In essence, what Lindberg here foreshadowed was the 
growing complexity of the energy policy. For our present 
purposes, complexity is defined as a function of the number 
of actors engaged in the political process, the number of ob-
jectives being pursued, and the degree to which these ac-
tors affect one another in pursuit of their objectives.3 The 
coming pages will detail the specific responses of W est Ger-
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many, France, and the Netherlands to the growing com-
plexity of the energy issue. W e will see that the new ap-
proaches were much more comprehensive than the previ-
ous ones.4 Somewhat paradoxically, however, a comprehen-
sive response, in and of itself, may further exacerbate 
the problem because of two closely associated factors: the 
decline of the market as sovereign arbiter of energy pol-
icy decisions, accompanied by the expansion of govern-
mental activity and responsibility throughout the energy 
sector. 
Indeed, where policymakers have opted for a comprehen-
sive approach to energy policy, the primary reason for 
change has been from the perceived dysfunctions of the 
market: for example, overreliance on the international en-
ergy market for imported oil and the problems precipitated 
by skyrocketing prices in the areas of inflation, employment, 
economic growth, and halanee ofpayments; the externalities 
of energy use as they affect the environment; and the like. 
Under circumstances where overt choices partially displace 
the anonymous decisions of the marketplace, certain aspects 
of the market that have made complex decisions more man-
ageable are lost. 
Thus, a more comprehensive strategy affects the politi-
cal system in a very fundamental way. Many areas previ-
ously regulated by the remote, self-adjusting mechanisms 
of the market will now fall under government purview, in-
creasing complexity by bringing new actors with their own 
objectives into the expanded political arena. In other 
words, the number of actors demanding participation will 
increase appreciably with a comprehensive energy policy, 
since many more groups and individuals will see them-
selves as affected. 
If present-day energy policy must involve complex and 
comprehensive approaches, it must at the same time be 
conducted in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. In policy 
spheres dominated by the complex interactions of many 
actors pursuing often-competing objectives, cause and ef-
fect relationships have become increasingly difficult to de-
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fine. The issues surrounding today's energy debate have 
generated little agreement: 
• What are the problems to be addressed-impending eco-
logical disaster, declining supplies of conventional fuels, 
the increased cost offuels, growing dependence on foreign 
energy supplies? 
• What are the causes-profligate practices of advanced 
industrial countries, the finiteness of conventional energy 
resources, the roaehinations of OPEC, the manipulations 
of the oil industry, the ineptness of government interven-
tion, perhaps government intervention itself? 
• Where are the solutions to be found-in a fundamental 
transformation of modern lifestyles, increased efforts to 
conserve energy, development of alternative energy 
sources, freeing the forees of private enterprise? 
• What are the socio-political implications for a society that 
foregoes traditional economic growth; the exact relation-
ships between energy consumption and economic growth, 
the precise trade-offs between proposed alternative en-
ergy technologies' cost, environmental impact, political 
and social structures, and so forth? 
While many groups active in the energy debate may 
helieve that they have identified the causal links in the 
energy concatenation, agreement among them is spotty at 
best. The broad differences over the nature of the energy 
problem and the choices required to rectify it have proved 
unamenable to compromise, thus frustrating the movement 
toward consensus that is preferred in democratic polities. In 
the coming pages, we will analyze the effect of these uncer-
tainties on the ability of government to build the consensus 
needed for political action. 
OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK 
The guiding question of this study is: what pushed nu-
clear power to the top of the political agenda in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, and the Netherlands, yet led 
to very different outcomes? To address this question, we 
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must first look beyond a strict analysis of the nuclear issue 
to examine the context of overall energy policy and its 
evolution over time. Further, to assess the forees shaping the 
three countries' energy strategies, we must briefly review 
developments in the international energy market in the 
years since the Second World War. This is the task of the 
following two chapters. 
Chapter 2 looks at the changes in the structure of the 
world market, the etTeets of those changes on the price and 
supply of oil, and the responses to such changes at the 
national level through the early 1970s. These responses 
were characterized by a general preference for allowing the 
international market to determine the general shape, direc-
tion, and content of energy policy. Chapter 3 focuses on the 
national energy strategies formulated in response to the 
OPEC revolution. In contrast to the earlier period, energy 
policy is defined much more comprehensively and govern-
ment is given an active, central role in its execution. This 
period also saw nuclear power given a central role to play in 
reducing dependence on imported oil. Finally, we will see 
how the transformation of energy strategies in the mid-
1970s resulted in certain changes in overall decision making 
that led to the different outcomes examined in this hook. 
Chapters 4 and 5 offer the heart of the analysis, exploring 
the various dimensions of nuclear policy in West Germany. 
Chapter 4 examines the unraveling ofpolitical consensus on 
nuclear power as various actors were introduced into the 
policymaking process. Chapter 5 analyzes subsequent gov-
ernment efforts to resolve the developing political stalemate 
over nuclear power, as policy became mired in domestic 
electoral politics and the entanglements of an international 
debate over nuclear proliferation. The situation in Germany 
was strongly affected by the structure of the political system 
and its impact on nuclear policy. 
Chapters 6 and 7 compare German nuclear policy with 
that of two other European countries. Chapter 6 examines 
nuclear policy in France. Although France shared certain 
characteristics with W est Germany-a strong commitment 
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to nuclear power and comparable levels of domestic opposi-
tion throughout much of the 1970s-the French state was 
not deflected from its policy of rapid nuclear expansion. 
More similar to the German outcome was the Dutch case. 
Chapter 7 details how implementation of a proposed Dutch 
nuclear program has been stalled for a decade as govern-
ment officials have sought the type of broad political con-
sensus valued in their polity. Again, the political system of 
each country played a crucial role in struduring its nuclear 
debate. 
Chapter 8 briefly analyzes the factors responsible for the 
rise of the nuclear power issue to the top of the political 
agenda and the differing abilities of governments to imple-
ment their nuclear programs. We see that the transition 
from the more limited, ad hoc approach to energy policy, 
which relied primarily on the market, to a comprehensive, 
long-term energy strategy, in which government played a 
more central role, had the effect oftransforming the nuclear 
controversy from a scattered, local phenomenon to a na-
tional debate that engaged the major political, social, and 
economic institutions of each country. The reasons for this, 
I will argue, had much to do with the corresponding change 
from an incremental to a more synoptic approach to poli-
cymaking, an approach that elevated the policymaking 
structure itself to a position of crucial importance. 
2. World Energy Markets 
and National Policy 
In order to assess properly the forees now shaping the energy 
debate that began in the 1970s, we must look at the ante-
cedents within the context of developments in the interna-
tional energy market. In this chapter, I will first examine 
the structure of the world energy market as it has evolved 
since the end of the Second World War, focusing specifically 
on changes in the oil company/producer country relationship 
and their effect on the price and supply of oil. Second, I will 
consider the response of national energy officials to these 
changes through the early 1970s, taking special note of how 
far policymakers relied on market mechanisms in the con-
duct of energy policy or opted for governmental intervention. 
FROM CARTEL TO OLIGOPOLY: 1945-70 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the world 
energy market has been shaped largely by the policies of the 
international oil majors-Exxon, Mobil, Socal, Texaco, Gulf, 
Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum (BP), and Compagnie 
Fran<;aise de Petrole (CFP). As early as the 1920s, efforts to 
structure this market along the lines of a cartel were un-
dertaken, as the international majors negotiated explicit 
arrangements to regulate the production and marketing of 
oil worldwide. Central to these cartel arrangements were 
the so-called "Red Line Agreement," which established 
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means of controlling levels of production within the Middle 
East as well as aecess to that production, and the "Ach-
nacarry Agreement" or "As Is Agreement of 1928," which 
defined the market shares to be allocated to participating 
members. 1 Once fully operative, these cartel arrangements 
served to stabilize a market earlier characterized by fre-
quent periods of overproduction and collapsing oil prices. 
Following the Second World War-as national govern-
ments in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan 
became increasingly interested in the operations of the in-
ternational oil market-the cartel framework gave way to 
an oligopolistic organization. That is, explicit collusion at 
the expense of competition was no longer practised, but 
considerable competitive self-restraint in commercial activ-
ities was displayed by the international majors. 2 
Through the 1950s, vigorous competition in the world oil 
market was moderated by the international majors' exclu-
sive control of oil production in the Middle East. Because of 
concessions granted by local governments to the oil compa-
nies--often stipulating exclusive production rights for peri-
ods of up to sixty years or more-the majars could exclude 
potential competitors from the most profitable area of oil 
production. Thus able to regulate production and control 
aecess to crude oil, the international majars informally re-
stricted price competition, thereby keeping prices at an 
artificially high level. By the late 1950s, however, certain 
developments had begun to undermine the majors' control of 
production and distribution. 
One minor factor was the entrance of the Soviet Union 
into the world petroleum market. Soviet oil furnished inde-
pendents and state oil companies with a limited supply of 
crude oil, but this alone was not enough to pose a long-term 
threat to the majors. More important was the acquisition of 
concessions in the Middle East by independent and state-
owned oil companies, which provided the breakthrough 
needed to challenge the positian of the majors. By agreeing 
to more advantageous deals for the producer countries, these 
companies gained a crude oil base that enabled them to 
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compete more effectively with the international majors for 
customers on the world market. For example, rather than 
the fifty/fifty concessions traditionally given by the majors, 
joint venture agreements offered a seventy-five/twenty-five 
split ofproduction revenue shares. Finally, the imposition of 
import quotas on oil in the United States after 1957 left 
Western Europe virtually the only other major oil market 
capable of absorbing the new oil production flooding the 
market. 
The consequences of these events were swift in coming: 
increased competition, with a subsequent breakdown in the 
informal pricing arrangement among the majors. The extent 
to which the oligopolistic structure of the world market 
changed over the course of the 1960s is illustrated in the 
following figures: in 1957, the eight international majors 
controlled 91.7 pereent of OPEC production; by 1970, ap-
proximately two hundred companies had entered the inter-
national market, with their output representing about 20 
pereent of OPEC production.3 As the international majors 
fought to proteet their traditional markets from the aggres-
sive pricing policies of their new competitors and, at the 
same time, compete with the independents and one another 
for growing markets in Western Europe, the price of oil fell 
dramatically: in 1959 the posted price dropped from $2.08 
per barrel to $1.80, while the actual selling price declined 
even farther (1959, $1.50; 1965-67, $1.00-1.25; and 1969, 
$1.00-1.10). 
The precipitous fall in oil prices, combined with the pros-
pect of further increases in supply and the attractive phys-
ical properties of oil-its ease of transport and use, compared 
to coal-held important implications for those European 
countries that had relied on coal to fuel their reconstruction 
after the war. 
ENERGY POLICY IN WEST GERMANY 
Energy policy in the Federal Republic of Germany 
throughout most of the postwar era has been a series of 
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responses to developments in the nation's coal industry, an 
important and prominent element in the domestic economy. 
The largest indigenous energy source in Western Europe, 
domestically produced coal dominated German energy pat-
terns (see Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix). More than 500,000 
people were employed in the coal industry throughout the 
1950s, with millions more indirectly affected by coal. Most of 
the industrial activity associated with coal and steel produc-
tion was concentrated in one area, the Ruhr basin. 
With a burgeoning demand for coal to fuel economic 
recovery, the coal industry appeared to be entering an era of 
prosperity in the 1950s: between 1950 and 1957, coal pro-
duction had increased 20 pereent and employment had 
jumped from 536,800 to 604,000 (see Table 3 in Appendix). 
Over the next decade, however, the coal industry went 
through a crisis from which it neve1· completely recovered. 
With the aforementioned changes in the world energy 
market by the 1950s, German coal became increasingly 
uncompetitive with oil. Whereas the price for German coal 
had remained relatively stable for the ten years between 
1957 (DM 63.29 per ton) and 1966 (DM 67 per ton), the price 
for fuel oil went from DM 95.20 per 1,000 CE (coal equiva-
lents) in 1957 to DM 37.36 in 1966 (see Table 4 in Appendix). 
The effects were devastating. Between 1957 and 1968, em-
ployment fell from 604,000 to 272,000 as conversion from 
coal to oil accelerated. Hard coal dropped to only 34 pereent 
of total energy consumption in 1968 as opposed to almost 70 
pereent in 1957. Stockpiles of unsold coal fluctuated wildly 
over the same period (1957, 1 million tons; 1959, over 17 m; 
1963, under 4 m; 1966, over 20 m).4 No German govern-
ment could ignore the political implications in these figures. 
Beginning in 1959, the federal government, under in-
creasing pressure from the so-called Ruhr lobby, undertook 
a series ofmeasures designed to counteract, or at least slow, 
the transition from coal to oil. The Ruhr lobbyisa unique 
constellation of forees that gives the coal sector substantial 
political clout. Industrially, coal companies in Germany 
have traditionally been closely associated with powerful 
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steel interests (steel holdings produced over 52 pereent of 
German coal). Coal miners are represented by one of the 
larger and more influential labor unions in the Federal 
Republic (/. G. Bergbau und Energie), which, in addition, 
maintains very close ties with a major political party, the 
Social Democrats (SPD). North Rhine-Westphalia, one of 
the economically and politically most powerful of the eleven 
Laender in the Federal Republic, is where these industrial 
activities are concentrated. The North Rhine-Westphalia 
government, therefore, has treated very seriously the prob-
lems of the coal sector. 
The first major government effort was an informal gov-
ernment attempt to establish a coal-oil cartel in which the 
international majors committed themselves not to sell heavy 
fuel oil (the most direet competitor to coal) under the price 
level as determined on the world market and recognized by 
the cartel. This approach was quickly abandoned, however, 
as outsiders not belonging to the cartel began to take over an 
appreciable portion of the German fuel oil market by under-
bidding the cartel price. 
Following the collapse of the cartel, the government tried 
more direet action. A 1960 law levied a tax on fuel oil, but 
this too failed as the price increase evidently had not been 
passed on to the consumers by the companies. 
A third tack was pursued in the mid-1960s. The govern-
ment attempted to promote the use of coal in the specific 
sectors of power generation and steel: power generation laws 
(Verstromungsgesetze) were passed that offered various in-
centives to construct or extend the use of power plants 
committed to the burning of coal. At the same time, coking 
coal subsidies were provided to the steel industry. Although 
somewhat more effective than their predecessors, these mea-
sures were not enough to offset the cumulative monetary 
and social costs of decHning coal sales and rising unemploy-
ment.5 
One further salvage attempt was made by the federal 
government in the late 1960s. Legislation was offered to 
initiate a wholesale restructuring of the coal industry. 
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Drawing on the lessons of the unsuccessful 1963 efforts to 
rationalize the coal industry, a single private corporation 
unifying all of Ruhr coal was created in November 1968-
Ruhrkohle A. G. In contrast to earlier government policy 
intended to maintain coal production at a specific level, the 
task of Ruhrkohle was to make German coal as competitive 
as possible, which meant drastic reductions in production 
capacity and output, or, more bluntly, the elosure of the less 
efficient mines.6 
Thus, German energy policy was, essentially, coal policy. 
Energy officials took action in the oil sector only as heavy 
fuel oil came to compete directly with coal for customers. 
Government policy was not to concern itself at all with 
overall consumption patterns or with their future develop-
ments. The government preferred the market to be the final 
arbiter in such matters. Even the complete restructuring of 
the coal sector, as represented in Ruhrkohle, signified ac-
ceptance of market forees and a hope to restore coal even-
tually to the marketplace. 
FRANCE AND ENERGY PLANNING 
The conelusian of the Second World War left France a 
country psychologically humiliated by its rapid collapse 
before the German invasion and morally compromised by 
the Vichy collaboration. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the new French leadership put the highest priority on the 
restoration of France's former "grandeur." According to 
Charles de Gaulle, this required that France become a "great 
industrial power."7 What has been described as "stagnant, 
non-competitive industries associated with the selerosis and 
decadence of the interwar period" was to be transformed.8 
Withinthis context, a small body ofplanners headed by Jean 
Monnet formulated a plan to modernize French industry. 
The Plan Monnet, in turn, was to articulate the content and 
direction of French energy policy. 
Central to the plan's strategy was intensive development 
of coal and hydroelectric power-a choice representing a 
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conscious preference for national energy sources in the im-
mediate post-war period. Among the reasons were the large 
amounts of energy required for reconstruction and the scar-
city of energy throughout Europe at the time. In addition, 
this preference reflected the high political value attached to 
the restoration of French autonomy by Gaullists and others. 
At the same time, the most relevant energy sectors were 
nationalized. Under the nationalization laws of 1946, virtu-
ally the entire coal sector came under the public ownership 
of Charbonnages de France (CDF). Electricite de France 
(EDF) was given monopoly rights in the production, trans-
port, and distribution of electrical energy. In addition, Gaz 
de France (GDF) was set up to control all activities in the gas 
sector. 
By 1952-53, reconstruction of the basic sectors outlined in 
the Plan Monnet had pretty much been completed. In 
1954-57, the Second Plan therefore placed greater emphasis 
on the construction of thermal power plants because of the 
high costs associated with hydroelectric production. Sixty-
five pereent of all increased production capacity was to be 
covered by thermal plants, 35 pereent by hydroelectric. How-
ever, most French mines reached their maximum capacity 
toward the end of the Second Plan, with coal production in 
France peaking at 60 mt in 1958. As energy consumption 
outstripped domestic coal production, there was a rapid 
increase in the importation of coal and oil (see Table 5 in 
Appendix). 
In the early 1950s, as the importance of oil in French 
energy supply was becoming more apparent, efforts were 
under way to help assure control of the domestic petroleum 
sector. In 1951 a system requiring special authorization for 
importing and retining oil was reimposed. 9 Further, the 
Bureau de Recherches de Petrole was created by the state to 
finance exploration in France's overseas territories. Finally, 
in an attempt to control the distribution of oil products more 
effectively, a CFP subsidiary-Total-was established in 
1955.10 
Together, these measures served the purpose of the See-
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ond Plan and its stress on developing the petroleum as well 
as coal and electrical sectors by expanding the domestic 
refining industry and intensifying exploration within 
France and the franc zone-primarily North Africa and 
Gabon. The intention was not only to help assure energy 
supply but also to improve France's balance-of-payments 
position. Somewhat unrealistically, the Second Plan pro-
jecteda 40 pereent increasein the volume of exports with no 
increase in the volume of imports, a feat to be made possible 
through anticipated developments in such import-substi-
tution industries as oil production.11 
The Second Plan, again, largely defined the content and 
direction ofFrench energy policy through the mid-1950s. As 
in the Plan Monnet, public investments were focused on 
developing national energy sources, although at times with 
certain shifts in emphasis. Maximizing coal production and 
expanding electrical power generation (but with thermal 
rather than hydroelectric plants) remained priorities; ex-
ploring for oil and gas within France and the franc zone 
gained in prominence; and accelerating development of a 
domestic refining capacity received greater attention. 
French energy policy as articulated in the Third Plan 
(1958-61) maintained the orientation toward developing 
national energy resources. Circumstances, however, caused 
the major guidelines of the plan to be virtually ignored by 
the public officials responsible for energy policy. 
In 1958 and 1959, energy demand in France was stag-
nating because of a slump in the economy.12 In addition, 
changing conditions in the international oil sector, com-
bined with continued worldwide increases in coalmining 
productivity, was leading to an energy glut rather than 
gap. As a consequence, French coal declined steadily in 
competitiveness against imported oil. Between 1958 and 
1965, the price of coal for industrial use increased 19 per-
eent while the price of heavy fuel oil for industrial use 
declined 17 percent; the price of coal for domestic use in-
creased 33.8 pereent while the price of heating oil for 
domestic use declined 12.7 percent.13 The resulting drop in 
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oil prices, accompanied by a decline in the price of Ameri-
can coal, presented French officials with an uncomfortable 
dilemma. Should they continue to emphasize the develop-
ment of secure national energy supplies, despite their cost 
and scarcity, or should they place greater reliance on abun-
dant, inexpensive, imported energy at a time when the in-
ternational competitiveness of French industry was being 
seen as increasingly critical? 
This concern with the economic and political wellbeing of 
France was due in large part to French membership in the 
European Community. As a consequence of the systematic 
dismantling of tariff barriers among the member states of 
the European Community and the negotiation of common 
external tariffs beginning in 1959, the French economy for 
the first time in decades was exposed to international com-
petition. 
A decision came swiftly in the form of the Plan Jean-
neney, a program adopted in June 1960 to reduce French 
coal production substantially. Discarding the optimistic 
goal of 63 mt set less than two years earlier, the new plan 
called for closing unprofitable and inefficient mines in 
areas such as the Centre and Midi to cut production to 
53.5 mt in 1961. 
Thus, the Third Plan and its energy policy was brushed 
aside. Rather than relying primarily on domestic coal, in-
creased hydroelectric production, and development of indig-
enous oil and natural gas sources, the government would 
pursue improved international competitiveness by increased 
consumption of inexpensive, imported oil. 14 Market consid-
erations would serve as the overriding, if not the sole, cri-
teria in energy policy decisions throughout the 1960s. 
With oil prices decHning steadily on the world market 
during the 1960s and coal production dropping at an accel-
erated pace, the French oil sector expanded rapidly. 15 The 
objective of energy policy came to be the promoting of the 
international competitiveness ofFrench industry. However, 
this market lögic did not mean less state intervention in the 
petroleum sector, nor did it mean complete abandonment of 
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efforts to retain some degree of energy independence, al-
though the concept as defined by French officials assumed 
somewhat different connotations in the 1960s than it had 
carried in the 1950s-or would acquire in the 1970s. 
Reflecting more general concerns pervasive in France at 
the time (le "defi Americain"), energy independence came to 
be defined not only by the ratio between domestic production 
and energy imports but also increasingly by the threat of 
international ("Anglo-American") oil companies dominating 
the domestic petroleum market. The response of French 
officials was twofold: first, they established new import, 
refining, and distribution quotas to allocate a larger share of 
France's rapidly expanding market to French companies 
and to reserve a larger share of France's rapidly expanding 
oil sector; second, they moved to acquire crude oil production 
for French companies independent from that of the interna-
tional majors. The new distribution quotas established in 
1965 allotted 52.9 pereent of the domestic market in 1965 
and 54.4 pereent in 1968; the refining quota, covering a 
ten-year span beginning in 1965, was set at 61.3 percent. In 
addition, the state required that at least 90 pereent of all 
petroleum products distributed domestically be refined in 
France. 
With loss of ownership in the Saharan oil fields after 
Algerian independence (1962), the French government pur-
sued a strategy of state-to-state negotiations with producer 
countries. In December 1965, ERAP-a totally state-owned 
oil company-was created from existing smaller state oil 
entities for implementation of this strategy. An initial 
agreement was concluded with the Algerian government 
that same year, establishing a so-called positian privilegiee 
for French oil interests in Algeria (although the prices set 
for Algerian oil were somewhat higher than those prevailing 
on the world market). 16 Subsequent agreements were con-
cluded between ERAP and Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and 
Libya, but these were less important, as 80 pereent of 
ERAP's crude oil production came from Algeria. 
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Th us, although the objectives of French energy policy in 
the oil sector throughout the 1960s were still being stated 
in terms of "security of supply" or "energy independence," 
they actually had less to do with the total arnount of 
domestic energy consumption that was supplied by imports 
than by control over the domestic oil market and assured 
"French" crude oil production. And although this required 
pervasive state intervention, the state placed few con-
straints on the function of the international market. As 
Saumon and Puiseux point out, these various methods of 
state intervention "were never used to limit or direet the 
use of petroleum products" (p. 141). Indeed, although both 
major French oil companies-CFP and ERAP-were 
nominally controlled by the state, they followed essentially 
the same policies as the international majors: maximize 
sales, stimulate demand through pricing policies, and the 
like. 
In short, as France's economy began to open up with the 
creation of the Common Market, state aetions in the energy 
sector seemed less and less guided by a plan. With oil prices 
dropping on the world market and the international com-
petitiveness ofFrench industry supplanting energy indepen-
dence as the major concern of public officials, market forees 
increasingly dictated the patterns of French energy con-
sumption throughout the 1960s. 
Official expression of this change in priorities was re-
flected in the 1968 report of PEON, Annex 7: "It is futile to 
hope to attain ... total independence at a time when the 
national economies are dependent upon each other in an 
ever-increasing manner. Then what is independence? It is 
possible to define the potential for economic independence as 
the capacity to maintain economic competitiveness for the 
long term and on an international scale, without letting this 
capacity be at the mercy of decisionmaking centers that 
would no longer be controlled by a national or multinational 
collectivity."17 In other words, the principal criterion of 
independence is economic competitiveness. 
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ENERGY AND THE ECONOMY IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In the years immediately following the Second World 
War, Dutch policymakers were confronted with a cluster of 
economic problems that required prompt attention: 
• Approximately one-third of the Netherland's national 
wealth had been lost under German occupation. 
• Important traditional trade patterns had been seriously 
disrupted by the war; Indonesia, Holland's principal de-
pendency before the war, became independent, and Ger-
many, one of the country's largest pre-war markets, faced 
major rebuilding. 
• The population of the Netherlands was growing at an 
uncomfortably rapid rate-the working population of the 
Netherlands increased approximately 12 pereent between 
1950 and 1960. 
• Its industrial base was not as highly developed as was its 
European neighbors'. 
The options available to government officials were se-
verely circumscribed. Although modernization of the tradi-
tionally important agricultural sector was required, mech-
anization only exacerbated the acute employment situation, 
and the surpius labor could not be absorbed by increases in 
industrial production because the domestic economy pro-
vided too small a market. Taking into account such con-
straints, Dutch officials finally adopted a strategy of indus-
trial development that emphasized exports. To guarantee 
the competitiveness of Dutch products on the world market, 
the government pursued an active incomes policy to hold 
down wages and prices. 
The success of this strategy was reflected in the perfor-
mance of the Dutch economy over the next two decades: 
between 1949 and 1960, the volume of industrial exports 
rose approximately 400 percent; overall, net national in-
come had risen from Fl 17.06 billion in 1950 to Fl 61.69 
billion by 1965; and the gross domestic product increased at 
a rate of 4.8 pereent a year between 1950 and 1960 and 5 
pereent a year from 1960 to 1965.18 Along with this success 
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went the search for energy sources to fuel the economic 
expansion. 
As in both France and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
in the N etherlands reconstruction of the eco no my following 
the Second World War was based primarily on restoration of 
domestic coal production, though the ratio of production to 
total consumption represented a somewhat higher level of 
energy dependence than that of either France or West Ger-
many.19 By the late 1950s, however, the Dutch coal indus-
try, like that in other European countries, was encountering 
the problems caused by the dramatic decline in oil prices and 
American coal prices. 
In contrast to West Germany, where the government-at 
least initially-had neither the means nor the inclination to 
intervene directly in the marketplace, Dutch officials pos-
sessed several of the technical resources required to proteet 
their coal sector from competing coal imports, had the gov-
ernment desired to do so. In 1902, the Dutch government 
had established the State Mines (Staatsmijnen) to prevent 
foreign control of the coal industry. Through the mid-1960s, 
State Mines controlled 60 pereent ofproduction; the remain-
der was owned primarily by steel companies (approximately 
25 percent). Management of the government's wage and 
price policy had given officials the experience necessary to 
administer effectively a program designed to save the coal 
industry. Yet, aside from a few rather insignificant mea-
sures, such as discontinuing the issue of licenses for coal 
imports from the United States and promulgating require-
ments for minimum stocks by oil marketers, the government 
did virtually nothing to shield domestic coal from foreign 
competition or even to slow the switch to imported oil. 
lnstead, with the rapid displacement of coal by oil, succes-
sive measures were formulated to eliminate domestic coal 
production. In 1966 an agreement was concluded between 
the Dutch government and State Mines on output reduction, 
measures followed in 1969 by a government announcement 
that all state mine production would end in 1973 and that all 
private mines would close by 1975. These figures tell the 
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story: coal production fell from 11.4 mt to 6. 7 mt between 
1957 and 1968; employment in the industry declined at an 
even faster rate: from 47,245 in 1957 to 18,700 in 1968. 
In deciding to expose the country's chronically uncompe-
titive coal sector to the full force of international competi-
tion, the government accepted an immediate increase in 
Dutch energy dependence and substantial economic disloca-
tions in the coal mining province of Limburg. The reasons 
for strategy that permitted the elimination of an entire 
industrial sector can be found in the role alternative energy 
sources had begun to play in Dutch economic policy. 
Holland's economic prosperity has long been linked to 
foreign trade. Possessing few natural resources, the Neth-
erlands has imported almost all of its raw materials and paid 
for them largely through the sale of finished products 
abroad. By the early 1960s, the value ofimports had cometo 
represent approximately 50 pereent of the national income, 
with exports slightly less. 20 In this light, growing energy 
dependence as a consequence of increasing energy imports 
appeared insignificant, especially as the Netherlands was in 
an excellent position to benefit from transformations in the 
international energy market then underway. 
First, Royal Dutch Shell, one of the largest and most 
powerful oil companies in the world, had its headquarters in 
the Netherlands and Dutch interests held 60 pereent of the 
shares. With Dutch Shell occupying an extremely important 
position in the Dutch economy, both tended to profit from 
increasing oil trade. 
Second, the port of Rotterdam was ideally situated to 
serve the rapidly expanding oil markets of central and 
northern Europe. The international majors were reassured 
by the Dutch government's refusal to prop up its ailing coal 
sector, which signaled its commitment to a freely competi-
tive energy market, and by the importance of Royal Dutch 
Shell in the country. Thus, corporate investment soon 
pushed Rotterdam to the forefront of the international oil 
trade. Extensive transshipment, storage, and petrochemical 
facilities were developed, along with what was to become the 
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largest retining complex on earth. Because approximately 
80 pereent of the volume passing through Rotterdam was 
destined for re-export-much of it in the form of refined 
products-the income and jobs these activities added to the 
Dutch economy were significant. 
Third, as we saw earlier, competitiveness on the interna-
tional market was perceived as the key to economic prosper-
ity. Industrial production for the world export market was to 
provide the domestic employment to accommodate an in-
creasing work force. And while the government's incomes 
policy was the major tool used to hold down production costs, 
a policy allowing low-cost energy imports to displace more 
expensive domestic coal fitted well with such an export 
strategy.21 
Fourth, in an energy development of equal or greater 
importance, a huge natural gas field was discovered in the 
province of Groningen. In 1959, the exploration efforts of a 
company formed jointly by Shell and Esso-NAM or Ne-
derlandse Aardolie Matschappij-had finally paid off with 
the natural gas finds of the Slochteren field and the acqui-
sition ofthe concession to all ofGroningen by 1963, although 
ata cost. Under Dutch mining law, no concession had to be 
granted until oil or gas had been found; the government, 
therefore, was ab le to dictate the terms of the concession. In 
this case, the oil companies were forced to take on the state 
as a partner. Dutch State Mines took 40 pereent interest in 
NAM, which was to be responsible for exploration, produc-
tion, and marketing of the Slochteren gas and each of the 
international majors received 30 percent. Gasunie, which 
was to handle inland transportation and wholesale distribu-
tion of the gas from all sources, was jointly controlled by 
Shell (25 percent), Esso (25 percent), Dutch State Mines (40 
percent), and the Dutch government (10 percent). 22 
Initially NAM formulated a sales strategy for an orderly 
marketing of the natural gas, which was to discipline the 
ra te of expansion. 23 But with the price of oil ehe ap and 
continuing to decline, the recent commercial discoveries of 
natural gas in the North Sea, and developments in the 
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United States during the early 1960s that fostered expecta-
tions of abundant, safe nuclear energy within twenty years, 
this strategy was quickly supplanted by plans to exploit the 
gas as quickly as possible. Massive long-term export con-
tracts were concluded with French, Belgian, German, and 
Italian companies, so that, by 1973, natural gas exports 
accounted for 48 pereent of total domestic production. With 
the lowering of internal prices, the domestic conversion to 
natural gas, particularly in most end uses, was very swift. 
Where in 1965 oil had 65 pereent of domestic energy con-
sumption and natural gas had 5 percent, by 1973, natural 
gas and oil had equal shares of 4 7 percent. 
Thus market forees largely dictated energy policy choices 
in the Netherlands between 1950 and the early 1970s. The 
results can be seen in the accompanying table. 24 
The state coal industry was sacrificed to cheaper energy 
sources on the world market and to increasing interests in 
the gas sector. Official energy policy objectives remained 
unarticulated, although energy costs and their effects on 
economic activity were accorded primary importance. Be-
cause the international energy market appeared to be func-
tioning satisfactorily for Dutch interests, the government 
made few systematic efforts to anticipate future develop-
ments. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
WORLD ENERGY MARKET, 1970-73 
Between 1970 and 1973, the international energy market 
underwent a rapid, thorough transformation. The declining 
prices that had characterized the buyers' market of the 
1960s were being replaced by a sellers' market in which the 
price of oil rose to levels that were considered at the time 
exorbitant. Further, the relationship between oil company 
and producer country was being altered fundamentally. 
Both changes were closely tied to the growing influence of 
OPEC. 
In virtually all advanced industrial countries of the West 
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Dutch Energy Consumption Patterns in Percentages of 
the Total 
25 
Coal Oi! Natural Gas 
1950 76.6 22.8 0.7 
1955 66.9 32.3 0.8 
1960 49.2 49.3 1.5 
1965 30.0 64.9 5.1 
1970 10.5 57.1 32.4 
1971 7.6 52.4 40.0 
1972 5.8 49.1 45.0 
and Japan, consumption of oil had been increasing almost 
exponentially. The United States was no exception, but 
there was one major difference. One of the largest markets 
in the world, the United States had been largely self-suf-
ficient, where Western Europe andJapan relied heavily on 
imports of oil from the Middle East. The relatively small 
amounts of oil imported by the United States-less than 10 
pereent of total energy consumption in 1970-came primar-
ily from nearby Canada and Venezuela. This situation be-
gan to change by the early 1970s. 
Because of price controis and the depletion of domestic 
fields, oil production in the United States was starting to 
level off. In addition, Venezuela had begun to limit produc-
tion in order to conserve reserves, and Canada had started to 
impose ceilings on exports. Unable to meet its burgeoning 
demand for oil from these former sources, the United States 
increasingly went outside the Western Hemisphere. By 
1973, 35 pereent of oil and natural gas (15 pereent of its total 
energy consumption) was imported, with most of it coming 
from the Middle East.25 Given the already large and grow-
ing requirements in Western Europe andJapan for Middle 
Eastern oil, the stage was set for oil producers to exploit the 
situation. 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) was created in 1960 in response to the drop in oil 
prices. Although somewhat successful in stabilizing reve-
26 Politics and Nuclear Power 
nues, the member countries were unable to bring about any 
price increase, largely because of surpius supp li es persisting 
through much of the 1960s.26 However, in the wake of a 
military coup in Libya in September 1969 that placed 
Muammar Qaddafi in charge of the country, this began to 
change. 
Basing its claims on Libya's proximity to the major mar-
kets of Western Europe and the desirability of Libyan low-
sulfur crude in those markets because of the importance of 
the environment as a political issue in the West, the Qaddafi 
government demanded aprice increase for its oil. Exploiting 
the vulnerability of several independents in Libya-Occi-
dental in particular-to threats of reduced oil production, 
loss of concessions, and the like, the Qaddafi government 
finally ohtained more favorable terms from Occidental in 
September 1970. The other independents as well as the 
majors soon followed. 
The vulnerability of the independents was related to the 
relative absence of concessions elsewhere. The majors, in 
contrast, could shift production to other fields in the Middle 
East ifLibyan production were restricted. The independents 
were unwilling to roaintaina united bargaining front with 
the majors against the Libyan government uniess lost pro-
duction was assured by the majors at cost. This, the majors 
were unwilling to do.27 
Following this graphic demonstration of the enhanced 
bargaining power ofproducer countries, other arrangements 
were concluded. The oil companies and the OPEC countries 
of the Persian Gulf concluded the Tehran Agreement of 
February 1971 and the Mediterranean parties concluded the 
Tripoli Accord of April 1971, firmly establishing the price-
setting prerogatives of the producer countries. The effect 
was a jump in the posted price which, in certain regions, 
exceeded $3.00 per barrel, a tremendous increase from the 
1969 posted price of $1.80 (the actual selling price was $1.00 
to $1.10). 
In addition to wresting away the power to set the price of 
oil, producer countries used their new-found leverage to 
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accelerate demands for full control over their resources. 
Within two years, by 1973, virtually every country in the 
Middle East had concluded agreements with the oil compa-
nies calling for 25 pereent participation. The exceptions 
were Algeria, Iraq, and Libya, which nationalized the for-
eign oil companies operating in their countries, and Iran, 
where the government finally acquired full control of its 
operations in 1973, although the oil sector had been nation-
alized since 1952.28 
The OPEC countries were now in a position to determine 
production as well as pricing policy, reversing the previously 
existing relationship between oil company and producer. 
Combined with changes in German, French, and Dutch 
energy patterns over the previous decade, these events pre-
cipitated a reassessment of national energy strategies. 
NATIONAL ENERGY POLICIES RECONSIDERED 
In spite ofWest German efforts to slow the transition from 
coal to oil, energy imported into the country rose from 6 
pereent oftotal energy consumption in 1957 to 55 pereent by 
1972; in France, the growing dependence on imported en-
ergy was equally dramatic-from 38 pereent in 1960 to 66.6 
pereent in 1970. As long as oil had remained inexpensive, 
abundant, and accessible, energy dependence was not per-
ceived as a serious problem. With the transformation of the 
world energy market in the early 1970s, however, these 
assumptions quickly became obsolete. 
Before these developments, W est German government 
officials had shown little inclination to tamper with their 
domestic oil sector, despite the dominant position enjoyed by 
the international majors in this market. Collectively, the 
international majors owned 75 pereent of the refining facil-
ities in the Federal Republic and controlled over 50 pereent 
of the distribution outlets.29 Equal aecess was granted to all 
companies, domestic or foreign; and even in instances where 
a major took over a German oil company, the government 
remained strictly neutral. In 1966, for example, there was a 
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takeover of Deutsche Erdoel by Texaco; and during the same 
period, Mobil increased its participation in the distribution 
chain Aral from 11 pereent to 29 percent, while Shell and 
Esso had gained control of the German oil company Elwer-
ath.30 
By the late 1960s, however, the government was becoming 
much less sanguine about the predominance of the foreign 
companies in the oil market. These concerns initially were 
due less to OPEC, which hadn't yet begun to flex its muscles, 
than to three other factors. First, the Western Hemisphere 
(United States, Canada, Venezuela) was no longer in a 
position to serveas a reserve for Western Europeincase of 
supply difficulties in the Middle East and Northern Africa. 
(During the 1956 Arab-Israeli War, the United States had 
supplied oil to Western Europe until the Suez Canal was 
reopened and the regular supply restored; during the 1967 
war, the United States again offered aid, but the supply 
situation was such that the Europeans didn't need it.) Second, 
as theUnited States was fast becoming the largest consumer 
of Middle Eastern oil, it was also emerging as a powerful 
competitor for oil in that region. Third, as a consequence, 
U.S.-based international majors were becoming subject to 
American government pressure during periods of crisis. 
First indications of the growing West German concern 
appeared toward the end of 1968, as the French oil company 
CFP made a bid for the Dresdener Bank' s minority holdings 
in Gelsenberg, the largest remaining German-controlled oil 
company and the only one with worthwhile overseas conces-
sions. Just before the deal was concluded, the federal gov-
ernment intervened. Forbidding the sale of Dresdener's 
holdings to foreign interests, the government arranged for 
the purchase of Gelsenberg (Dresdener's shares plus those 
owned by the Deutsche Bank) by the public utility RWE.31 
This was followed by a second initiative in February 1969: 
the establishment of a national oil organization called De-
minex (Deutsche Erdoelversorgungsgesellschaft). 
Composed of eight German companies, Deminex was a 
government-sponsored effort to strengthen the crude oil 
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base of German oil companies either through exploration, 
acquiring production rights in proven fields overseas, by 
participation in the exploration ventures of other groups, or 
by long-term purchasing arrangements. German oil compa-
nies, with the possible exception of Gelsenberg, had virtu-
ally no directly-owned crude oil. During periods of surplus, 
this created no problem since oil could be purchased on the 
spot market at bargain prices. But in times of tight oil 
supply, which were developing in the late 1960s because of 
the closing of the Suez Canal and a subsequent temporary 
tanker shortage, these oil companies had to rely on higher-
priced crude purchased from those controlling production-
primarily the international majors. 
Finally, by 1973, proposals were in the works for the 
creation of a strong national oil company to operate inter-
nationally. Energy officials in Bonn had drawn certain con-
clusions from recent events in the Middle East. They be-
lieved that producer countries were no longer content simply 
to increase oil revenues; rather, these countries wanted to 
use their wealth to further economic development. They 
were, therefore, interested in finding potential partners able 
to help in the industrialization of their countries. The inter-
national majors were less suited and less willing to engage 
in the type of state-trading arrangements preferred by the 
producer countries. With Veba-a large, German-owned en-
ergy concern in which the government already held 40 
pereent interest-to serve as the nucleus, a state company 
would be able to take advantage of changes in the interna-
tional market and provide a negotiating partner able to 
accommodate the interests ofproducing countries and at the 
same time profit from new aecess to crude oil. 
Thus, the early 1970s contained the seeds of a new era in 
German energy policy. Although stiil in the initial stages, 
the scope of government energy policy had enlarged appre-
ciably. No longer restricted to the coal sector, industrial 
reorganization in the oil sector was impending. In addition, 
the environmental ramifications of energy policy choices 
were becoming more politically salient. Finally, as we will 
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see later, nuclear energy was on the threshold oflarge-scale 
application and this would bring greater government in-
volvement in development and regulation. 
Recent changes in the world energy market also led to a 
reevaluation of energy strategies in the other two countries 
of this study, although the resulting initiatives were consid-
erably more modest than in Germany. For Dutch officials, 
the unsettling developments in the Middle East combined 
with growing fears that gas supplies might be exhausted 
sooner than anticipated. The consequence was a decision in 
1972 not to conelude any new agreements for the export of 
natural gas and, in order to restrict consumption domesti-
cally, to increase its price. Along with the hoped-for effect on 
conservation, the government decision to allow the price of 
gas to follow that of oil also meant bigher profits without 
increased costs. After long and difficult negotiations, the 
state pushed through an agreement with Shell and Esso, its 
two partners in N AM, calling for a larger state share of the 
profits. Instead of the original 70 percent, the state was to 
receive 85 pereent of the additional profit. 
In France, ill-fated efforts continued throughout the 
1960s to establish an independent crude oil source. These 
attempts largely consisted of cultivating special relation-
ships with Arab oil-producing states. Most ofthe advantages 
sought proved ephemeral. France's privileged position in 
Algeria was terminated in November 1969 when Algeria 
unilaterally raised the price of oil that had been set in the 
1965 agreement. By the end of 1970 the price of Algerian oil 
was aligned with that prevailing on the world market, set at 
Tripoli by OPEC. Finally, in February 1971, all French oil 
interests in Algeria were nationalized. In Iraq, although 
ERAP had ohtaineda large concession in 1969, the govern-
ment subsequently demanded bigher payments than those 
contained in the contract, following the discovery of several 
fields worth developing. As a result, ERAP was purchasing 
55 pereent of its total crude supply-approximately 35 mt-
from American majors by 1973.32 
Consequently, the French government sought ways to 
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lessen the country's vulnerability to aetions by its oil sup-
pliers. As early as 1971, the following measures were pro-
posed at a meeting of the Council of Ministers: 
• Creation of a fund to finance a supplementary effort at 
prospecting by ERAP both offshore and in black Africa. 
• Diversification of supply among the various countries of 
the Middle East. 
• Supplementary stocking of ten million tons, beyond the 
three months' worth of consumption already imposed by 
law. 
• Encouragement of long-term contracts with producer 
countries-Iran for CFP, Iraq for ERAP. 
• Increasing the French share in petroleum transport. 33 No 
apparent urgency was attached to these proposals, how-
ever, since the Ministry of Finance objected to the large 
expenditures that such measures would require; it 
blocked their implementation. Not until the shocks fol-
lowing the 1973-7 4 energy crisis was there a fundarnen-
tal reorientation of French and Dutch energy policies. 
ENERGY CRISES AND THE OPEC CARTEL 
On October 6, 1973, war broke out in the Middle East, 
with Egypt and Syria opposing Israel. The effects of the war 
were worldwide, as OPEC aetions over the following months 
acted to transform the world energy market. 
Of most immediate impact was the decision taken by the 
Arab members of OPEC (OAPEC) on October 17 to cut oil 
production and limit exports on the basis of importing coun-
tries' support for Israel. Initial production cuts were to be at 
least 5 pereent of the previous month's production, to be 
followed by a further 5 pereent cut each subsequent month 
"until Israeli withdrawal is completed and the legal rights of 
the Palestinian people are restored."34 Because of their open 
support for Israel, the United States and the Netherlands 
were to be totally embargoed. 
In March 1974, the embargo was lifted and oil production 
quickly rose to pre-embargo levels, but a precedent had been 
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set that has haunted government officials in the oil import-
ing countries of the West ever since. Concern over the future 
use of embargo as a political weapon, however, was not the 
only legacy of the 1973-7 4 energy crisis. 
Between October 1973 and January 1974, a succession of 
price hikes by OPEC pushed the price of oil from $3.00 to 
$11.65 per barrel. Though slower in developing, the effects of 
this unanticipated increase were devastating in the ad-
vanced industrial economies, as they experienced declining 
economic growth, rising unemployment, and higher infla-
tion (see Table 6). Equally important, however, the effects of 
this fourfold price rise were not limited to the industrial 
democracies. With worldwide demand for oil dropping 
sharply as economic recession deepened, the OPEC cartel 
was to face its first major challenge.35 
Because OPEC was a newly formed cartel that relied on 
price setting rather than production quotas to control the oil 
market, accumulating surpluses threatened an outbreak of 
price competition among exporters wishing to roaintain 
their market share. Predictions of OPEC's collapse prolifer-
ated.36 Yet, despite such pressures and predictions, OPEC 
managed to survive-in no small measure because of the 
central position assumed by Saudi Arabia in the cartel. With 
a large surpius production capacity, huge reserves, and a 
small population that placed comparatively modest de-
mands on oil revenues, the Saudis were able to pursue their 
policy objectives with much greater flexibility than most 
other OPEC members. For countries such as Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, and lraq-states that either 
had large populations or populations large in relation to 
their oil incomes-policies requiring revenue-reducing ac-
tions such as lowering production meant considerable hard-
ship and sacrifice for their development programs. More 
similar to Saudi Arabia in their relatively large production 
capacity, reserves, and small populations-and hence often 
in coalition with them-were countries such as Kuwait and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
By the latter part of 1976, pressures were developing 
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within OPEC-first and foremost from Iran-for a further 
price increase of 15 percent. Because of their assessment of 
their long-term interests, the Saudis strongly opposed these 
efforts. With little need for additional surpius revenues and, 
at the same time, possessing reserves large enough to sus-
tainoil production far into the future, the Saudi leadership 
opposed an OPEC pricing policy that it feared would hasten 
the substitution of alternative energy sources for oil. Unable 
to resolve the disagreement within OPEC, Saudi Arabia 
increased production by 3 mbd, thereby forcing the rest of 
OPEC to compromise during the course of 1977-the price of 
oil rose only 10 percent. Thus, despite lagging demand and 
internal tensions between 1974 and 1978, OPEC held to-
gether. 
There was some slippage in oil prices when the effects of 
world inflation and the depreciation of the dollar were taken 
into account (oil prices were denominated in dollars). One 
writer cited a decline of 15 pereent in purchasing power for 
OPEC, not including a precipitous drop in the value of the 
dollar in 1978. Overall revenues, however, more or less kept 
pace with inflation during the period. This was the result of 
higher taxes on foreign oil company operations and the 
termination of private ownership in the producer countries 
after 1973.37 
By 1978, a state of general equilibrium had been brought 
to the world oil market, in large part because of accelerating 
oil consumption in the United States, accompanied by its 
increasing reliance on Middle Eastern oil. Oil consumption 
had actually declined by 2.3 pereent in Western Europe and 
Japan between 1973 and 1978, but consumption in the 
United States had increased by 12 pereent and imports by 
28.5 pereent over the same period.38 Consequently, when 
about 4 pereent of world oil supplies was lost following the 
collapse of the Shah's government in Iran, there was little 
spare production to buffer the crisis. Panic buying on the 
spot markets ensued, sending prices on those spot market 
transaetions skyrocketing.39 The cohesiveness of the cartel 
was again brought into question. 
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Between December 1978 and October 1979, spot market 
prices jumped from $12.70 to $38 per barrel, with some sales 
rumored to be as high as $50. To cash in on such a bonanza, 
many producers shifted more of their sales to the spot mar-
ket; but more importantly, they used these spot market 
prices to help determine the price in their long-term con-
tracts.40 This, in turn, led to a wholesale disintegration of 
OPEC's existing price structure. 
In June 1980, OPEC made an initial attempt to restore 
some semblance of order to the pricing system, but it was 
unsuccessful. Rather than agreeing on a unified price struc-
ture, members decided to allow prices to range from $32 to 
$37 per barrel. Saudi Arabia, however, refused to go along, 
keeping its price at $28. North African oil was selling for as 
much as $40 to $41 by 1981. 
Again, the Saudis' primary concern was that a rapid 
acceleration of oil prices might threaten the long-term value 
of its massive oil reserves. The foremost objective of Saudi 
policy was to reunify OPEC prices at a lower level. Accord-
ingly, they pushed their output to over 10mbdin 1981. This, 
combined with plummeting demand in the industrialized 
world owing to deep economic recession, conservation, and 
increased non-OPEC output-primarily from the North Sea, 
Mexico, and the North Slope of Alaska-set the conditions 
for just such an outcome. 
With a growing glut on the international oil market, 
many instances of competitive price cutting both within 
and outside OPEC, and predictions of a further decline in 
world demand, a compromise among OPEC members was 
reached in October 1981. A unified price structure was re-
stored, with Saudi marker crude set at $34 per barrel. At 
the same time, Saudi Arabia reduced production from 10 to 
8 mbd. In March 1982, the agreement was supplemented 
by a decision to impose an output ceiling of 17.5 mbd on 
cartel production. 
Pressures on both the price structure and production 
ceiling continued, however, as various members discounted 
prices or ignored the output quotas. Among the chief offend-
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ers were Iran, Nigeria, Libya, Indonesia, and VenezuelaY 
As a consequence, further price reductions to $29 were 
adopted at a meeting of OPEC in March 1983. These were 
followed in October and November 1984 by a lowering of 
quotas from 17.5 to 16 mbd, with Saudi Arabia absorbing 43 
pereent of the cut, after Nigeria reduced the price of its light 
crude by $2 (down to $28), and thereby threatened OPEC's 
official price structure. 
Nigeria lowered its price in response to price cuts for 
Norwegian and British North Sea oil, a light grade crude 
similar to Nigeria's. This type of crude oil had been experi-
encing low demand and spot market prices, because ofrecent 
improvements in retining facilities, which allowed the up-
grading of the cheaper heavy crude into more valuable light 
products. This, in turn, had led to demands from light crude 
producers within OPEC such as the UAE and Nigeria to 
realign the differentials in the official price structure, light 
crude traditionally having been priced $3 higher than heavy 
crude. 
All told, what had been labeled the second oil crisis for the 
industrial democracies also proved the greatest challenge to 
OPEC to that time-a precipitous drop in OPEC's oil pro-
duction from approximately 30mbdin 1980 to 16-17 mbd by 
November 1984, debilitating revenue shortfalls for all but 
the most affiuent members, lingering instances of cheating, 
and a bitter armed conflict between the member states of 
Iran and Iraq.42 Yet, despite all these difficulties, the cartel, 
however battered and bruised, had not broken. 
Even more to the point, if OPEC is not the force it once 
was on the international oil market, consumers of the in-
dustrialized West can take little solace in this perhaps 
transitory eclipse. Consider these points: 
• For the countries of Western Europe, imported oil still 
constitutes a large share of energy consumption. 
• The Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, and the possi-
ble spillover of these conflicts into the Persian Gulfregion 
indicate the tenuous nature of the current oil gl ut. 
• Over the longer term, the power of the Middle Eastern oil 
36 Politics and Nuclear Power 
producers is likely to increase as the market eventually 
tightens, because approximately two-thirds of the world's 
present oil reserves are located within OPEC. 
In the next chapter, I will examine just how the govern-
ments ofWest Germany, France, and the Netherlands have 
responded to the series of dramatic changes in the world 
energy market over the past decade. 
3. The Energy Crises 
of the 1970s 
As we saw in the previous chapter, erosion of the interna-
tional majors' oligopolistic hold on the world oil market led 
to dechning prices through the 1960s. At the time, the 
preference of energy officials in West Germany, France, and 
the Netherlands was to allow the international market to 
determine the shape, content, and direction of national en-
ergy policy. The result was a growing dependence on inex-
pensive, readily available imported oil. Government inter-
vention, when it did occur, had limited aims, such as to 
proteet the German coal sector or to secure French oil sup-
plies. 
With the emergence of OPEC as a force on the world 
energy market by the early 1970s, government officials 
began to reevaluate the basic assumptions underpinning 
their existing energy strategies. Only after the events of 
1973-74, however, did policymakers fully realize the extent 
to which the energy market had been transformed. Such a 
transformation required dramatic responses. To these re-
sponses, we now turn. 
As we will see in the pages that follow, many of the 
general characteristics and policy objectives of the three 
countries were at the outset remarkably similar: 
• Each country acknowledged an active central role for 
government in the formulation and execution of energy 
policy. 
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• Energy policy itself was defined much more comprehen-
sively to indude activities in virtually all energy sectors; 
the interactions of these activities were assessed for their 
effects on future energy patterns; and the implications for 
preferred political, economic, and environmental out-
comes were examined. 
• The overriding rationale or policy objective of each coun-
try's energy strategy was to reduce dependence on im-
ported oil. 
• The rapid expansion of nuclear power was seen as critical 
to the realization of this objective. 
Despite these similarities, significant differences em-
erged in subsequent years, most noticeably in the area of 
nuclear policy. In later chapters, I will analyze in detail the 
respective ability or inability of the French, German, and 
Dutch governments to implement their nuclear programs. 
However, in order to appreciate the importance attached by 
these nations to nuclear power, we must examine its place 
within the broader framework of each nation's overall en-
ergy strategy. That is the task of this chapter. 
THE ENERGY CRISIS AND ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH 
In W est Germany, the immediate effects of the oil pro-
ducers' cutbacks in production and the boycott of strategi-
cally chosen consumer countries were shortfalls of oil sup-
plies over the next months. Compared to October 1973, 
supplies of crude oil were down 7 pereent in November, 12 
pereent in December, and 13 pereent by January. The Fed-
eral Republic was hit especially hard in the light fuel oil 
used for home heating and the gasoline and diesel fuel used 
for transportation, because it had to import 30 pereent of its 
refined fuel needs. During the same months, imports of 
refined products fell 8 percent, 21 percent, and 32 pereent 
respectively. 1 The price increase from DM 76 per ton in 
September 1973 to DM 230 per ton by March 1974 only 
added to the anxiety and uncertainty stemming from decHn-
ing oil supplies. 2 
The Energy Crises of the 1970s 39 
Empowered by hastily-passed legislation, the Law to Se-
cure the Energy Supply (Energieuersorgungsgesetz), the fed-
era! government responded to these events with the impo-
sition of speed limits on November 19, 1973, and a driving 
han for the following four Sundays. Additional measures 
were less specific: the government appealed for energy con-
servation, created a clearing office to help distribute petro-
leum products in case of bottlenecks, and initiated an infor-
mation and reporting system to keep tabs on developments 
in the oil industry. Calls for stronger measures within the 
SPD/FDP government coalition were resisted. Left-wing So-
cial Democrats wanted price controis imposed on oil prod-
ucts; the "Jusos," the official group of younger SPD mem-
bers, even demanded the nationalization of the oil sector.3 
In addition to taking these ad hoc measures to ameliorate 
the most immediate dangers of the supply shortage, the 
government pursued direet negotiations with producer coun-
tries in an attempt to secure agreements on future oil de-
liveries. Under the leadership of Hans Friderichs, the Min-
ister of Economics, an industrial consortium was formed to 
negotiate industrial projects with Iran in return for oil and 
gas supplies; but deals guaranteeing oil supplies in return 
for industrial cooperation were not immediately forthcom-
ing. By fall 1974, a barter deal was concluded with Saudi 
Arabia in which certain industrial projects were exchanged 
for the delivery of 12 million tons of oil over a three-year 
period, but no guarantee against embargo was included in 
the agreement.4 These efforts to acquire more secure sup-
plies of oil through barter deals proved less successful than 
originally hoped for, although negotiations did continue 
with various producer countries. Subsequent industrial 
agreements did help in the recycling of petrodollars and in 
maintaining a favorable halanee of payments. 
On the whole, the Federal Republic came through the 
crisis period in fairly good shape. Without price controls, 
more petroleum products entered the German market than 
might have otherwise done so; during the first seven months 
of 1974, the country enjoyed a DM 16 billion balance-of-
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payments surplus; and the inflation rate remained virtually 
unchanged, at about 7 percent. But the nation didn't emerge 
unscathed from the experience. There had been a decline in 
real GNP in 1974 instead of the 5 pereent rate of growth in 
1973 anda subsequent doubling of the unemployment rate-
4 pereent by the latter part of 197 4-thus provoking ques-
tions about the exact relationship between economic growth 
and energy consumption. 5 There was also concern about the 
future use of the oil weapon following its first effective 
application. 
In France, the oil embargo and price hikes triggered by 
the Y om Kippur war were initially greeted somewhat non-
chalantly by the French government, in spite of the coun-
try's high dependence on imported oil. Having been desig-
nated as friendly by the Arab oil producers, France was not 
to suffer any supply restrictions. In sharp contrast to other 
European countries, such as West Germany, France did 
virtually nothing to reduce oil consumption.6 It soon became 
clear, however, that France would not be untouched by the 
crisis. One reason was that, despite France' s exemption from 
the oil embargo, oil imports had begun to decline, albeit only 
3 pereent under the previous year-this in contrast to a 
decline of 11 pereent in German oil imports over the first 
half of 197 4. The decline in French oil imports resulted 
largely from an informal decision by the oil companies to 
divert oil from exempted markets to those more affected by 
the embargo. 7 But more important than the import reduc-
tion, although the effects were somewhat slower in mani-
festing themselves, was the fourfold increase in oil prices, 
which was beginning to have a devastating impact on 
France's balance-of-payments position. Whereas 1972 
showeda F 1.46 billion surplus, the halanee ofpayments fell 
to a F 3 billion deficit in 1973 and a F 28.8 billion deficit the 
following year. N evertheless, i ni tial responses in France to 
the energy crisis were limited primarily to attempts to 
conelude bilateral state-to-state deals with oil producers. 
The Netherlands, uniike France, was designated as un-
friendly by the Arab oil exporters, and as such, was hit by a 
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total oil embargo. The Dutch government rapidly imple-
mented emergency measures-a han on Sunday driving; 
speed limits, initially through request and later by law; 
lowering of temperatures in public buildings, offices, and 
factories; replacement of heavy oil by coking coal in steel 
production; altering methods used in power plants which 
normally changed over from gas to oil with cold weather; 
temporary rationing of gasoline; and the like. In retrospect, 
these measures proved more than adequate. Despite the 
embargo, stocks of oil stored in the country during the last 
quarter of 1973 and the first quarter of 1974 were sufficient 
to cover 110 days requirements, the highest in the European 
Community-a situation largely attributable to the redis-
tributive activities of the international majors. Yet, al-
though the Netherlands had managed to avoid the more 
proximate dangers accompanying the energy crisis, the em-
bargo went far to finish undermining the assumptions that 
had guided Dutch energy policy into the 1970s. It was clear 
that the international oil market no longer assured the 
Netherlands of an adequate, comparatively inexpensive en-
ergy supply. 
Thus, the events of 1973-74 reminded government offi-
eiais-and impressed the general public-in all three coun-
tries that energy had become an integral companent of most 
activities of modern society and that an automatic supply of 
this energy was no longer a foregone conclusion. Those in 
positions ofresponsibility resigned themselves toa complete 
reconsideration of their nations' energy strategies. 
NATIONAL ENERGY STRATEGIES 
By the latter part of 1974, oil prices had stabilized, pro-
duction had returned to normal, and signs of an oil gl ut even 
were beginning to appear on the world market. With the 
most immediate dislocations of the energy crisis having 
passed, government officials were ready for a fundamental 
reassessment of their national energy strategies. 
The West German minister of economics, Hans Fri-
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derichs, wrote in 197 4, "An energy policy is one of the main 
political tasks today. The supreme responsibility of the state 
for a secure, adequate and, in the long term, viable energy 
supply which also takes into account the needs of environ-
mental protection, requires an integrated, comprehensive 
strategy."8 
He thus acknowledged a fundamental change in the in-
terpretation of government responsibility in the energy sec-
tor. Rather than being limited to the protection of a declin-
ing coal sector, government policy would now indude the 
overall securing of low-cost energy supplies in the short, 
medium, and long term, while respecting the needs for 
environmental protection. Energy policy was to be viewed 
much more comprehensively. 
The first significant step toward a comprehensive long-
term energy strategy was the publication of an energy pro-
graro for the Federal Republic on September 26, 1973.9 But 
the course of events quickly invalidated many of the pro-
gram's estimates and assumptions. Within days of its pub-
lication, the Yom Kippur war had erupted; within weeks the 
Arab countries had announced cutbacks in oil production 
and an oil embargo; and within months the price of oil had 
more than quadrupled. In October 1974, the program was 
revised. 
Although similar to the original1973 program, the 1974 
revision contained several shifts in emphasis. The most 
significant was the new goal of reducing the country's de-
pendence on imported oil; the original program had been 
intended to stabilize the proportion of annual oil consump-
tion over the next decade. (For a comparison of the original 
program with the first revision, see Tables 7 and 8.) 
The revised program was to reduce the share of oil to 44 
pereent oftotal energy consumption by 1985, 10 pereent less 
than projected in the original program. This was to be 
achieved in three ways. First, the use of nuclear energy and 
natural gas would be accelerated. The installation of 45,000 
MW or possibly 50,000 MW production capacity by 1985 was 
deemed necessary if nuclear energy was to play its role in 
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reducing dependence on oil; this would be approximately 40 
pereent of total electricity production. Natural gas was to 
assume an 18 pereent share of total consumption by 1985, 
where the 1973 program had called for 15 percent. Second, 
coal production was to be roaintained at the 1973 level of 94 
million tons through 1980, rather than reducing coal output 
to 83 million tons by 1978. And third, greater effort was to 
be made in the area of energy conservation.10 The federal 
government then set out to implement the major elements of 
this energy program-with varying degrees of success. 
The coal sector experienced a short-lived resurgence fol-
lowing the oil embargo; but it soon reverted to its permanent 
state of crisis. A worldwide recession in the steel industry, 
combined with stagnating demand for electricity as well as 
declining energy consumption in general, resulted in lower 
coal sales, growing stockpiles, increasing losses, and contin-
ued government subsidization. In 1974 and 1975, coal con-
sumption had dropped 14 pereent below the 1973 level. By 
December 1977, record stockpiles of coal, exceeding 33 mil-
lion tons, had accumulated withasurpius production capac-
ity of 15 million tons per year. This translated into losses for 
Ruhrkohle of DM 400 million in 1977 and government 
subsidies totaling over DM 8.7 billion between 1974 and 
1977-3 billion in 1977 alone.U These events, combined 
with the legal problems encountered in the construction of 
new coal-fueled power plants, played havoc with govern-
ment efforts to roaintain coal consumption at the level called 
for in the first revision. 
Although construction on a number of coal-burning power 
plants were said to be affected, the grievances of the coal 
sector coalesced around the thwarted plans of the Steag 
utility to expand the capacity of its plant at Voerde from 
1400 to 2100 MW. Approved by the government licensing 
authorities in North Rhine-Westphalia, the decision was 
appealed by a local citizens' initiative. In summer 1976, the 
higher court stopped construction on the grounds that it 
would add to the already high level of air pollution afflicting 
the area. 
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The coal interests were especially vocal in their criticism 
of this ruling since the proposed power plant would have 
complied with the emission standards announced by the 
BMI in conjunction with the implementation of the Federal 
Anti-Emission Act of 1974, in which the maximum permis-
sible concentration of air pollutants-approximately fifty 
types of particulate matter and thirty gases-had been de-
fined in what was called the "Technical Specification-Air" 
(Technische Anleitung-Luft, or TA-Luft) and were to serve 
as guidelines for government licensing agencies. The judges, 
however, interpreted the st:mdards as defined in TA-Luft as 
offering only orientation points; as an executive directive, 
the government licensing bodies were bound by these stan-
dards but, as TA-Luft was not incorporated in the law as 
passed by parliament, the courts were not. 
In December 1977, a second revision of the energy pro-
gram was announced. Despite the problems that we have 
discussed, it called for coal to reassert its key role in German 
energy supply. Accordingly, the following measures were 
proposed or subsequently set forth while the plan was being 
implemented. First, government expenditures of DM 4.1 
billi on were to be used for the financing of such programs as 
the Third Power Generation Law and coking coal subsidies. 
Second, to eliminate uncertainties and facilitate the con-
struction of new coal-fueled power plants, the Federal Anti-
Emission Act was to be revised or amended so as to make the 
standards contained in TA-Luft legally binding rather than 
simply an administrative requirement. The manner in 
which this was to be implemented was not specified; how-
ever, the government stipulated that the proposals should 
give careful consideration to "reconciling the need for envi-
ronmental protection and the conditions for employment 
and economic growth." This phrase reflected an interminis-
terial struggle between the Ministry of the Interior, which 
interpreted the proposals as a weakening of air pollution 
standards as well as a challenge to its executive preroga-
tives, and the Economics Ministry, which was feeling pres-
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sure from its clientele in the coal sector. Ultimately, the 
objections raised by Interior were overruled in the cabinet. 
As far as the substantive proposals were concerned, two 
alternatives were being considered: the explicit inclusion of 
TA- Luft in the Federal Anti-Emission Law, thereby binding 
the courts to those emission standards in every case, or the 
adoption of a presumption clause (Vermutungsklausel), 
meaning that if plants observed the TA-Luft standards, it 
would be presumed, in general, that no harm was being 
done. To this extent, the courts would be bound, but it would 
also enable special regional circumstances to be considered. 
Third, under strong government pressure in 1980, the 
coal-mining industry and public utilities concluded an 
agreement that committed the utilities to gradually in-
crease the use of domestic coal in power generation through 
1995. An amendment to the Third Power Generation Law, 
adding an additional DM 2 billion to the price paid for 
electricity beginning in 1978, paved the way for this agree-
ment. Finally, a DM 1 billion program was adopted in 
October 1981 to support the development of coal gasification 
technologies. 
These measures notwithstanding, the coal sector re-
mains a source of concern, despite (or perhaps, in part, 
because of) large state subsidies for coal. In 1980, subsidies 
were estimated to be more than DM 6 billion. 12 Production 
capacity continues to run far ahead of demand. By mid-1983, 
stockpiles of unsold coal approached 35 mt, an arnount 
representing approximately five months' supply. In re-
sponse, the government, with the approval of mine manage-
ment and the unions, adopted a program to reduce produc-
tion through a series of adjustment shifts-periods during 
which miners would not mine, although they would stiil be 
paid, albeit at lower rates. 
Although the primary objective of German energy policy 
was to reduce the country's dependence on imported oil, the 
government program acknowledged that the Federal Repub-
lic would have to rely on oil imports for a substantial share 
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of its energy supply well into the future. Accordingly, gov-
ernment efforts in the oil sector focused on securing as 
reliable and low-cost supplies as possible. This meant, 
among other things, obtaining direet aecess to crude oil 
either by state-trading arrangements or independent explo-
ration. The instruments chosen for these tasks were V eba 
and Deminex. By early 1975, a merger between Veba an 
Gelsenberg had been completed and Deminex was reorga-
nized. The number of companies participating in Deminex 
was reduced from eight to four, with Veba receiving a ma-
jority share. Accompanying this reorganization was agov-
ernment commitment of DM 800 million from 1975-80. 
Also, a major change was undertaken in operating proce-
dures: the companies belonging to the group had first to offer 
each prospective project to Deminex and only ifit was turned 
down could a company then go on its own.13 Despite contin-
ued government support, Deminex has, as yet, made only a 
relatively small contribution to German-controlled crude oil 
production in foreign countries. It produced 2.4 mt in 1981, 
this out oftotal imports approaching 84 mt crude (120.7 mt 
when petroleum products are included). 14 
Asi de from Deminex, developments in the German energy 
market as well have rendered the creation of a national oil 
company more a source of vexation than a valuable instru-
ment for government policy. Economic recession, warm win-
ters, and modest success in conservation had the conse-
quence oflowering heavy fuel oil consumption. This, in turn, 
resulted in excess production by oil refineries in the Federal 
Republic. (Unlike the United States market where refiner-
ies are heavily oriented toward the production of gasoline, 
the German market is such that heavy fuel oil constitutes 
one of the major products of the refining process.) This 
situation was exacerbated by several factors. In the early 
1970s, the federal government had encouraged refinery con-
struction in order to reduce the arnount of refined products 
that had to be imported into West Germany. The result was 
excess capacity. Further, the government continued to push 
for coal consumption by means of the power generating laws. 
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The trend in the early 1970s to build natural gas fueled 
power plants also reduced the demand for heavy fuel oil. 
Finally, nuclear power plants were beginning to come on 
line. As a result of all this, production was cut back so 
drastically that the refineries in the Federal Republic were 
operating at only 50 to 60 pereent capacity throughout much 
of the period between 1975 and 1977. 
Under different circumstances, losses from heavy fuel oil 
sales could have been made up through rises in gasoline and 
light fuel oil prices. These products still were very much in 
demand, but the supply was decHning because of the overall 
cutback in refining. (There is a fixed ratio of products pro-
duced in the refining process; the ratio can be altered but 
only with some cost and difficulty.) With a general surplus 
of oil prevailing in the European oil market, however, inde-
pendent German importers were able to purchase refined 
products at bargain prices on the Rotterdam market. In 
order to remain competitive and retain their customers, the 
domestic refiners were forced to hold down their prices to 
levels near those of the independent importers. 
All oil companies operating in the German market were 
affected by sagging demand, refinery over-capacity, and 
competition from independent importers, but the interna-
tional majors appeared to be in a much better position to 
absorb the losses. For one, they enjoyed a certain arnount of 
flexibility because of their international operations. In ad-
dition, a large share of those products being imported from 
Rotterdam came from their refineries. But most important 
was the internationals' ownership of practically all oil and 
gas production in the Federal Republic. The shares were 
Esso, 28 percent; Shell, 28 percent; Texaco, 21 percent; and 
Mobil, 12 percent. This production, although comparatively 
small, provided substantial revenues after the sharp price 
increases in 1974-an estimated DM 1.8 billion by May 1975 
alone. 15 Veba, on the other hand, enjoyed none of these 
advantages. As could perhaps be anticipated, the types of 
demands made on government were not uniform throughout 
the industry. 
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In certain areas, general agreement did exist among all 
oil companies. They were quite unified in their demands for 
an end to the tax on fuel oil, no additional support for 
German coal, and the elimination of competitive distortions 
resulting from government reserve regulations. The govern-
ment required a sixty-five day reserve (ninety day after 
October 1976) for all companies refining in the Federal 
Republic, whereas the reserves required for independent 
importers were substantially less-the consequence being 
an estimated DM 6 to 7 per ton price advantage. 16 
Splits over two issues developed between the "haves"-
the German subsidiaries of the international majors owning 
domestic oil production-and the "have nots"-V eba, joined 
by BP, both of which lacked domestic production. The first 
was a windfall profits tax; V eba called for a tax on profits 
resulting from domestic oil production in order to reduce 
what it perceived to be an unfair competitive advantage for 
the majors. The second issue was government regulation of 
the domestic oil market. Veba wanted prerogatives like 
those enjoy ed by national oil companies in most of the other 
countries of Western Europe. Veba, as the chosen instru-
ment of government oil policy, demanded that restrictions or 
taxes be imposed on imports of refined products in the 
Federal Republic. This proposal was not well received in 
the Economics ministry. Not only did it directly contradict 
German post-war economic canon, but its adoption, in all 
likelihood, would have resulted in considerably higher fuel 
costs, thereby adding to inflationary pressures. Up to this 
time, West Germany had enjoyed relatively low energy costs 
compared with most of its European neighbors, a situation 
largely attributable to its unrestricted oil market. 
The second revision of the energy program provided an 
opportunity to respond to these conflicting pressures. The 
government, however, restricted itself to the problem of 
inequalities in competition stemming from stockpiling re-
quirements. The only concrete proposal was to create a 
public corporation toassume the costs of the reserve system, 
holding compulsory reserves equal to sixty-five days con-
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sumption, while the refineries would be required to hold 
reserves for twenty-five production days. The structural 
problems in the retining industry were not directly ad-
dressed, and the issue of windfall profits tax was avoided 
altogether. 
As a consequence, a crisis of abundance persisted through 
1978, the positive side being the relatively low-cost energy 
supphes enjoyed by the German consumer because of the 
inexpensive refined products purchased in Rotterdam by 
independent importers. These conditions were quickly re-
versed in 1978-79, however, when the Iranian revolution 
disrupted the world oil supply. 
With the scramble among consumers for limited supphes 
of oil sending the price skyrocketing on the spot market, the 
domestic repercussions were soon felt. For the independent 
importers, who by this time had acquired 40 pereent of the 
German market in refined fuels, the developments were 
ruinous. Oil supplies, if available at all, could only be pur-
chased on the Rotterdam market at prices well above those 
the international majors had to pay for their contracted 
purchases. This meant that the independent importers were 
no longer able to buy cheap on the spot market and underbid 
the German subsidiaries of the majors. Indeed, the interna-
tional majors, now enjoying a competitive advantage, were 
able to drive many of the independents out of the market 
and, at the same time, show handsome profits. For the 
German consumer, the combination of higher oil prices and 
reliance on the spot market for a large share of its refined 
products meant considerably greater fuel costs. In 1979, the 
price of heating oil more than doubled, making it the most 
expensive among countries of the EC. As these higher en-
ergy costs passed through the economy, inflationary pres-
sures mounted. Although the Federal Republic's 1979 infla-
tion ra te was low compared with that of other countries, half 
of it was attributable to oil price increases. 
As a consequence of these changing circumstances, the 
federal government was faced with a new set of demands. In 
the wake ofrapidly rising energy costs and reassuring state-
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ments from the international majors in the United States 
that their profits derived primarily from their foreign oper-
ations, West Germany being one of their largest markets, 
consumer groups and organized labor dusted off long-dor-
mant demands for controis to guard against suspected 
large-scale abuses by the oil companies. 
By 1981, however, conditions again reversed: an oil glut 
on the world market, decHning sales of petroleum products 
domestically, and refining capacity operating at close to the 
technical minimum (just below 57 pereent of capacity from 
1981 through 1983), resulted in large losses for many of the 
oil compani es operating in Germany, thereby exacerbating 
friction between the haves and the have nots. 17 
Thus, in less than eight years, the German oil sector has 
been characterized by tight supply anda four-fold price hike, 
a period of stable costs and large surpluses succeeded by 
rapidly rising prices and restricted supp ly, followed in turn 
by stagnating domestic demand anda world oil gl ut. To date, 
government initiatives have been little help in coping with 
the shifting sets of problems, political demands, and inter-
ested constituencies that have accompanied each change. 
Perhaps in acknowledgement of its ineffectiveness, the 
government apparently has abandoned its strategy of hav-
ing a large national oil firm act as a counterweight to the 
international majors in the German oil market, accepting 
the costs as well as the benefits of a largely open, unregu-
lated oil market. In 1983, the government announced that it 
was reducing its stake in V eba from 43.75 to 30 percent, an 
action preceded in 1978 by an agreement between V eba and 
BP that, in essence, provided marginally greater domestic 
refining and distribution to the international majors. 18 More 
significantly, the agreement transferred majority control of 
Ruhrgas, the largest natural gas company in West Germany 
and Europe, to the international companies-this at a time 
when natural gas was to assume increasing importance in 
Germany's energy consumption patterns. 
Along with nuclear power, growing use of natural gas was 
to help reduce the Federal Republic's dependence on im-
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ported oil. Representing 10 pereent oftotal energy eonsump-
tion in 1973, natural gas had inereased its share to 16.7 
pereent by 1980. The eontinued eontribution of natural gas 
toward the aehievement of government objeetives has not 
been without problems, however. 
In November 1981, a large long-term eontract between 
the Soviet Union and German gas eompanies was approved 
by the federal government. By the late 1980s, Soviet deliv-
eries under this agreement would represent around 30 per-
eent of German natural gas supply-approximately 5 to 6 
pereent of overall energy eonsumption, an arnount suffieient 
to ereate serious disloeations ifwithheld. Aeeordingly, while 
diseounting the likelihood of any interruptions, the govern-
ment has initiated measures to inerease storage eapaeity. 
Despite these precautions, relations between West Germany 
and its most important ally suffered eonsiderably as the 
Reagan administration unsuccessfully pressed the German 
government to cancel its agreement to help with the con-
struction of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline. 
The final area to receive attention from West German 
energy officials was conservation. Although conservation 
was mentioned in previous versions of the energy program, 
it was not until the second revision in Deeember 1977 that 
energy conservation was given formai priority-priority in 
governmental statements, position within the written pro-
gram, and space devoted to conservation. While the proposed 
measures were unassailable beeause no responsible group 
could oppose the elimination of waste, the program never-
theless encountered certain unantieipated problems. 
The most important elements of the program related to 
the provision of DM 4.35 billion to eneourage energy con-
serving investments in existing buildings, with funds to be 
provided by both the federal and state or regional (Laender) 
governments. But major objections were raised by several 
CDU-governed Laender. At issue was budgetary compe-
tence: the federal!Laender programs were seen as a threat to 
the Laender parliaments. One grievance concerned the pro-
portion of the funds; the federal government had speeified a 
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fifty/fifty federal!Laender split. Another disputed the man-
ner in which those funds were to be used; the CDU-governed 
Laender demanded that they be untied. After a long series of 
negotiations extending over a period of months, the compro-
mise finally struck called for half of the DM 4.35 billi on to be 
provided by the federal government and halfby the Laender, 
with DM 2.34 billian of that to be administered as direet 
subsidies and DM 2.01 billian to be used as compensation for 
a short-fall in tax revenues resulting from the alternative 
tax write-offs. 
Subsequent efforts to supplement the conservation mea-
sures outlined in the second revision avoided similar federal 
and state confrontations; but the debate over conservation 
continued within the governing coalition. The major point of 
contention was whether conservation should be compelled 
by regulation or induced through market incentives. Advo-
cating compulsion was Research Minister Hauff (SPD), who 
floated such proposals as prohibiting the use ofheating oil in 
new buildings, cancelling all motor sports events, and re-
introducing car-free Sundays and speed limits on the au-
tobahns-an issue that has elicited more controversy and 
discussion over the years than all other proposals combined. 
Economics Minister Lambsdorf (FDP) was the primary ad-
vocate of inducing conservation, placing emphasis on tax 
incentives and the prorootian of greater public awareness. In 
May 1979, the cabinet adopted a package of energy conser-
vation measures which, although containing elements of 
both approaches, appeared to be weighted toward induce-
ment. There was no general imposition of speed limits or 
restrictions such as emergency gasoline rationing, but there 
were regulations to imprave heat savings in government 
buildings and public housing, plus enforcement of speed 
limits for government-owned cars; higher insulation stan-
dards for new construction; gas conservation as a mandatory 
part of driving instruction; more car pools with insurance 
and tax incentives to eneourage their use; and public edu-
cation programs. This general orientation was reaffirmed in 
the government's Third Revision of November 1981.19 
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When the more conservative CDU/CSU replaced the SPD 
as coalition partner of the FDP, the change in government 
only served to reinforce the preference for induced conser-
vation through market incentives. 
On balance, in the decade since the 1973-74 energy crisis, 
West Germany's overall energy policy has enjoyed consider-
able success: between 1973 and 1983, oil's share of primary 
energy consumption has dropped from 55 to approximately 
45 percent; efforts in the coal and natural gas sectors have 
somewhat diversified the country's sources of energy; some 
degree of geographical diversification of oil supplies has 
taken place, the North Sea rooving ahead ofSaudi Arabia as 
the single largest supplier in 1982; and domestic measures 
such as stockpiling and crisis management mechanisms and 
international arrangements like those within the Interna-
tional Energy Agency have been established to respond to 
supply interruptions. 
Nevertheless, as one of the largest unrestricted oil mar-
kets in the world, the West German economy continues to be 
extremely sensitive to changes in the price of oil, as the 
economic figures in Table 8 graphically illustrate. In addi-
tion, the Federal Republic remains vulnerable to supply 
interruptions. Finally, a significant share of the reductions 
in oil consumption achieved recently has owed more to 
economicslowdown than to genuine conservation-approx-
imately three-fifths of the 11.4 pereent decline in energy 
consumption between 1979 and 1982 by the calculations of 
an official in the Economics Ministry. 20 Accordingly, the 
expansion of nuclear power has remaineda top priority for 
high government officials throughout the preceding decade. 
THE ENERGY CRISIS AND FRANCE 
In the period 1970-7 4, French energy policy underwent a 
significant reorientation in response to fundamental 
changes in the world energy market. In the midst of the 
energy crisis, a hurriedly revised energy program was an-
nounced by the Messmer government in March 1974. It 
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called for the implementation of certain conservation mea-
sures, a stop in the decline of French coal production, some 
increase in the import of coal and natural gas, and a rapid 
acceleration of the French nuclear program. Rather than 
accepting the continued rapid rise in oil imports and the 
political and economic problems accompanying them, the 
program attempted anew to reassert state control over the 
pattern, as well as the volume, of domestic energy consump-
tion. 
By early 1975, order had more or less returned to the 
world markets. Under these less turbulent conditions, a 
general reassessment of French energy policy was uuder-
taken within the framework of the Conseil Central de 
Planification under the chairmanship of President Giscard 
d'Estaing. Although the program announced in February 
1975 did not diverge dramatically from the one formulated 
at the height of the energy crisis, it laid out the overarching 
principles, as well as specific targets, that were to guide 
French energy policy over the next decade. 
At the heart of the program was the imperative of reduc-
ing France's dependence on foreign oil. This was to be ac-
complished in two ways: diversification ofthe energy supply, 
both in terms of alternative energy sources toreplace oil and 
shares of the domestic market supplied by oil producers; and 
a reduction in overall energy consumption through conser-
vation, building on initiatives taken earlier such as speed 
limits, limits on times for street display window lighting, 
discontinuation of favorable rates for high electrical con-
sumption, tax on certain petroleum products such as gaso-
line, and tax on gas-guzzling cars. 
Without conservation, the government calculated, total 
energy consumption would be 280-85 million tons petro-
leum equivalent (mtpe) by 1985, whereas the government 
target was 240 mtpe. (For a quantitative breakdown of the 
government program by energy sector, see Table 9.) To 
achieve a savings of up to 45 mtpe, French energy officials 
began to erect an impressive array of conservation measures 
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to supplement the provisions made in the immediate after-
math of the energy crisis: 
• The state set ceilings on the consumption ofheavy fuel oil 
by large industrial consumers, with special fines for ex-
ceeding these ceilings. 
• Ceilings on the total purchases of imported petroleum and 
petroleum products were imposed; the Council of Minis-
ters specified a ceiling ofF 51 billion in 1976, F 55 billion 
in 1977, and F 58 billi on in 1978. 
• Based on studies of potential energy savings in various 
industrial sectors, accords sectoriels were concluded be-
tween the state and those industrial sectors that designed 
special energy saving programs. Subsidies and tax pref-
erences, as weil as regulations, were offered as induce-
ments. 
• Quotas were established for sellers of heating oil; those 
who exceeded their quota were either fined or had their 
quota reduced. 
• A special tax of 2-3 pereent of energy costs on industrial 
concerns consurning more than 15 mtce per year was 
imposed, with plants whose yearly sales were under F 100 
million exempted. Enterprises investing in energy con-
servation were to be either partially or fully freed from 
the tax. 
French officials enjoyed considerable success in their ef-
forts to restrict the growth of energy consumption in a 
country already ranking high among advanced industrial 
states in energy efficiency: energy savings rose from an 
estimated 12 mtpe in 1975 to 24 mtpe in 1980. What success 
France has enjoyed in conservation has been due, in part, to 
the absence of a major impediment to the implementation of 
compulsory conservation measures often encountered in 
other major industrial democracies-that of parliamentary 
consent. Many of the directives on conservation were issued 
as government "decrets," thereby circumventing any need 
for parliamentary approval; the remainder have been pro-
mulgated in the form of government "arretees,"-decisions 
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taken by administrative authorities based on broad, over-
arching laws already on the books. 
Nevertheless, conflict has not been absent from conserva-
tion issues in France. The state agency responsible for pro-
posing and promoting energy conservation (Agence pour les 
Economies d'Energie) had little political clout of its own; 
only through the Ministry of Industry, which had tutelage 
over the conservation agency, or government councils 
headed by the President, could measures regulating energy 
consumption be implemented. These bodies were subject to 
pressures from powerful state agencies such as EDF and 
state oil and gas enterprises that often were more interested 
in promoting their own particular product than in overall 
energy conservation. 
Despite opposition, conservation efforts continued. In the 
same year, 1975, the government revised its energy policy 
objectives for 1990, projecting savings of 60 mtpe, accompa-
nied by further measures to eneourage conservation. 21 In 
1981, a Socialist government came into power with a strong 
commitment to energy conservation, a commitment demon-
strated by the single largest pereentage increase in the 
energy budget for 1982-59 percent. 
Attempts to reduce dependence on imported oil through 
diversification, on the other hand, have met with some-
what mixed results. The objective articulated in the Feb-
ruary 1975 program, that no foreign oil producer should 
supply more than 15 pereent of the domestic petroleum 
market, has been largely ignored as Saudi Arabia contin-
ues to supply well over a third of France's oil. This situa-
tion has been due partly to the costs entailed in diversify-
ing supply. Refineries constructed to use certain grades of 
crude oil would sometimes require sizable investments to 
accommodate different crudes from other countries. Fur-
ther, alternative supplies have proved unreliable. Iranian 
supplies were lost to the revolution and then Iraqi supplies 
were cut off by the Iran-Iraq war. Oil from Mexico and 
Venezuela has filled some of the gap, but Saudi Arabia has 
been the major substitute supplier. Attempts to provide 
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French oil companies-CFP and Elf-Aquitane-with new 
resources through intensified oil exploration off the coast of 
Brittany have yielded few results as yet.22 Efforts begun 
under President de Gaulle to foster special relationships 
between France and the Arab-Islamic world have contin-
ued and been intensified. 
In the wake of the 1973-74 energy crisis, the French 
government refused to join the International Energy 
Agency, partly because of the confrontational connotations 
associated with the lEA at its creation. In addition, France 
initiated the abortive North- South dialogue, the Conference 
on International Economic Cooperation-a forum favored by 
the countries of OPEC and oil-consuming developing coun-
tr.i.es for discussion of energy problems. The conference dis-
cussed topics within the broader context of development as 
articulated in the demands for a "New International Eco-
nomic Order." Before Mitterand came into office, French 
Middle-East policy had shown a distinct pro-Arab tilt; and 
extensive economic ties between French industry and sev-
eral Moslem states have continued. In pre-revolutionary 
Iran and in Saudi Arabia, petrochemical plants and cement 
factories have been built; nuclear technology has been ex-
ported to lraq, Iran, and Pakistan; and sizable amounts of 
arms have been sold to Iraq, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. 
Whether these diplomatic and economic ties constitute some 
degree of real security in energy supply, however, remainsa 
question. 23 
In the gas sector, contracts for the delivery of natural gas 
have been concluded with the Netherlands, Algeria, the 
Soviet Union, and North Sea producers with an eye to 
increasing gas consumption into the 1980s, although these 
efforts have not been without their vexations. For example, 
during the second oil crisis, the Algerian company Sona-
trach demanded a price increase for gas supplied through an 
existing contract. The dispute was finally settled by the 
Mitterand government, agreeing to a price well above the 
world level. Another controversy was with the Reagan ad-
ministration over the purchase of gas from the Soviet pipe-
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line and the associated issue of technology transfer to the 
Soviet Union.24 
In the 1975 program, the newer alternative energy 
sources such as solar and bioconversion were to play only a 
marginai role in diversification, supplying only 1 pereent of 
French energy needs for 1985 and 5 pereent by the year 
2000. Under the Socialists, research funding was increased 
considerably, but important contributions of these sources to 
the energy halanee were still far in the future. 
Finally, with French coal production in decline, initia-
tives were undertaken in the 1970s to increase coal imports, 
primarily from the United States and South Africa. When 
the Socialists came into office, however, they initiated plans 
to halt the decline in domestic coal production and even to 
increase it in the future-from 20 mt per year up to 30 mt. 
But by 1983, a reappraisal of this policy was underway as 
losses for CDF in 1982 of $86 million had increased ten-fold 
over the previous year's. In 1984, the government decided to 
cut national coal production to 11 mt by 1988 and, in doing 
so, halve the CDF workforce of 56,000, despite strong oppo-
sition from the trade uni ons. 25 
Thus, France has made considerable progress toward a 
reduction in energy dependence in several areas since the 
1973-74 energy crisis. Nevertheless, the economic impact of 
the 1979-80 crisis demonstrated the need for further cut-
backs in oil consumption. As illustrated in Table 6, economic 
growth slowed dramatically in 1980, inflation as well as 
unemployment rates rose, and the halanee of payments 
moved from a $1.5 billion surpius in 1979 to an estimated 
deficit of$4 billion in 1980.26 In addition, the strengthening 
of the dollar following the second crisis put even further 
pressure on France's halanee of trade; despite a decline in 
the price of crude oil in dollars, France paid what approxi-
mated a 70 pereent increase in the price of oil between 1980 
and 1982.27 
To achieve further cutbacks, the government has adopted 
a policy designed to reduce the share of imported oil in 
overall energy consumption to 30 pereent by 1990, down 
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from 66 pereent in 1973 and 53.2 pereent in 1980. The key to 
further progress toward this goal has been, and remains, the 
rapid expansion of nuclear power. 
THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In fall1974, the Dutch Minister ofEconomic Affairs, Rudi 
F.M. Lubbers, submitted a White Paper on energy policy to 
parliament. The government at the time was a coalition of 
five parties. The parties and their percentages of represen-
tation were the PvdA (Labor), 27.3 percent; PPR (Radicals), 
4.8 percent; D'66 (Democrats 1966), 4.2 percent; KVP (Cath-
olic Peoples Party), 17.7 percent; and ARP (Anti-Revolutio-
nary Party), 8.8 percent. Ten cabinet ministers came from 
the PvdA, PPR, and D'66, six from the two confessional 
parties. 
Representing a significant departure from the past ori-
entation of Dutch energy policy, the White Paper stated: 
This paper sets forth the various aspects of energy 
policy in their interrelationships. The basic assump-
tion is that energy sources can and must be inter-
changeable and that energy policy as such must be 
integrated with socio-economic policy and attuned to 
other elements of government policy, including those 
coneerning the environment. International contexts 
also play a major part. 
The paper thus aims at an integrated approach. It is 
intended to provide the impulse for policy for the next 
ten years and to be the starting point for discussions 
on the basic policies to be selected ... 
The traditional role of the government in energy 
administration will have to be increased. There are 
new duties ahead for the government both on the de-
mand side (limitation of the growth of energy consump-
tion) and on the supply side (the widening of supplies 
by volume and variety). This can be done not only by 
promoting and channelling political orientation re-
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garding what is desirable but also by taking stimulat-
ing or retarding action in certain cases. It is essential 
that in other cases the authorities themselves will have 
to perform certain duties. 28 
Substantively, the White Paper made specific proposals 
covering a broad spectrum of energy policy coneerns-from 
a slowdown in the depletion rate of natural gas reserves, 
through the promotion of alternative energy supplies such 
as nuclear power, coal, and new sources, to energy conser-
vation. 
Conceptually, the White Paper represented a blueprint 
for a future energy plan much different from the government 
approach to energy policy that had prevailed in the Nether-
lands throughout mu ch of the post-war period. Rather than 
allowing the marketplace to determine the country's energy 
patterns, significant government intervention was foreseen 
across a broad range of issues. In addition to expanding 
governmental activities relating directly to conservation 
and natural gas policy, the White Paper called for greater 
government responsibility in the electricity generating sec-
tor. Up to this time, electrical power production policy had 
been formulated solely by SEP, the central organization 
representing fourteen publicly owned companies at the pro-
vincial and municipallevels, although, according to certain 
observers, the effect of public ownership had been mini-
mal. 29 For example, SEP was responsible for a binding 
nine-year electricity plan for the construction of power 
plants, a plan not subject to anyone else's approval. The 
White Paper proposed that the electricity plan be reviewed 
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs-which would provide 
some measure of control by parliament-and that a state 
monopoly be created for the generation of electricity with 
nuclear power. 
Further, rather than focusing exclusively on economic 
and market criteria, the environmental and social implica-
tions of various energy technologies were acknowledged as 
important considerations in future energy policy choices. 
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Finally, rather than reflecting a preoccupation with imme-
diate energy coneerns-the Netherlands, after all, had just 
become a net energy exporter-future energy production 
and consumption patterns in the Netherlands were a major 
concern. Fears that domestic gas supplies would be ex-
hausted by the end of the century tempered considerably any 
optimism about the nation's long-term energy outlook. In 
execution, then, the central tenet of the government pro-
gram was the extension of domestic gas supplies through 
energy conservation, development of nuclear energy, anda 
combination of policies directed at the gas sector. 
In its gas policy, the government has undertaken initia-
tives in several areas relating to gas policy subsequent to 
publication of the White Paper in 1974. In an effort to reduce 
domestic gas consumption, the government decided that 
agreements for deliveries to electrical utilities or industry 
for purposes of heating would not be renewed. As the Eco-
nomics Ministry explained, "We want to ensure that we 
have gas available, chiefly for domestic heating purposes 
and higher grade and efficient industrial application until 
the year 2000. After that gas will be restricted to domestic 
heating purposes." More recently, however, this policy has 
been relaxed somewhat as inland sales and exports dropped, 
causing painful cuts in government revenues by 1982-83. 
More on this below.30 
To contribute to the diversification of Dutch energy sup-
plies, as well as to prolong the life of domestic reserves, the 
government has actively pursued a policy of importing nat-
ural gas. By 1977, Gasunie had contracted with Norway for 
the importation of 55,000 million cubic meters over twenty 
years; and in 1979 an agreement was reached with Algeria 
on the purchase of 112,000 million cubic meters in the form 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG), deliveries to begin in 1983. 
Combined, imports from N orway and Algeria would cover 
nearly 20 pereent of domestic consumption after 1983, a 
share that would increase if additional import contracts 
were concluded. 
The import agreement with Algeria, already in doubt 
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because of demands by the state-owned company Sonatrach 
to renegotiate the price, was effectively canceled as a con-
sequence of the decision by Sonatrach not to build its 
planned gas liquefication plant during the five-year plan 
scheduled to end in 1984, although the possibility was held 
out that an alternative supply contract covering either pipe-
line deliveries or a later LNG project might be offered to the 
Netherlands, butata later date.31 As for the agreement with 
N orway, Gasunie had been negotiating for further imports. 
Provisional agreement for the purchase of Nigerian LNG 
had been made and imports from the Soviet pipeline were 
being considered, but both were rejected as Gasunie began to 
pursue a more "selective" and "limited" policy in the wake of 
decHning sales and lower revenues from domestic gas.32 
A logical correlate of the policy to increase natural gas 
imports was the decision to limit gas exports; accordingly, no 
new export contracts have been signed since 1974, no re-
newals for existing contracts have been given, and current 
deliveries have not been increased. But because the sale of 
natural gas had become such an important source ofrevenue 
for the Dutch government (see Table 10 in Appendix), it was 
equally important to assure that a policy designed to de-
crease gas exports would not result in an immediate decline 
in those revenues. (Exports were expected to decline consid-
erably after 1978, approaching zero by 1995.) 
Domestically, steps were taken in the early 1970s to 
tighten the link between the price of natural gas and oil 
prices. To do the same abroad despite recalcitrant partners, 
the government initiated measures to strengthen its bar-
gaining position. In April1975 Gasunie, in which the state 
held a 50 pereent interest, was given the monopoly for the 
distribution and sale of natural gas overseas as well as 
domestically. That same year, a gas price law was sent to 
parliament to allow the Minister of Economic Affairs, if he 
believed that natural gas would be supplied at a price not 
reflecting its real value, to forbid delivery both within and 
outside Hollandata price lower than a minimum set by him. 
Efforts to renegotiate foreign contracts proved extremely 
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difficult. Not all contracts with foreign customers had con-
tained a fuel oil clause to make automatic changes in gas 
prices to match the price of fuel oil; and even when price 
adjustments were included, there was a considerable time 
lag. Only after threats of unilateral price rises by partia-
ment and an announcement by the Economics Minister that 
"decisions have been taken and funds set aside" to enable a 
cut-off of gas exports was an agreement finally reached in 
fall1980. 
At the time, contracts were concluded with German, !tal-
ian, Belgian, and French companies raising the average 
price of gas by 14 percent, bringing it into line with the price 
of low-sulfur heating oil. The new contracts tightened the 
indexing of gas prices to heating oil prices; a future rise in 
the price of heating oil will add 95 pereent of the increase to 
the price of gas, rather than the old 80 percent. Further, the 
length of time between price adjustments was shortened to 
five months rather than the ten months provided in some 
earlier contracts.33 
As in the energy strategies of most other W e stern indus-
trialized countries in the years immediately following the 
energy crisis, energy conservation in the Netherlands re-
ceived considerably less emphasis than other major ele-
ments of the energy program. Aside from the intended con-
serving impact of domestic natural gas price hikes on gas 
consumption, initial conservation measures consisted pri-
marily of an efficiency campaign carried through the mass 
media, in which the consumer was offered practical tips in 
newspaper and roagazine advertisements, television com-
mercials, films shown in movie theaters, and the like. Such 
initiatives had some effect. Between 1968 and 1973, the 
growth in overall energy consumption had increased at an 
annual rate of9.3 pereent whereas it rose by only 0.7 pereent 
per year in 1973-77. Oil consumption, increasing 9 pereent 
annually before the energy crisis, was reduced to approxi-
mately 1.6 pereent by 1978; in electricity, consumption rose 
only 2.2 pereent in 1977 compared with an average of 8.4 
pereent in 1967-77. It is difficult to determine, however, how 
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much of the decline was due to a relatively low level of 
industrial activity and how much to conservation.34 
Nevertheless, an impasse developed in the expansion of 
alternative energy sources; and influential domestic critics 
of Dutch energy policy began to demand a greater emphasis 
on conservation. These developments led to a reconsidera-
tion of the government's commitment to energy conserva-
tion by 1977-78. 
Action was delayed by a long change in governments 
following national elections held in May 1977. Only after 
months of negotiations was a government finally formed in 
December 1977. Although the PvdA had been the clear win-
ner, Labor was unable to put together a coalition. The con-
fessional parties, campaigning for the first time as a unified 
Christian Democratic party, joined with the right-wing lib-
erals (VVD) to form the new government. The table com-
pares the old and new parliaments by number of sea ts held. 
The new Christian Democratic/Liberal cabinet, building 
on measures initiated by its predecessor, announced a twen-
ty-year conservation program designed to halve the Neth-
erlands' projected oil bill by the end of the century. Included 
were measures to increase insulation ofbuildings, to tighten 
regulations for central heating systems, to conduct a large 
publicity campaign, and to provide subsidies.35 The public 
sector was to provide Fl 12 billion of the estimated Fl 60 
billion to finance these conservation measures over the 
twenty-year period. This broke down into annual expendi-
tures of Fl 600 million to be spent on energy conservation, 
targets that were actually exceeded in 1980 (Fl 756.2 mil-
lion) and 1981 (Fl 742.6 million).36 
On balance, the government has been relatively success-
ful in erecting two of the three pillars that support Dutch 
energy policy. A gas policy designed to husband indigenous 
reserves is being implemented; anda renewed commitment 
to energy conservation, backed up by monetary resources, 
has begun to show results.37 Yet, in certain respects, the 
Netherlands appears only marginally better placed than its 
less energy-endowed European neighbors, particularly over 
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1977 1972 
PvdA (Labor) 53 43 
CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal) 49 48 (KVP, ARP, CHU) 
VVD (Liberals) 28 22 
PPR (Radicals) 3 7 
CPN (Communist) 2 7 
D'66 (Democrats '66) 8 6 
Democratic Socialists 1970 1 6 
Others 6 9 
the longer term. While technically energy independent 
through much of the 1970s, the Netherlands had resumed 
being a net energy importer by 1982. Oil stiil takes up a 
sizable share of domestic energy consumption; the 1983 
share, 43 percent, was only a little under the 1973 level, 4 7.6 
percent, and the proportion is expected to increase to well 
over 50 pereent by the mid-1980s as natural gas use is cut 
back. In any event, natural gas is not easily substitutable for 
oil in many areas of use. 
W e can see, then, that the Dutch economy would not be 
immune to disruptions in the world oil market, in spite of its 
natural gas. To prepare the nation to meet supply disrup-
tions, domestic measures ranging from the creation of stra-
tegic natural gas reserves to the construction of boilers 
capable of burning both oil and natural gas have been 
introduced. But of equal, if not greater, importance has been 
the emphasis of government officials on the need for inter-
national collaboration in times of emergency, a need made 
all too apparent to Dutch policymakers during the 1973-74 
Arab embargo. In what was to have been a total embargo of 
the Netherlands, fellow members of the EEC showed little 
inclination to share oil supplies. The distress of Dutch offi-
cials over this circumstance was reflected in statements 
threatening the possible halt of gas exports if the other 
countries in the EEC failed to hold to "recognized playing 
rules," a reference to the commitment to free trade within 
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the Community, which included oil. What sharing did take 
place was organized on an informal basis by the interna-
tional majors themselves. Whether the member states would 
have eventually launched a sharing arrangement had the oil 
companies not acted remains in question. 
In the event of future supply interruptions, not only 
would th ere be direet effects of an oil shortage but repercus-
sions would also be felt throughout the Dutch economy 
because of the impact on the port of Rotterdam. Oil and oil 
products represent about 65 pereent of all goods handled 
there. As a consequence, efforts to secure the third major 
component ofDutch energy policy, the expansion ofnuclear 
power, has remained top priority for the succession of coa-
litions that have governed the Netherlands over the past 
decade. 
THE ENERGY RESPONSE OF THE SEVENTIES 
Although differences in policy mix, institutional arrange-
ments, and energy resources have distinguished the energy 
policies of West Germany, France, and the Netherlands, 
their responses to recent upheavals in the world energy 
market have shared two central features. First, each has 
attempted to formulate and implement a comprehensive 
energy strategy designed to reduce its dependence on im-
ported oil. Such a strategy has signified a greater willing-
ness on the part of government to intervene along a broad 
range of issues rather than to follow the earlier pattern of 
relying on the market mechanism to determine energy con-
sumption patterns. Second, each country has been led to a 
conviction that nuclear power is essential to the success of 
such a strategy. 
In the wake of the energy crisis, nuclear power has been 
perceived to be one of the few available alternatives to oil. 
Equally important, government leaders have seen it as a 
secure, reasonably-priced, environmentally-benign energy 
source. That such a view was not universally shared was 
evidenced by growing political opposition to nuclear power 
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throughout Western Europe. As the following chapters on 
German, French, and Dutch nuclear policy make clear, how-
ever, the impact of nuclear opposition on the conduct of 
government policy has not been uniform. 
4. Unraveling Consensus in 
West Germany, 1973-1977 
This chapter looks at the sudden rise of the nuclear power 
issue to the top of the German political agenda in the 
mid-1970s. As we saw in the previous chapter, nuclear 
power was assigned a central role in the comprehensive 
energy strategy designed to reduce West Germany's depen-
dence on imported oil. The German government's view that 
the rapid expansion of nuclear power was imperative, how-
ever, did not guarantee swift implementation of the nuclear 
program. A relatively small circle of energy officials, who 
were primarily sensitive to the traditional energy problems 
of the Federal Republic, drafted the energy program, but its 
execution relied on achieving a domestic consensus. With 
the introduction of several new actors into the decision-
making process because of government efforts to approach 
energy policy comprehensively, such agreement was to be-
come extremely problematic. 
As we will see, the addition of elements such as environ-
mental groups, the courts, political parties, Laender govern-
ments, organized labor, and industrial interests to the do-
mestic political mix made the problems faced by policymak-
ers much more complex. The consequence was an unraveling 
of consensus on the key component of the government's 
energy package. 
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NUCLEAR POWER AND THE PUBLIC 
Before the energy crisis, energy issues had not concerned 
most citizens in the Federal Republic. Conventional energy 
policy issues had been managed largely within the Econom-
ics Ministry by energy officials collaborating closely with 
interested parties from industry and labor. Likewise, the 
development of future energy technologies primarily had 
been the exclusive preserve of officials in the responsible 
government ministry (the Federal Ministry of Research and 
Technology-BMFT or Bundesministerium fuer Forschung 
und Technologie), industrial interests (mainly electronics 
and chemical firms), and experts within the scientific com-
munity.1 But the relative anonymity and isolation enjoyed 
by government energy officials ended in the wake of the 
events of 1973-7 4. 
Mo re than any previous event, the energy crisis raised the 
consciousness of the general population in the Federal Re-
public. The pervasive role played by energy in their every-
day lives and the dependence of the West German economy 
on imported oil was forcefully brought home during the 
winter months. With little domestic production and govern-
ment regulation, the full force of the OPEC price hike hit the 
consumers in their pocketbooks. But an even greater impact 
was the threat of an insufficient supply of heating oil, since 
fuel oil hea ts a far larger pereentage of homes in Germany 
than, for example, in the United States. In addition, the 
automobile-free Sundays and imposed speed limits were 
instructive for a society whose prosperity and sense of free-
dom had come to be equated by many with the ownership 
and unrestricted use of the automobile. 
Although, objectively, the country emerged from the cri-
sis in mu ch better shape than most, subjectively, confidenee 
in the continuation of the post-war "economic miracle" may 
have been momentarily shaken in the face of declining oil 
supplies, a halt in economic growth, and rising unemploy-
ment. But the heightened uncertainty and anxiety stem-
ming from the immediate as well as potential effects of an oil 
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shortage quickly dissipated as the embargo ended and oil 
production was restored to normallevels. What did remain, 
however, was an appreciation for the role played by energy 
in the functioning of a modern economy and the conse-
quences of inadequate supply. Not surprisingly, the audi-
ence for the revised version of the government's energy 
program had broadened considerably by fall 1974. 
Although the objectives of energy policy in the first revi-
sion remained essentially the same as those in the 1973 
program, there was a major shift in emphasis. Rather than 
simply restricting the growth of dependence on imported oil, 
the new program emphasized decreasing the degree of de-
pendence-from the 1973 level of 55 pereent to 44 pereent by 
1985. The corollary of this goal was quickening the pace of 
the development of certain energy sources, and this implied 
the rapid expansion of nuclear energy, from 1 pereent of 
primary energy consumption in 1973 to 15 pereent by 1985. 
This involved the construction in the Federal Republic of 
approximately fifty nuclear power plants generating 
45,000-50,000 MW of electricity by 1985. 
Government efforts in the area of energy research and 
development had begun to bear fruit by the late 1960s. 
Through a series of nuclear programs spanning the period 
from 1956 to 1973, nuclear technology had been brought to 
a point where it seemed commercially feasible. In 1967 the 
first commercial orders were placed for two light water 
reactors (LWR) by German utilities; two years later, three 
more were ordered; and in 1971, five further orders were 
placed. By 1973, all ten projects had permits to begin con-
struction, with a number of additional plants planned for the 
near future. For the longer term, government research and 
development efforts, especially during the Third (1968-72) 
and Fourth (1973-76) Nuclear Programs, concentrated on 
the development of two advanced reactor technologies: the 
fast breeder reactor (FBR), which held out the hope of an 
almost inexhaustible energy source by the turn of the cen-
tury, and the high temperature reactor (HTR) which, in 
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addition to producing electricity, could generate very in-
tense process heat suitable for coal gasification. 
Before 1974, public concern over nuclear power had been 
virtually non-existent, despite the acceleration in nuclear 
plant construction in the early 1970s. In sharp contrast to 
the United States, where coordinated anti-nuclear move-
ments had emerged by the late 1960s, the Federal Republic 
was most notable for the absence of nuclear energy as a 
political issue. Nothing had prepared government and in-
dustry officials for the emotional and broad-based opposition 
that nuclear energy was to encounter. 
The spark that ultimately ignited national opposition to 
nuclear energy was struck in the tranquil, largely rural and 
agricultural southwest region of Germany, bordering the 
upper Rhine. In May 1974 the state (Land) government of 
Baden-Wuerttemberg announced the choice of Wyhl as the 
site for a four-block nuclear power plant, each block to 
produce 1300 MW. Public hearings were held that Novem-
ber; and by January 1975, officials had approved construc-
tion of the first reactor. 
It may be useful at this point to describe the licensing 
process, as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act of 1959. 
The federal government has primary responsibility through 
the BMI; but the states (Laender) execute the provisions of 
the law in the course of licensing. A company wishing to 
build a nuclear power plant must, therefore, initiate the 
process by submitting an application, along with supporting 
materials, to the Land government. 
The licensing authorities at the Land level then solicit 
studies from experts and advisory committees to evaluate 
the safety of the proposed reactor. Simultaneously, the Land 
government forwards the application documents to the BMI, 
where they are studied independently by standing advisory 
committees-primarily the Reactor Safety Commission and 
the Radiation Protection Commission. In addition to evalu-
ations at both the Land and federallevels, the Land govern-
ment is required to hold public hearings. 
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Once public hearings have been held and the recommen-
dations of the advisory commissions have been considered, 
the Land government licensing agency either approves or 
denies the application. Nuclear plants are licensed in stages, 
the most important being the first stage approval (erste 
Teilerrichtungsgenehmigung or 1. TEG), which approves the 
site and allows construction to begin. In the case of approval, 
the decision may be appealed in the administrative courts by 
any citizen who had lodged formai objections during the 
public hearings. 
No nuclear facility may be licensed without the consent of 
the BMI. The BMI may also require the Land government to 
license a nuclear facility; but a license can be denied by the 
Land government for reasons relating to jurisdiction in non-
radiological matters such as land use, water, and the like. 
At Wyhl, strong local opposition to the construction of the 
plant was primarily expressed by ad hoc citizens' initiatives 
(Buergerinitiativen). Approximately 90,000 signatures of 
area citizens objecting to the nuclear power plant had been 
gathered. The residents of Wyhl itself (around 2,700), how-
ever, were more favorably disposed to the plant because of 
the prospect of jobs and the large tax revenues the plant 
would provide the town. The feeling was that the Baden-
Wuerttemberg government had cavalierly ignored reserva-
tions raised at the public hearings. That is, the hearings had 
been a mere formality. With construction on the plant im-
minent, the citizens' initiatives began the only aetions that 
seemed available to stop the beginning of construction. On 
February 18, 1975, approximately 8,000 anti-nuclear dem-
onstrators occupied the Wyhl site-a strategy used success-
fully in 1974 by German and French citizens' initiatives in 
the sam e upper Rhine region to stop construction of a sulfur 
plant in Marckolsheim, a small town located on the French 
side of the Rhine. 
The government response to this demonstration of civil 
disobedience was swift. Two days after the occupation, the 
police were ordered to clear the site. The 300 demonstrators 
who had set up camp at the site were forcefully expelled by 
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police using high-pressure water hoses, police dogs, and 
truncheons. 
Coincident with this police action, the Minister President 
of Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hans Filbinger, attempted to 
blame the occupation on outside provocateurs, labeling the 
demonstrators "left-wing extremists." (In fact, a l2ter study 
commissioned by the BMFT showed that three-quarters of 
the inhabitants of the region-which voted overwhelmingly 
CDU, the party headed by Filbinger-were opposed to the 
nuclear plant, with the most adamant opposition coming 
from such conservative groups as farmers and vintners.)2 
Officials also attempted to rally public support with dire 
predictions that lights would go out by the 1980s if construc-
tion were not begun immediately on the Wyhl plant. 
Within days, however, the citizens' initiatives responded 
with a massive demonstration, estimated at between 25,000 
and 28,000 participants, held near the construction site. At 
its conclusion, approximately 10,000 people stormed the 
barriers erected around the site and, despite stiff resistance 
from the police, were able to reoccupy it.3 
Because of the considerable attention given this series of 
events in the national news media-as well as because 
of the strong opposition within its own constituency in the 
region-the Baden-Wuerttemberg government decided 
against further direet confrontations. As the occupation ex-
tended through the summer and fall, negotiations eventu-
ally resulted in an agreement between the government and 
contracting utility on the one hand and the citizens' initia-
tives on the other. It stipulated that, pending a decision by 
the administrative courts on an appeal of the government's 
licensing of the Wyhl plant, the nuclear opponents would 
end their occupation of the site and the contractors would 
not begin construction. As the atmosphere of confrontation 
between government and private citizen began to abate in 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, however, seeds of nuclear contro-
versy were starting to germinate in other areas of the Fed-
eral Republic. 
Schleswig-Holstein, the northernmost Land in West Ger-
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many, was the location of the next confrontation between 
government and citizens. In reaction to the licensing of a 
nuclear plant near the town of Brokdorf, a series of large 
demonstrations were staged in October and November 1976. 
They degenerated into pitched battles between the police 
and demonstrators. After the administrative courts ordered 
a temporary suspension of the construction permit, tensions 
between citizen and state eased somewhat. But no sooner 
had calm been restored in Schleswig-Holstein than nuclear 
opposition erupted at a plant site in the neighboring Land of 
Lower Saxony. In March 1977 the most violent clash in the 
short history of the environmental movement occurred near 
Grohnde as demonstrators attempting to storm the barriers 
surrounding the reactor site were repulsed by approxi-
mately 4,000 police.4 
The esealabon of violence that marked the series of anti-
nuclear demonstrations between 1975 and 1977 were in-
creasingly seen as counterproductive by the citizens' initia-
tives. A major concern was the manipulation of mass dem-
onstrations by left-wing groups, leading large segments of 
the population to identify anti-nuclear views with left-wing 
extremism. The public was already partially traumatized by 
left-wing terrorist attacks on major political and economic 
institutions in German society, including the kidnapping 
and assassination of prominent judicial and business lead-
ers. To avoid identification with such forces, the national 
coordinating body of the citizens' initiatives (Bundesverband 
der Buergerinitiativen Umweltschuetz) declared its intention 
to abstain from any further association with large centrally-
directed demonstrations against nuclear power plants. This 
decision followed a demonstration on September 26, 1977, at 
Kalkar, site of the German fast breeder reactor under con-
struction. The protest was attended by approximately 
35,000, with many more reportedly unable toreach Kalkar 
because of police controis set up at all aecess routes. The 
event remained peaceful despite efforts by leftist groups to 
incite demonstrators to storm the site. 
In spite of the violence-or perhaps, in part, because of 
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it--the anti-nuclear movement played an extremely impor-
tant role in catapulting the nuclear power issue to the top of 
the national political agenda. Nevertheless, the national 
salience of this issue was not attributable solely to the 
activities of the citizens' initiatives. 
Local protests occurring before Wyhl had received virtu-
ally no national attention. The selection of Wyhl as the 
location for a nuclear power plant was, in fact, a direet 
consequence of the Baden-Wuerttemberg government's de-
cision to withdraw its previous choice for the plant site-
Breisbach, a town located only a short distance from Wyhl-
because of strong local opposition expressed in several dem-
onstrations. 
Further, the major objections raised by nuclear opponents 
initially were parochial or local in nature. Illustrative were 
the arguments against the Wyhl location: 
• Fog from the cooling towers would alter the weather in 
such a way that many of the major crops of the region 
(wine, fruit, tobacco) would be damaged. 
• The warmer water returned to the Rhine would disturb 
the river's biological balance, a problem exacerbated by 
the construction of a nuclear reactor on the French side of 
the Rhine. 
• With large amounts of water to be taken from the Rhine 
daily (9.6 million cubic meters), much of the vegetation in 
the area would be damaged by the lowering of the water 
table. 
• Fear of radioactivity escaping from the plant. 
• Concern that construction of the power plant in this 
largely rural, agricultural region would only be the initial 
stage of large-scale industrialization and urbanization. 5 
The events surrounding the energy crisis focused public 
attention on plans for coping with the associated problems, 
most specifically, on the large role of nuclear energy in the 
government's comprehensive energy program. Once this 
happened, concern over nuclear energy ceased to be a local-
ized phenomenon. The broader implications of the wide-
spread use of this technology became subject to a public 
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debate that expanded to engage important institutions 
throughout West German society as well as private citizens 
and their ad hoc groups. Public discussion was no longer 
restricted to localized concerns but rather quickly came to 
include questions about the long-term disposal of radioac-
tive waste; the political, social, and economic ramifications 
of a "plutonium economy" in which spent fuel is reprocessed 
and fast breeder reactors are introduced; and the possible 
consequences for society offoregoing development ofnuclear 
power. 
BROADENING THE DEBATE: 
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
The events at Wyhl and Brokdorf caught government 
officials completely by surprise. Equally unanticipated was 
the resonance that many of the anti-nuclear arguments were 
beginning to find in the general population. In a study 
conducted by the lnstitut fuer Demoskopie Allensbach, cit-
izens were asked how they would east their ballot, given the 
opportunity to vote on a plan to construct a nuclear power 
plant in their area: 35 pereent indicated they would approve, 
47 pereent were against, 18 pereent were undecided.6 More-
over, the study commissioned by the BMFT found that 
between November 1975 and November 1976, the attitude of 
citizens with regard to nuclear energy had become in-
creasingly less favorable, as compared with other energy 
sources. 
Attributing this resistance and concern about nuclear 
energy to misinformation or lack of information, the federal 
government responded by conducting an extensive cam-
paign to educate the public about nuclear energy. Respon-
sibility for this Buergerdialog Kernenergie (dialogue with 
citizens over nuclear energy) was assumed by the then 
Federal Minister for Research and Technology, Hans Matt-
hoefer, who wrote: "The federal government's goal in this 
campaign is to restore the trust of the population in the 
functioning of the democratic process, especially in that area 
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where much of this trust had been lost-the nuclear energy 
controversy. On this basis, a broader consensus on the ne-
cessity, safety, and tolerable burdens of this new energy 
source will be attempted. The federal government will make 
clear that it will push forwardin the promotion and devel-
opment of nuclear energy only within this consensus."7 
In the first advertisement of the campaign, placed in 
various newspapers throughout the country, Matthoefer 
stated: "Nuclear energy in the Federal Republic is not con-
ceivable without a broad base of trust in the population. 
Many citizens regard nuclear energy with uneasiness. This 
is understandable. The intensive public discussion over its 
benefits and risks is welcomed by the federal govern-
ment .... Safety for all citizens has priority over all other 
interests. The safety regulations of the government are the 
strictest in the world. Our expenditures on reactor safety are 
exemplary."8 
In addition to the ads taken out by the government in the 
national press, the Buergerdialog was pursued through 
booklets explaining the actual proeesses of nuclear power 
production and public discussions sponsored by the govern-
ment. These efforts, however, seemed to have little effect, as 
the elashes between police and anti-nuclear forees increased 
polarization within the country. The nuclear debate had 
been broadened to such an extent that government reassur-
anees of safe plant operation no longer addressed the most 
central issues raised by nuclear opponents. 
To counter the arguments of those who were, in essence, 
questioning the desirability of technological progress itself, 
the Buergerdialog increasingly took up the theme, "How do 
we want to live in the future?" 
Those for or against nuclear energy must first of all be 
familiar with the various alternative energy sources 
and be ab le to evaluate themin terms of their present 
and future importance. In a further step they must 
understand the macroeconomic relationships of energy 
supply and which options are associated with which 
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chances and risks-not only within the national frame-
work of the Federal Republic, but worldwide. Finally, 
they must become thoroughly familiar with the social 
benefits and social burdens entailed in the various 
possible alternatives. We must evaluate all these fac-
tors and then deeide how we want to live in the future. 9 
And in various interviews given throughout 1976, Matt-
hoefer repeatedly stuck to the theme: 
The question about the risks and benefits of nuclear 
energy cannot be answered outside the more general 
context of environmental degradation and the debate 
over growth. 10 
We need economic growth if we want to secure full 
employment, and we all want qualitative improve-
ments. But even with smaller growth rates, we will 
need new power production in the coming years. With-
out nuclear energy, we would expose ourselves to a 
dangerous dependence on an uncertain supp ly of oil. A 
moratorium on nuclear energy would drive the price of 
oil even higher and increase our dependence on im-
ported energy .... The world economic crisis of recent 
years and, even more, the crisis of the 1930s has dem-
onstrated how rapidly economic decline can lead to a 
self-perpetuating and even stronger chain reaction of 
unemployment, falling demand, reduced investment 
and new unemployment with incalculable political con-
sequences. In this instance, not merely a small portion 
of luxury and standard of li ving would be endangered, 
but rather, the very basis of our democratic state. 11 
In retrospect, this initial government response to the 
nuclear controversy appeared to have little effect in gaining 
public support for an expansion of nuclear power. If any-
thing, public sentiment went in just the opposite direction. It 
did, however, represent a significant change in govern-
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ment's perception of the nuclear controversy; no longer 
would debate be conducted by dismissing nuclear opponents 
as left-wing radicals or back-to-nature romantics, with dire 
predictions of lights going out by the 1980s, or with public 
reassurances of nuclear reactor safety. 
As it developed, this Buergerdialog reflected a dawning 
recognition of the growing complexity of energy policy. 
High-ranking public officials understood that new elements 
had been introduced into the energy debate that required 
responses ifthe major components of the government energy 
program were to be realized. 
NUCLEAR POWER AND THE COURTS 
The anti-nuclear movement did not achieve an element of 
legitimacy so rapidly solely by mass demonstrations and 
appeals to the general public. A parallel and complementary 
course of action-less obtrusive but undeniably effective in 
actually influencing the plans ofindustry and government-
was redress through the legal system. 
In Baden-Wuerttemberg, where the Wyhl nuclear plant 
had aroused such emotion, the judges were very circumspect 
in handling the case. Because of its technical complexity and 
political sensitivity, traditional administrative court proce-
dures were set aside in favor of more flexible methods. 
Rather than taking the usual written testimonies of experts, 
the judges decided on a format similar to a hearing, where 
experts responded verbally to a catalogue of questions, 
where additional questions that came up in the course of the 
proceedings could be posed, and where the more controver-
sial details could be discussed among experts. Following 
such a format, the judges felt they were in a better position 
to differentiate between personal opinion and scientific 
knowledge. 12 
Taking an entire year to consider the case, the court 
finally announced its long-awaited decision in March 1977. 
It ruled that the construction permit (first stage approval) 
should be canceled on the ground that the proposed reactor 
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was not sufficiently secure against a possible rupture of the 
pressurized vessel that housed the reactor core. In addition, 
in order to receive a license in the future, the plant would be 
required to have an additional containment wall. 13 The 
construction stop originally agreed upon for political reasons 
was now legally binding on government and industry. 
In contrast to the Wyhl decision, which was based mainly 
on the hazards posed by a possible nuclear accident, the 
decision by the administrative courts in Schleswig-Holstein 
focused primarily on the potential problems ofnuclear waste 
disposal. Questioning whether an immediate start of con-
struction best served the public interest, the administrative 
court temporarily suspended the construction permit at 
Brokdorfin December 1976. In February 1977, the construc-
tion stop was extended until the appeals on the licensing had 
been heard in the higher administrative court; the rationale 
was the unresolved problems of storage and disposal of 
radioactive waste. And in October of that same year, the 
higher court ruled that two conditions had to be met before 
further construction licenses could be granted by the Schles-
wig-Holstein government: first, a testable application for 
interim storage facilities for spent fuel rods must have been 
submitted to the licensing agency; and second, geological 
studies to examine the suitability of the site for permanent 
storage facilities must have been initiated. 
That same month, on the basis of a June 1977 ruling by 
the administrative court in Lower Saxony, all construction 
on the nuclear plant at Grohnde ceased. The court had 
upheld the appeals of a chemical firm and pharmaceutical 
firm, which feared contamination of the medical products 
they produced because oftheir close proximity to the nuclear 
plant. 
The final significant case before the courts at this time 
dealt with an appeal of the license granted for the construc-
tion of a fast breeder reactor at Kalkar. This case was 
distinguished by its focus on the constitutional issue of 
executive prerogative in the licensing of a nuclear reactor of 
this advanced type. In a letter to those involved in the 
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litigation on the Kalkar fast breeder project, the chief judge 
of the higher administrative court in North Rhine-West-
phalia wrote: 
Consider the cumulative environmental problems re-
sulting from the radioactive waste of many individual 
nuclear power plants and the uncertainty associated 
with the final storage of nuclear waste; [and] the prob-
lems of military defense in a country with numerous 
nuclear installationso The control of a "plutonium econ-
omy" in terms of a growing share of investment capital 
devoted to the nuclear sector 0 0 0 Because of the possi-
ble consequences for the Federal Republic in terms of 
national and international interests such develop-
ments would entail, the question must be examined as 
to the extent to which irrevocable dependencies and 
forees possibly resulting from these developments 
should be subjected to direet parliamentary control and 
the concomitant democratic exchange between political 
partieso14 
Reflecting a sensitivity to many of the issues being de-
bated during summer 1977, thejudge, in essence, was argu-
ing that the Nuclear Energy Act, having been written in 
1959, could not have foreseen the long-term, far-reaching 
consequences inherent in the application of the fast breeder 
technologyo His conclusion was that the introduction of a 
technology so qualitatively different from its predecessors 
required parliamentary sanction rather than simply execu-
tive approval. To resolve the question, the judge requested 
that the highest court of the Federal Republic, the Consti-
tutional Court, make a ruling on such an interpretationo 
We can see that no single pattern emerged from the 
rulings of the various administrative courts: construction at 
Wyhl was stopped because of the possibility of serious acci-
dent; at Brokdorf because of the unresolved problems of 
waste disposal; and at Grohnde because of possible radioac-
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tive contamination resulting from power plant operations. 
At Kalkar the fast breeder program was threatened with 
long delays because of the constitutional question. 
The net effect of these court actions, however, was ehiHing 
for an industry that only a few years earlier had seemed on 
the threshold of an era of unprecedented expansion. By the 
end of 1977, work on three of the thirteen reactors under 
construction in the Federal Republic had been halted-four, 
if the three-month stop ordered by the courts for the Muel-
heim-Kaerlich reactor were included. At plants where 
courts had not imposed stops, practically all were experienc-
ing delays; of the three plants that were to come on line in 
1977, only one actually did. In 1977 only one nuclear power 
plant was issued a license to begin construction, only one 
order had been placed (a letter of intent for a 1300 MW plant 
at Neupotz), and no new projects had been announced. Fi-
nally, although construction on the Kalkar project had not 
been stopped while the Constitutional Court considered the 
case, the future of the fast breeder program appeared uncer-
tain if approval had to be sought in a parliament where 
nuclear power in general and the fast breeder reactor in 
particular had increasingly become the subject of intense 
internal party conflict. 
Th us, in combination with the pressures of environmental 
groups, the decisions of the courts served to frustrate gov-
ernment efforts to facilitate the implementation of central 
elements of the energy program. As we will see below, 
powerful interests in the domestic economy, which for var-
ious reasons were intent on the rapid expansion of nuclear 
energy, took steps to counter this development, thereby 
adding to the forees tugging on government officials. 
INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND THE NUCLEAR DEBATE 
In April 1969, with strong encouragement from the fed-
era! government, the two major German companies involved 
in nuclear reactor development-Siemens and AEG-
formed the Kraftwerk Union (KWU), a joint subsidiary 
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created to supply the national market as well as challenge 
the powerful American companies internationally.15 Once 
they were able to sever their license ties-Siemens did not 
renew its license agreement with Westinghouse in 1970 and 
AEG ended its commitment to General Electric in 1973-the 
two reactor divisions were consolidated; but by 1974, the 
year of consolidation, AEG had begun to suffer heavy losses. 
Problems with a leaky stearo pressure pipe in the boiling 
water technology used by AEG had necessitated changes in 
the one commercial reactor in operation and six others under 
construction. With construction delays of up to two years 
resulting in cost overruns, losses totaled over DM 300 mil-
lion; and because these contracts had been concluded before 
consolidation, Siemens was not required to share the losses. 
Already in a financially weak position, AEG decided to 
sell its 50 pereent ownership in KWU to Siemens in 1976. 
Despite the problems that had plagued AEG, however, op-
timism over the future ofKWU abounded within the nuclear 
industry and government alike. In 1974 and 1975 alone, 
KWU had received domestic orders for ten nuclear power 
plants; and with the conclusion of an agreement with Erazil 
in June 1975, the German company made a spectacular 
entrance into the world export market-an arena heretofore 
monopolized by the two large American companies. In the 
largest commercial transaction in nuclear industry history, 
Erazilian and West German government and industry offi-
cials negotiated an agreement calling for the delivery of two 
1300 MW reactors-with an option for six more by 1990-
along with the construction of uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing facilities, for a total cost of DM 12 billion. 
The international competitiveness of the West German 
nuclear industry seemed confirmed when, one year later, the 
Iranian government ordered two 1300 MW nuclear reactors 
at a cost of approximately DM 11 billion, with the prospect 
of more orders in the near future. In 1976, for the first time 
in its history, KWU broke even and, with these new orders 
in hand, anticipated profits for 1977. It is not surprising, 
then, that when the nuclear industry was threatened with 
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the combined effects of a growing anti-nuclear movement 
and the interjection of the administrative courts in the 
licensing process, it responded vigorously. 
This threat was most tangibly represented in a proposal 
introduced by the citizens' initiatives for a moratorium on 
nuclear power plant construction. In February 1977, the 
nuclear industry launched an intensive lobbying campaign 
with the publication of a memorandum written by KWU 
outlining the consequences of the proposed moratorium. It 
was sent to the President of the Federal Republic, the Chan-
cellor, all cabinet ministers, all members of the Bundestag, 
the chairmen and executive committees of the major politi-
cal parties, officials within the civil service, all members of 
the Laender parliaments, important industrial and labor 
organizations, and important figures in education and the 
media. 
The memorandum argued that: 
• With a domestic moratorium, 170,000 jobs would be lost 
and, with no further orders from overseas, the job loss 
would reach 260,000. 
• The Federal Republic would not be in a position to develop 
the more advanced reactor types-the fast breeder and 
high temperature reactors. 
• The highly trained teams of technicians, engineers, and 
scientists would be broken up and, once dissolved, could 
not effectively be reassembled. 
• As a consequence of an anticipated energy gap left by a 
moratorium, economic growth would decline, resulting in 
an additional 1.6 million unemployed by 1985. 
Subsequent statements by industry officials expanded 
some of these points: 
• Foreign countries would be reluctant to make any further 
orders since no domestic plants would be available to 
demonstrate the quality of the technology. 
• This loss in international competitiveness would lead to 
further loss of jobs and endanger the advanced technology 
that is the basis of Germany's projected export strength-
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a serious matter as the country's affluence depends to a 
large extent on its export sector. 16 
The immediate effect of this memorandum and of the 
private lobbying effort that accompanied it on those most 
directly responsible for energy policy was, in all likelihood, 
minimal. The government, for one, needed little encourage-
ment to push for its own energy policy. But sentiment for a 
moratorium had been growing within both coalition parties 
and, ifthis development were to be checked, organized labor 
would have to be enlisted as a source of pressure, especially 
in the case of the SPD. 
The appearance of quality of life concerns on the political 
agenda of the Federal Republic in the early 1970s had not 
been without effect on organized labor. Included in labor's 
calls for reform during this period were such issues as 
humanization of work (Humanizierung der Arbeit) and im-
proved li ving conditions, such as reduced pollutian in urban 
areas. Although there was little question where labor would 
stand when the choice was unequivocally between job pres-
ervation or improved environment, not all choices were so 
distinct. The sudden emergence of the nuclear controversy 
presented such an ambiguous issue. 
Compared to the total work force found in the German 
trade union movement, those employed in the nuclear in-
dustry represented only a small share. It was, therefore, by 
no means assured that labor, as such, would oppose a pro-
posed moratorium in view of growing reservations about 
nuclear energy among large segments of the general popu-
lation. As a consequence, the overriding priority of those 
whose jobs depended on a healthier nuclear industry was to 
mobilize their national organization. Without national 
union backing, little influence could be exerted on groups 
within the governing coalition parties to remove the imped-
iments blocking power plant construction. 
In the winter of 1976-77, an intense campaign was 
launched by local union organizations employed in the nu-
clear sector. These plant workers' councils focused their 
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lobbying efforts on the leadership of their national unions-
primarily lG Metall (metal workers) and lG Bau, Steine, 
Erde (construction). The ultimate intention was to persuade 
the powerful umbrella organization of organized labor-the 
Federation of German Trade Unions (Deutscher Gewerks-
chaftsbund, or DGB)-to come out against a moratorium. 
With the decision of lG Bergbau und Energie (representing 
the coal miners) to oppose such a moratorium actively, their 
prospects were enhanced appreciably. 
An alliance of coal and nuclear power would at first 
glance appear somewhat anomalous, coal being a potential 
beneficiary of any action resulting in restricted nuclear 
power expansion. Environmental groups, however, had been 
quite indiscriminate in their targets; local citizens' initia-
tives were instrumental in hindering the construction of 
several coal-fueled as well as nuclear power plants. Peter 
Reuschenbach, an SPD member of the Bundestag sympa-
thetic to coal interests, estimated that construction on six 
coal-fueled power plants, totaling 7,000 MW, with a 1,000 
MW plant consurning approximately two million tons of coal 
per year, had been blocked because oflegal uncertainties. 17 
With the coal sector reverting to its permanent state of crisis 
after a short-lived resurgence following the oil embargo (see 
Chapter 3), the coal and nuclear industries had enough 
common problems to justify an alliance that would counter 
the influence of the environmental movement and reduce 
the legal ambiguities that had been hindering power plant 
construction. 
The combined efforts of the local workers' councils within 
the nuclear industry and lG Bergbau, however, were appar-
ently having a little impact on the moratorium position ofiG 
Metall and the DGB. Reflecting a general concern for ques-
tions raised by nuclear critics in recent months as well as the 
divisive effect of the nuclear controversy within the country, 
DGB chairman Heinz-Oskar Vetter declared in March 1977 
that the decision for nuclear energy had been taken "without 
sufficient political and social discussion and without com-
plete information." He added that nuclear power plants 
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already under construction should be completed but that a 
too-rapid expansion would be irresponsible in view of the 
many objections from citizens and experts. 18 
This position was formalized by the DGB national exec-
utive council in a declaration issued April 5, 1977, entitled 
"Nuclear Energy and Environmental Protection." Citing the 
linkages between energy, economic growth, maintenance of 
international competitiveness, the impact of energy produc-
tion on the environment, and full employment, the state-
ment acknowledged the importance of the Brokdorf occur-
rences and the associated protest movement in activating 
the debate on future energy needs and the ways to satisfy 
them. The statement recognized that no socio-economic 
formula currently existed that could simultaneously resolve 
all economic, social, and environmental-health risks. The 
solution to the energy problem, therefore, could only be 
found within the framework of political compromise. Since 
the social system would be endangered if economic growth 
were foregone, construction must begin immediately on new 
coal power plants to replace the old and to cover future 
demand. Finally, although accepting the need for nuclear 
power plants, the statement called for all reservations to be 
cleared away before a final decision was made from which 
there would be no turning back.19 
The statement went on to specify a set of conditions that 
the DGB felt were necessary if all reservations alluded to 
earlier were to be removed: 
• The nuclear industry must formulate and submit a safe 
and economic waste disposal concept, the costs of which 
were not to be carried by the public sector. 
• Before the issuance of a construction permit for the re-
processing plant, no licenses for the construction of new 
nuclear power plants already under construction were to 
receive operating licenses, evaluations of the safety and 
waste disposal situation had to be positive.20 
This declaration essentially represented a DGB proposal 
for a moratorium. That is, the use of nuclear power was 
made contingent on the "solution"-as defined in the above 
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specifications-ofthe waste disposal problem, but the licens-
ing process that would be required to meet the conditions 
specified by the DGB would extend over at least a three-year 
period, during which time no nuclear power plants could 
receive construction or operating permits. 
MORATORIUM AND THE DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR WASTE 
The statement issued by the DGB on nuclear energy 
clearly demonstrated the competing forees and demands 
that had begun to coalesce around the energy issue and 
illustrated the types of choices being required of political 
and social institutions. However, as the DGB declaration 
implied, by 1977 the whole spectrum of issues defining the 
energy debate appeared to have been condensed into the 
controversy over a moratorium-a controversy that ulti-
mately centered on the problems and uncertainties of nu-
clear waste disposal. 
There is a certain irony connected with the moratorium 
focus on nuclear waste disposal, since the two groups most 
opposed to a long delay in nuclear power plant construc-
tion-the federal government and the nuclear industry-
were primarily responsible for the initial explicit linkage of 
plant construction to waste disposal. 
With an amendment to the Nuclear Energy Law, the 
nuclear industry was made responsible for the interim star-
age of spent fuel rods and reprocessing; the state was to 
assume responsibility for final storage of nuclear waste. 
lndustry's enthusiasm for this division of responsibility, 
however, soon waned; officials within the BMI, therefore, 
began in mid-1976 to evaluate various measures that would 
pressure private industry into completing its plans for a 
reprocessing center. The government feared that it would be 
forced to assume the costs of waste management as spent 
fuel rods began to accumulate from reactors already operat-
ing or scheduled to go on line in the near future. Speculation 
about industry's reason for dragging its feet on plans for the 
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reprocessing plant was that the industry feared reprocessing 
would not be as lucrative as originally anticipated. 
The strategy finally adopted was to suspend nuclear 
power plant licensing until plans for storage and waste 
disposal had been formulated. On December 16, 1976, Chan-
cellor Schmidt articulated this linkage, stating that licens-
ing for the construction of further nuclear power plants 
would depend on whether waste disposal were "adequately 
guaranteed".21 The criteria to be used in determining the 
adequacy ofwaste disposal, however, were left undefined. It 
was precisely over this issue that opinions diverged dramat-
ically. 
In an interim report on energy policy issued the following 
March, the government finally defined the prerequisites for 
further licensing; to be considered adequate: 
• A preliminary decision must be taken on the location of a 
waste disposal center. 
• The licensing procedure for the reprocessing plant must 
be underway through the application for the construction 
of storage tanks. 
• After a study of the safety report on the waste disposal 
center had been made, the Commissions on Reactor 
Safety and Radiation Protection-RSK <Reaktorsicher-
heitskommission) and SSK (Strahlenschutzkommission)-
must make a positive evaluation on the safety require-
ments for the disposal center. 22 
And with these criteria expected to be met by fall1977, the 
largest barrier to further construction delays, from the per-
spective of the government, would have been eliminated. As 
the demands formulated by the DGB in April demonstrated, 
however, support had been building outside government for 
different sets of criteria to be applied to the further licensing 
of nuclear plants. 
Noticeable for their absence in the energy debate 
throughout 1975 and 1976 were the political parties, the 
organizations traditionally viewed as the intermediaries 
between citizens and government in the West German 
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political process and, as such, legitimators of government 
policy. Perhaps most indicative of this was a virtual silenee 
during the campaign preceding the national Bundestag elec-
tions in fall1976 on the issue ofnuclear power. But by early 
1977 both partiesin the coalition government, the SPD and 
FDP, appeared to be making an effort toregain avoice in an 
issue heretofore dominated by extra-parliamentary groups. 
A conference sponsored by the SPD in late April entitled 
"Energy, Employment, Quality ofLife"-the first of its kind 
by a political party in the Federal Republic-represented a 
significant step in this direction. The discussions were bal-
anced, well-informed and wide-ranging, touching upon the 
major issues of controversy in the energy debate. But the 
conference also illustrated and brought into sharper public 
focus one of the major problems posed by the energy issue to 
the SPD-the serious and deep splits within the party over 
nuclear energy. On the one hand, there was the Chancellor, 
members of his cabinet, and those identified with the more 
conservative elements of the SPD-primarily Bundestag 
deputies from North Rhine-Westphalia closely aligned with 
labor in general and coal in particular-who emphasized in 
the discussions the tight linkage between full employment, 
economic growth, and the unavoidable need for nuclear 
energy. On the other hand, there were those primarily 
identified with the left or center-left of the party-Erhard 
Eppler, a former cabinet minister under Brandt and chair-
man of the SPD in Baden-Wuerttemberg, being the informal 
leader of this faction-who stressed the need for a pause in 
the construction of nuclear power plants for careful evalua-
tion of the alternatives to nuclear energy and the feasibility 
of a qualitative growth based on energy conservation, pres-
ervation of the environment, and, at the same time, creation 
of jobs.23 
Its smaller coalition partner, the FDP, was not immune to 
the sort of divisions developing within the SPD. The FDP 
cabinet ministers in the federal government-Foreign, Eco-
nomics, Interior, and Agriculture-and their backers sup-
ported Economics Minister Friderichs's energy program, 
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and those identified largely with the left wing of the party 
pushed for a moratorium. 
The first real test of strength in either party took place at 
the FDP's executive meeting in June at Saarbruecken. By a 
narrow margin it was decided that the party should call for 
further requirements for the licensing of new nuclear plants: 
safe, controllable final storage of highly radioactive waste, 
technically safe interim storage, and, most significantly, the 
licensing of a site (first stage approval) for final storage. 24 In 
other words, those in favor of an extended moratorium had 
won the day, since the licensing of waste disposal facilities 
would require several years as opposed to simply initiating 
steps in the licensing process. 
Three months later, a similar showdown occurred at a 
meeting of the SPD executive committee. A proposal drafted 
by Research Minister Matthoefer, using the government's 
previously articulated formula for adequate waste dis-
posal, was narrowly defeated, whereupon a counterproposal 
drafted by Rudie Arndt in consultation with Erhard Ep-
pler-both identified with the left-was presented. The 
counterproposal corresponded almost exactly with that of 
the DGB declaration of April 5. By the smallest of margins, 
the counterproposal passed. When this vote was taken, how-
ever, Chancellor Schmidt and two of his ministers had left to 
attend a meeting of the emergency group set up after the 
terrorist kidnapping of Hans-Martin Schleyer, president of 
the powerful Federation of German Industry.25 
Although no overwhelming mandate appeared to have 
developed on either side regarding nuclear policy, support 
for a moratorium seemed to have gained momentum 
through summer 1977 with the decisions of the DGB, FDP, 
and the SPD to push for an extended delay in nuclear plant 
construction. Even as the executive committee of the SPD 
passed its resolution, however, there were indications of a 
shift taking place. 
Most importantly, the alliance of coal and nuclear indus-
tries that had been forged within organized labor by the 
chairman of IG Bergbau, Adolph Schmidt, had begun to 
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make its presence felt within the DGB. The months of 
private lobbying and public demonstrations by the plant 
workers' councils in the electrical and nuclear industries 
started to bear fruit when, in September 1977, the member-
ship attending the union congress of IG Metall-the largest 
and most influential of the German trade unions-joined IG 
Berghau-one of the more powerful unions in the Federal 
Republic-in its opposition to a moratorium. Change within 
the DGB was inevitable. 
Ata Bundestag hearing in October 1977, a DGB repre-
sentative testified that the use of nuclear energy to cover 
future energy needs was unavoidable and that several neg-
ative consequences, especially in the area of employment, 
would result from permitting further delays in the construc-
tion of power plants. This theme had been played up contin-
ually in preceding months. For example, in a speech deliv-
ered at the IG Bergbau congress, Adolph Schmidt stated, 
"Currently ... construction on 10 power plants (whose total 
investment comes to DM 16 billion) is being hindered by 
court dec1sions, delayed permits, and citizens' initiatives 
... If I correctly assess the various relationships, DM 16 
billion translates into an approximate 1.5 pereent rise in 
GNP. If construction were to begin on these plants, we would 
have-according to my estimates-almost 200,000 fewer 
unemployed. "26 
On November 8, 1977, the executive committee of the 
DGB made official the reversal of its earlier position, reem-
phasizing the dangers posed to jobs by further delays in the 
construction of coal and nuclear plants. Using arguments 
resembling those of the nuclear industry, the DGB stated 
that jobs would be lost in construction firms and reactor 
industries as well as their subcontractors, and that jobs, in 
addition to factors related to future "quality of life," de-
pended on maiutaining Germany's international position in 
the development of high technology products.27 For effect, 
this revised position was announced at a mass rally of 
approximately 30,000 that was staged by labor in support of 
coal and nuclear power just days before the SPD was to hold 
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its annual party congress. At this meeting, energy was 
scheduled to take center stage. 
The FDP, also scheduled to hold its party congress in 
November, had not been exempt from such lobbying follow-
ing the executive committee's decision in June. Union lob-
bying had some effect, but most overt were the efforts by the 
nuclear industry's lobby, Atomforum, to push for a rever-
sal.28 Its campaign began with the publication of a widely-
distributed fifty-page booklet outlining in detail the threat-
ened consequences of an FDP-instigated moratorium. These 
were similar to those projected earlier in the KWU memo-
randum: a loss of 200,000 to 250,000 jobs related to the 
construction of nuclear power plants by 1985, with miilions 
of additional jobs threatened by insufficient production of 
electricity, an irreversible loss of competitiveness in the 
world market for the German nuclear industry, and so 
forth. 29 This document was followed up by mo re selective 
lobbying. But having equal or greater impact were initia-
tives undertaken within the party itself by Economics Min-
ister Friderichs and his eventual successor at the Economics 
Ministry, Count Lambsdorf, to dissuade colleagues from 
supporting a moratorium. 
These efforts appeared to pay off at the Kiel party con-
gress where, after extremely difficult negotiations, a com-
promise formula signaled a muted victory for the oppo-
nents of a moratorium. Couched in carefully worded 
phrases, the resolution on energy policy called for nuclear 
energy only after the exhaustion of all other possibilities-
conservation, improved efficiency of conventional power 
producers, and alternative energy sources, with special at-
tention paid to the interests of the coal sector. In order to 
cover a shortfall in energy production that was expected to 
develop after 1985, however, the resolution stipulated that 
new construction permits should be granted once two con-
ditions were met: safe final and interim storage facilities 
for nuclear waste, with this condition defined as being met 
when the government and Bundestag said so; and prelimi-
nary positive findings from geological studies confirming 
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the suitability of the site for final storage of radioactive 
waste.30 
This decision of the FDP to drop the linkage between new 
construction and the licensing of a waste disposal site, fol-
lowed within days by the DGB's demand for renewed licens-
ing of nuclear plant construction, set the stage for a hattle 
royal at the SPD congress held in Hamburg from November 
15 to 19. 
Reflecting the divergent views represented within the 
SPD and the difficulties impeding the search for a compro-
mise formula to reconcile the various demands, the resolu-
tion that finally received the endorsement of the congress 
attempted to touch all bases. Full employment was accorded 
the highest priority and, for electricity production, coal was 
to be favored over all other fuels. Only when additional 
energy demand could not be met by coal-fueled power plants 
were new nuclear plants to be licensed; and the prerequisite 
was to be guaranteed waste disposal. This condition would 
be satisfied only after the licensing of a waste disposal 
center, but if a shortfall in energy should develop in the 
medium term which, for compelling reasons, could not be 
covered by additional coal plants, construction permits for 
new nuclear reactors would be granted in exceptional cases if 
waste disposal were guaranteed through contractually bind-
ing agreements until storage facilities had been constructed 
(my emphasis).31 
Thus, moratorium support that had earlier been gather-
ing momentum appeared to be eroding by the latter part of 
1977. Both the DGB and FDP had dropped their demands for 
making new nuclear construction contingent on the licens-
ing of a waste disposal center; and although the new SPD 
resolution stiil retained this linkage, the loopholes in its 
formulation were substantial. "Compelling reasons" or "ex-
ceptional cases" were left undefined. 
With a modicum of consensus apparently restored 
through the compromises achieved at both party congresses, 
the government finally felt able to carry out a long-post-
poned second revision of its energy program. 
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A REVISED GOVERNMENT ENERGY PROGRAM 
Since the first revision ofthe energy program in fall1974, 
several unanticipated developments had changed the con-
text of domestic energy policy dramatically. There was the 
swift rise of a powerful opposition to nuclear energy, inter-
vention ofthe courts in the decision-making process, a grow-
ing preoccupation oflabor with threats to employment posed 
by a moratorium, increasing pressures from the nuclear 
industry for government action, and the divisions develop-
ing inside both coalition parties that made government 
action extremely difficult. At the same time, changes in 
patterns of energy demand and supply were taking place, as 
we saw in Chapter 3. The need for a revision of the govern-
ment's energy program was becoming apparent; but many of 
these developments also militated against a reformulation 
of energy policy. Most significantly, only minimal consen-
sus, if any, existed among the disparate interests over the 
future direction of German energy policy, and this gave rise 
to conflict over immediate measures, which invariably had 
longer-term implications. The result was predictable; the 
second revision, originally scheduled for March or April 
1977, was postponed indefinitely. 
In its stead, the government decided to publish what was 
called "Outlines and Key Data for the Revision of the En-
ergy Program" (Grundlinien und Eckwerte fuer die Forts-
chreibung des Energieprogramms) as an interim statement 
on energy policy. Published by the Chancellory, it docu-
mented the issues of greatest concern from the perspective of 
the Chancellor and his cabinet at that time: "The debate of 
recent months has demolished the political framework of 
energy policy. The necessity of increasing energy consump-
tion is being questioned; a drastic reduction in the growth of 
consumption is being demanded. The question is being ex-
panded to indude the necessity of economic growth in gen-
eral. The discussion, especially coneerning nuclear energy, 
has takenon a moral-political dimension which has led to 
uncertainty among broad segments of the population."32 
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In responding to these issues, the government emphasized 
the importance of economic gr9wth, predicting dire out-
comes uniess growth rates achieved at least 4.5 pereent to 
1980 and 4 pereent through 1985. Among the threats fore-
seen by the government were the possibility of serious un-
employment problems, the inability to guarantee the financ-
ing of social security programs, the possible danger to re-
quired public investment because of declining government 
revenues, the inability to solve internal income and distri-
bution problems as well as current structural problems of 
the economy, the endangering of attempts to alleviate hal-
anee of payments deficits and employment problems of im-
portant trading partners, and the inability to finance mea-
sures protecting the environment. The government then 
explicitly stated the need for nuclear power to maintain 
economic growth, declaring that despite the greater use of 
conservation to improve the ratio between economic growth 
and energy consumption and the greater use of coal, 30,000 
MW of electricity would have to be produced from nuclear 
energy by 1985. 
Aside from these elaimed general effects of lower eco-
nomic growth, the government warned of the loss of 25,000 
jobs in the nuclear industry itself, with this number multi-
plied many times when subcontracting industries were 
taken into account. There would also be the loss of compet-
itive position from the breakup of specialized teams and 
setbacks in the development of advanced reactors and of 
their later commercialization if delays in the construction of 
nuclear power plants continued. These points corresponded 
to many of the arguments used by industry in disputing the 
proposed moratorium. 
This general report, then, established government's con-
tinued advocacy of swift nuclear expansion despite the ar-
guments of those proposing a moratorium, arguments that 
were being buttressed by surpluses that had begun to appear 
in the oil, coal, and electricity production sectors. Although 
projections of energy consumption were being revised down-
ward-from 555 million tons CE for 1985 in the first revision 
West Germany, 1973--1977 97 
to 496 million tons CE in the new version, with nuclear 
power' s share going from 45,000/50,000 MW to 30,000 MW-
nuclear power was still to represent 13 pereent of total 
consumption by 1985 instead of the first revision's 15 per-
cent. 
In December 1977 the government finally announced the 
long-delayed second revision.33 Reflecting the controversy 
that had surrounded the nuclear issue and the hard-won 
compromises at the party congresses, the government's ap-
proach to nuclear energy was much more reserved in its 
second revision than in the preceding ones; it was to be 
developed only to the extent "absolutely necessary to secure 
electricity supply." But: 
Even given priority for the exploitation of other sources 
[primarily conservation, coal, and lignite] ... the Fed-
era} Government considers the construction of new 
nuclear plants on a correspondingly restricted scale to 
be absolutely necessary, especially in a regional con-
text, tomeet medium- and long-term requirements in 
the individual load categories; in view of the high 
safety standards attained, this is consideredjustifiable. 
Furthermore, energy and industrial policy consider-
ations dictate the need for keeping open the nuclear 
option and new projects will help achieve this. 34 
This formulation was purposely vague and therefore sub-
ject to wide interpretation; and noticeable by their absence 
were the quantitative goals specified in the earlier pro-
grams. Only in the appendix to the second revision was the 
figure of 24,000 MW production for 1985 given and this only 
in the context of the studies conducted by the research 
institutes in preparation of the program; it was not to be part 
of the official government energy program. The government 
did outline what was to determine "adequate and safe" 
waste disposal facilities, the prerequisite for any further 
development of nuclear energy. 
Before the publication of the second revision, the govern-
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ment had already done the following. First, it had adopted 
the evaluations of the Reactor Safety and Radiation Protec-
tion Commissions, published in October 1977, which as-
sessed positively the suitability of the proposed waste dis-
posal center at Gorleben. Second, an agency of the govern-
ment had filed a request with the government of Lower 
Saxony for approval of preliminary test drillings which, 
along with further geological tests, were to provide the 
necessary information on the site. Third, the federal govern-
ment had reached agreements with other Laender govern-
ments on interim storage facilities until the storage tanks at 
Gorleben were completed. 
On the basis of these and other measures, the following 
approval procedures for nuclear power plants' waste disposal 
were established: 
a. Approval for the construction of new nuclear power 
plants [first stage approval--erste Teilerrichtungsgen-
ehmigung] are acceptable from the disposal point of 
view if the waste is assured-in the case of storage 
facilities abroad by contracts-until such time as the 
waste centre has been completed; this indudes proof of 
the availability of interim storage facilities for ex-
tended time spans at home and abroad. 
In the opinion of the Federal Government these new 
nuclear power stations should not be granted operating 
approval until first stage approval for the waste centre 
has been given or adequate disposal abroad has been 
assured. 
b. Nuclear power plants for which approval has already 
been given should in the view of the Federal Govern-
ment be completed. Approval for the operation will 
however not be given until waste disposal is ade-
quately assured in line with para. 1 of (a) above for the 
time up to the completion of the waste centre.35 
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POLICY AND QUESTIONS 
The second revision, and the events preceding it, graph-
ically demonstrated the types of problems encountered in 
the implementation of a comprehensive energy strategy as 
well as the responses such problems elicited. 
In earlier pages we have seen the increasing complexity 
that came to characterize the domestic political arena, with 
a vast array of actors making competing, often conflicting 
claims on government. At first, the BMW i and coal interests 
had been the major participants in the policymaking pro-
cess, but by 1977 the number had expanded to indude 
environmental groups, the courts, Laender governments, 
several other federal ministries (such as BMI and BMFT), 
political parties, organized labor beyond the coal sector, and 
energy industries (nuclear, coal, oil, and natural gas). Each 
pursued specific goals which were often incompatible with 
those of the others. Not only had the number ofparticipants 
and policy objectives multiplied, but their interactions were 
greatly amplified by the open, pluralistic nature of the West 
German political system. Citizens' initiatives and the courts 
had dramatic effects on the nuclear and coal industries as 
well as on government energy plans. Repercussions were felt 
within the major economic and political institutions of the 
country, which subsequently brought new pressures to bear 
on government. Government policies also affected develop-
ments in energy sectors other than nuclear, which provoked 
new demands for government action. For example, the coal 
sector called for more government intervention to counter 
the effects of low fuel oil prices on coal sales, greater efforts 
to remove obstacles to coal power plant construction, and 
less government promotion of natural gas use. Indeed, in its 
first revision of the energy program, the government had 
emphasized greater natural gas use to reduce oil consump-
tion and had concluded several long-term agreements, pri-
marily with Iran and Algeria, for the delivery of natural gas 
into the twenty-first century. 
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The effect of these conflicts on public officials responsible 
for German energy policy was to substantially heighten 
their uncertainty. Among the questions confronting poli-
cymakers: 
• What are the environmental and political consequences of 
expanded nuclear production-the physical dangers of 
radioactivity and the dangers to personal and political 
freedoms posed by the types of controis and regulations 
required for such a technology? 
• In face of the growing opposition to nuclear power within 
the country, what would be the political and social con-
sequences of a forced expansion of nuclear energy? Would 
the present government be voted out of office, or would 
there arise social unrest resembling civil war? 
• Can a country highly dependent on imported oil for its 
energy supply forego the nuclear option, given the vul-
nerability of the national economy to an oil embargo or to 
rapid price hikes? 
• What are the economic and social consequences for a 
society to eschew traditional economic growth patterns in 
favor of a no-growth or qualitative growth policy? Can it 
rely primarily on rigorous conservation measures and 
renewable energy sources? How can it deal with unem-
ployment, increasing social unrest, and demands for re-
distribution of an economic pie that is no longer expand-
ing? 
Ifpublic officials were uncertain about what to do, some of 
the groups they had to deal with had all the certainty that 
strongly held values or a sense of survival could provide. For 
environmentalists, the priority of ecological concerns ren-
dered other issues secondary. Their concern for environmen-
tal protection meant that their opposition to nuclear power 
could not be compromised. For the nuclear industry, sur-
vival was clearly the motive behind its aggressive advocacy 
of nuclear power. The industry was not indifferent to public 
safety, but its perceptions of the dangers were somewhat 
different from those of nuclear opponents. For organized 
labor, growing agitation within several powerful trade 
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unions reflected the traditional overriding concern of the 
labor movement with employment. When jobs appeared 
threatened, all other considerations became secondary, in-
cluding the less tangible and more controvertible threats of 
expanding nuclear power production. 
Laeking any real consensus on such fundamental ques-
tions and facing competing forees not disposed to compro-
mise, the government suffered a virtual paralysis in the 
implementation of significant elements of its energy pro-
gram. The initial response of public officials was to delay 
decisions on energy policy that would exacerbate the divi-
sions within the governing coalition parties as well as in 
society at large. The political consequences of any policy 
decision on nuclear energy appeared so uncertain that the 
government continually postponed issuing a second revision 
to its energy pro gr am. On ee this course of inaction no longer 
seemed feasible, the government opted for a second strategy, 
one that did not foreclose any options. That is, it hedged its 
bets. On the basis of the compromises negotiated within the 
coalition f)arties, thereby simulating a measure of consensus 
among labor, industry and political parties, the energy pro-
gram was amended for the second time. 
Thus, the second revision was an attempt to restore con-
sensus to the policymaking process. Conservation was given 
formai priority; this alienated no one and incorporated the 
most important element of any environmentalist's energy 
program. Commitments to conservation, however, were not 
to be at the expense of developing costly alternative energy 
technologies. The revision reaffirmed the privileged position 
of coal, thereby shoring up support within the government's 
critical constituencies. The plan minimized the future re-
quirements for nuclear energy; but despite the many qual-
ifications and reservations attached to nuclear power, its 
necessity was stiil acknowledged by government. As we will 
see in the next chapter, these broad, vague formulations, 
retaining virtually all options, failed to revive the political 
consensus that was required for hard choices. 
5. Stalemate in West Germany, 
1978-1984 
For many government officials and politicians in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the second re vision of the energy 
program promised an end to the turmoil and uncertainty 
that had characterized the past. It provided a framework 
within which problems of recent years could be worked out 
in a spirit of accommodation rather than confrontation, 
enabling the central elements of the government's energy 
program to be preserved. The signs were propitious: the 
large, often violent, demonstrations had been abandoned by 
environmental groups; the various factions within the coa-
lition parties apparently recognized the need for compro-
mise; and both labor and industry seemed satisfied by gov-
ernment pronouncements on coal and nuclear energy. But 
expectations of progress proved ill-founded, as subsequent 
events soon demonstrated. 
NUCLEAR POWER AND ELECTORAL POLITICS 
Conspicuous by its absence throughout the campaign pre-
ceding national parliamentary elections in fall 1976 was a 
discussion of government energy policy. This silenee was 
due, in large part, to agreement among the principal polit-
ical parties on the central elements of German energy policy. 
Nevertheless, an increasingly acrimonious controversy over 
nuclear power had begun to attract considerable public at-
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tention. Tensions emerged during 1977, particularly within 
the two coalition parties, to threaten this general consensus, 
but the compromises in the revised government energy pro-
graro of December 1977 appeared to restore a modicum of 
agreement on energy policy (although the opposition CDU/ 
CSU was critical of government equivocation on the future 
role ofnuclear power). However, the issues that precipitated 
the divisions within both the SPD and FDP in the course of 
1977 had not disappeared-nor had the groups most dissat-
isfied with the vague government pronouncements on en-
ergy policy. Because of their disaffection with the existing 
political process, environmentalists set out to make nuclear 
power a major issue in the series of electoral campaigns for 
representation in Laender parliaments leading up to the 
Bundestag elections scheduled for October 1980. 
GREEN PARTIES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 
Continual waffiing of the political parties on the morato-
rium issue throughout 1977, as well as government's un-
willingness to take an unequivocating stand on nuclear 
energy, convinced many environmentalists that the estab-
lished political parties were more a part of the environmen-
tal problem than of its solution. They decided that additional 
measures were required if the expansion of nuclear power 
was to be halted. 
Until that time, most public opposition to nuclear energy 
had been organized in loosely-coordinated, ad hoc citizens' 
initiatives and was pursued through mass demonstrations 
and court actions. But in March 1977 in France, the ecolo-
gistes had considerable success in local French elections, 
receiving up to 15 pereent of the vote in several districts. 
Taking a page from the French, German environmentalists 
decided to challenge the traditional parties at the ballot box. 
In early 1978, "Green" parties were formed in Lower Saxony 
and Hamburg, where Laender elections were scheduled for 
that June. The Greens performed well enough in these two 
Laender that environmental parties were organized in each 
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subsequent Land holding elections. By 1980, a national 
Green party was created to contest the fall Bundestag elec-
tion, which would determine the compositian of the federal 
government over the next four years. 
As Table 11 (Appendix) shows, the Greens achieved vary-
ing degrees of electoral success when measured by pereent-
age of votes attracted; however, the numbers fail to reflect 
the actual impact of the Greens not only in affecting the 
outcome of several elections but also in determining the 
content of debate and the party positions in the electoral 
campaign. 
Opposition to nuclear power was the main plank in the 
Greens' electoral platform, but it was not the only one. Many 
other themes were struck during the Laender election cam-
paigns, varying somewhat from region to region. Prominent 
among these issues was the direction of current industrial 
development, with the Greens recommending the establish-
ment of ecologically benign industries. They attacked prob-
lems such as further freeway construction, housing, defor-
estation, waste disposal, and air and water pollution. They 
proposed more environmentally oriented plauning in trans-
portation and regional and urban development. More gen-
erally, they criticized dependence on economic growth and 
the achievement-oriented society (Leistungsgesellschaft). 
In an attempt to organize a national party and formulate 
a program to carry into the federal elections, the Greens 
extended the scope of their campaign platform far beyond 
strictly ecological questions. Contained in the program fi-
nally adopted by the party were a proposal for the thirty-five 
hour work week, prohibition of employer lockouts, demands 
for the breakup of large combines (Grosskonzerne) into 
smaller and more controllable firms to be run by the em-
ployees or co-workers (Mitarbeiter), liberalization of abor-
tion laws, a call for the dissolution of military blocs in 
Europe such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and unilateral 
disarmament within the Federal Republic. 
Nevertheless, opposition to nuclear power was the core 
grievance around which the environmental movement had 
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rallied, and the Greens campaigned vigorously against fur-
ther construction of nuclear power plants, as well as calling 
for the shutdown of plants then operating. They opposed 
reprocessing and the development of the fast breeder reactor 
(FBR). Emphasizing these themes in their initial outings, 
the Green parties produced minor electoral sensations. 
In Lower Saxony and Hamburg, the Greens failed to 
receive 5 pereent of thevoteas required by the West German 
law to gain representation in parliament. What they did do, 
however, was draw off enough votcs from the established 
parties to bring the FDP (the smallest and, therefore, most 
vulnerable of the parties) below the 5 pereent margin. This 
cost the Liberals representation in parliament as well as 
participation in government, for the party had been in coa-
lition with the SPD in Hamburg and the CDU in Lower 
Saxony. The implications of these election results were not 
lost on FDP politicians: ifthe trend continued through to the 
Bundestag elections, the very existence of the party would 
be threatened. 
The environmentalists had little impact on the electoral 
outcomesin Hesse, Bavaria, and Berlin, but they influenced 
the substance of the debate. In Hesse especially, the SPD 
and FDP waged aggressive campaigns emphasizing their 
commitment to environmental protection and their reserva-
tions about the expansion of nuclear power. This trend 
continued as attention shifted to northern Germany in 
spring 1979. 
From all outward appearances, little had changed be-
cause of the Schleswig-Holstein elections. The CDU was 
returned to power, the SPD increased its vote by a slight 
percentage, the FDP remained in parliament although it fell 
uncomfortably close to the 5 pereent cutoff, and the Green 
party received only 2.4 pereent of the vote. Y et, despite this 
rather small share, the environmentalists had exerted a 
significant influence on the campaign and its outcome. In all 
likelihood, they kept the CDU in government because of the 
votestaken away from the SPD and FDP. But more impor-
tant, with nuclear power the central issue of the campaign, 
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the Green party's unwavering position established the con-
text and starting point for debate. Ever since the Brokdorf 
demonstrations and the CDU government's role in them, 
nuclear power had been a hotly debated issue in Schleswig-
Holstein. In addition, the controversy over the Gorleben 
waste disposal center (discussed below) had been intensify-
ing. To top it all off, the nuclear accident at Three Mile 
Island occurred just one mon th before election day. As a 
consequence, both the regional SPD and FDP made every 
effort to distance themselves from the position of their own 
national government, with the SPD being especially vehe-
ment in its opposition to nuclear power. 
Within a span of ten months, the Greens had altered the 
outcome of several elections, set the tenor and content of 
certain campaigns, and compelled the established parties to 
address the issues that most concerned the environmental-
ists. What they had failed to do up to this point, however, 
was demonstrate an ability to play anything but a spoiler's 
role, that is, to be more than a protest vote. This changed as 
the 5 pereent threshold was surmounted in Bremen in Oc-
tober 1979 and Baden-Wuerttemberg in March 1980. The 
Green party was finally in a position to make a more credible 
case for its ability to play a positive role in the political 
process through parliamentary representation-a factor 
considered critical for its chances in the 1980 national elec-
tion where Franz Josef Strauss was the candidate for Chan-
cellor of the CDU/CSU. 
Long associated with the far right in German politics, 
Strauss as Chancellor was a prospect inimical to many 
voters who otherwise might have been sympathetic to the 
Greens. If the Greens were seen as having a good chanee of 
receiving 5 pereent of the vote, those supporting the envi-
ronmentalists but opposed to Strauss would be less hesitant 
to vote Green. If, on the other hand, the Green party seemed 
unlikely to achieve 5 percent, voters would hesitate to vote 
Green because their votes would, in essence, be voided when 
calculating parliamentary representation, thereby enhanc-
ing the possibility of Strauss becoming Chancellor. 
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As it turned out, the Greens were not a significant factor 
in the outcome of the Bundestag elections in October 1980. 
In the years to follow, however, electoral results (see Table 
11, Appendix) made them a force to reckon with: 
• The March 1983 federal elections brought the Greens into 
the Bundestag, with their strong environmental platform 
by this time joined by an uncompromising position on 
nuclear disarmament-in particular their opposition to 
the placement of American Pershing II and cruise mis-
siles in Europe. 
• In almost every regional election since 1980, the Greens/ 
Alternatives received well over 5 pereent of the vote. 
• In Hamburg and Hesse, they denied the FDP representa-
tion in parliament. 
• In two instances, Hamburg and Hesse, they held the 
halanee of power-no majority could exist without the 
Greens. 
For the Greens themselves, however, entering public life 
has had its trials and tribulations. From the party's incep-
tion, tensions have existed between those on the left who 
stressed economic, social, and defense-related issues and 
those more conservative groups who resisted dilution of the 
ecological principles that had initially guided the Green 
movement. More recently, tensions have arisen over the 
proper role of the Greens in the state and federal legisla-
tures. 
Having come into existence as an anti-party party, the 
Greens have differed over the degree to which they should 
engage in practices common to parliamentary politics. The 
"Fundos" or fundamentalists oppose collaboration and com-
promise, believing that such practices corrupt the principles 
that set the Greens apart from the established parties. The 
"Realos" or realists-pragmatists see cooperation and com-
promise as options under certain circumstances. Up to now, 
the willingness of the Greens to make allianees has been 
tested in Hamburg and Hesse. 
Following the June 1982 elections in Hamburg, the 
Greens engaged in negotiations with the SPD over mutually 
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acceptable terms if they were to cooperate. When they were 
unable to agree, a quick election in December of that same 
year returned an SPD majority to parliament, ending the 
need for an alliance. In Hesse, the September 1982 elections 
again left the Greens holding the halanee of seats. After a 
delay of a year, the minority SPD government called for 
elections in October 1983, but the outcome stiil left the 
major parties unable to form a majority government without 
the Greens. After months of talks, an alliance was formed 
between the SPD and the Greens. The Greens voted for the 
state budget and confirmed the SPD prime minister in office; 
in return, the SPD government agreed, among other things, 
to a halt on the construction of new nuclear power plants. 
The Realos in control of the Greens in Hesse, as well, 
compromised on several issues, lifting their demand that all 
nuclear power plants in the state be closed and dropping 
their opposition to a new runway at the Frankfurt airport. 
By November 1984, however, the working coalition fell 
apart as the Greens announced the end of their cooperation 
with the SPD government after it had endorsed the expan-
sion of nuclear fuel production facilities located in Hesse. 1 
Thus, the features unique to the German electoral sys-
tem, in combination with the delicate, often precarious, 
representational halanee among the established political 
parties, contrived to enhance appreciably the leverage of the 
environmentalists in the political process. A major conse-
quence was that nuclear opponents were able to keep at 
center stage the controversies surrounding government en-
ergy policy. The situation faced thepartiesin the governing 
coalition with perplexing dilemmas: 
1. At the Land level, do you-the local SPD and FDP-
continue to support the energy program of the federal gov-
ernment, thereby increasing the prospect of defections to the 
Green parties, defections perhaps sufficient to keep you out 
of offi ee or eve n out of parliament?2 Or do you pursue a more 
independent line, withholding support from major elements 
of official energy policy, thereby making the program infi-
nitely more difficult to execute? 
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2. At the national level, do you-the party leadership in 
government-continue to push for implementation of an 
energy program which, although absolutely necessary from 
your perspective, will accentuate divisions within the party 
and exacerbate relations between national leadership and 
Laender party organizations? Or do you back off from your 
announced program, thereby making the coalition govern-
ment more vulnerable to attacks from the political opposi-
tion? 
A PLUTONIUM ECONOMY 
Electoral considerations established the tactical context 
of domestic politics in the Federal Republic during much of 
the period from 1978 on. By early 1980, with United States-
Soviet relations deteriorating in the wake of the Iranian 
revolution and the Afghanistan occupation, the status of the 
Atlantic alliance and East-West detente had also become 
issues of concern in the campaign. During 1981-82, the issue 
ofnuclear rearmament became more prominent as the peace 
movement in West Germany gained momentum, lending 
greater strength to the Greens. With the deepening reces-
sion during the same period, economic policy began to re-
ceive greater attention. Finally, coalition politics came to 
dominate certain elections; in Hesse, the FDP's tactics of 
abandoning the coalition in Bonn became the focal point of 
the election. Nevertheless, energy policy remaineda princi-
pal substantive focus. The major points of controversy cen-
tered on two important components of the government's 
energy program: reprocessing of nuclear waste and develop-
ment of the fast breeder reactor. 
For several reasons, these technologies seemed crucial to 
the future security of German energy supply: 
• By closing the nuclear fuel cycle through the reprocessing 
of spent fuel rods from light water reactors (LWRs), sub-
stantial amounts of unused uranium could be recovered, 
thereby extending the supply of uranium, which other-
wise would have to be imported. 
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• At the same time, plutonium produced in the operation of 
L WRs could be extracted and later be recycled as fuel for 
FBRs. 
• By producing more plutonium than they consumed in 
their operation, FBRs represented one of the few technol-
ogies which, in the longer term, promised to reduce Ger-
man dependence on dwindling foreign energy supplies, 
whether oil, uranium, or natural gas. 
• Finally, reprocessing was a necessary stage in the dis-
posal of nuclear waste. After separating those elements 
that could be re-used from leftover radioactive waste 
products, the most radioactive and long-lasting of these 
wastes were to be concentrated and permanently isolated 
from the environment. 
The waste disposal problem had become the pivotal issue 
relating to the further expansion of nuclear power in the 
Federal Republic. Central to the government's plan for nu-
clear waste disposal was the construction of a large, inte-
grated facility designed to reprocess spent fuel rods and 
provide final burial for nuclear waste, all within a single 
site. This was called an Entsorgungszentrum. (There is no 
corresponding term in English. Literally translated, Entsor-
gung implies the alleviation of worry or concern.) Before 
1977, this part of Germany's nuclear program received little 
public attention, but when further nuclear power plant con-
struction was explicitly linked with safe disposal of nuclear 
waste in late 1976, pressure began to build for quicker 
action. The task of the private sector was to formulate plans 
for the reprocessing facilities; for its part, the federal gov-
ernment had to deeide on a site suitable for long-term stor-
age of high-level radioactive materials. Unfortunately for 
the government, this need for a rapid decision on the Entsor-
gungszentrum came just when the first effects of nation-
wide opposition to nuclear energy were beginning to have 
political impact. As a consequence, over the next several 
years the Entsorgung question became a political hot potato 
gingerly passed back and forth between federal and Laender 
governments. 
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After evaluating various methods of permanent waste 
disposal, federal officials had decided on burial in geologi-
cally stable salt formations, several ofwhich were thought to 
be present in Lower Saxony. Accordingly, the initial step 
toward construction of the Entsorgungszentrum was taken 
by the federal government in November 1976, as it pressed 
the Lower Saxony government to deeide on the site. How-
ever, having just witnessed the events at Wyhl and 
Brokdorf, Minister President Albrecht (CDU), although not 
wishing to scuttle the project, decided to play for time. 
Facing elections in spring 1978, he wanted to avoid the 
political problems such confrontations had created in the 
other CDU -governed Laender; but at the sam e time, since 
his party was a strong advocate ofnuclear energy, he did not 
want to appear to be impeding its rapid expansion. 
Albrecht's first move was to demand reconsideration of 
alternative methods for waste disposal, suggesting, for ex-
ample, storage in the ices of Greenland, burial in the deserts 
of the United States, or the like. This ploy having failed, he 
next chose from among the disposal sites proposed by Bonn 
the one considered most politically unpalatable to the fed-
eral government. This was Gorleben, questionable because 
of its location only five kilometers from the East German 
border. This selection was designed both to transfer respon-
sibility to Bonn and to create further delay in the selection 
of a site. But contrary to expectations, the federal govern-
ment accepted the Gorleben site and by summer 1977, au-
thorization was given to the Physikalisch-Technische Bun-
desanstalt, the federal agency responsible for construction of 
the storage facilities, to begin the studies required in the 
licensing process. Within the private sector, steps were also 
being taken. In March 1977 the DWK (Deutsche Gesellschaft 
fuer Wiederaufarbeitung), the company established by pri-
vate industry to handie reprocessing, had applied to the 
Lower Saxony government for first stage approval of its 
reprocessing facilities. 
As part of the studies designed to examine the suitability 
of the surface so il conditions and underground salt domes at 
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the Gorleben site, test drillings were required. Anticipating 
a strong reaction from environmentalist groups to such an 
action, federal officials and Minister President Albrecht 
confidentially agreed that the Physikalisch-Technische 
Bundesanstalt would apply to the Lower Saxony govern-
ment for permission to conduct test drillings only after 
Albrecht had given his consent-in all probability, after the 
elections that next spring. 
This agreement was due less to the good will of the federal 
government, which was increasingly coming under attack 
from the CDU opposition for the slowdown in nuclear power 
plant construction, than to the particular compositian of 
government at both federal and Laender levels. The direet 
negotiating partner of Albrecht in Bonn was Interior Min-
ister Maihofer (FDP), whose party in Lower Saxony was in 
coalition with the CDU. Wishing to avoid difficulties for his 
party colleagues, Maihofer, along with his fellow FDP cab-
inet ministers, managed to secure the agreement. This ar-
rangement became public after a speech given at a CDU 
conference in October 1977; Albrecht laid blame for delays 
in the nuclear program at the doorstep of the federal gov-
ernment, declaring that it hadn't even applied for a permit 
to begin the test drillings. A government spokesman subse-
quently released excerpts from a letter written by Albrecht 
to Chancellor Schmidt requesting the delay. 
Delays encountered at the Land level in the licensing of 
the Entsorgungszentrum did not deter the federal govern-
ment from moving ahead in other critical areas associated 
with the waste disposal problem. With the positive evalua-
tions of the RSK and SSK for the waste disposal concept 
released in October 1977, the choice of a waste disposal site 
made, and industry's submission of an application to begin 
construction on the reprocessing plant, the prerequisites for 
renewed licensing of nuclear plant construction as defined 
by the federal government in March 1977 had been met. And 
although the original stipulations were supplemented in the 
revised energy program ofDecember 1977, the added provi-
sions were satisfied in the course of 1978. A site was chosen 
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for an interim storage facility nearAhausin North Rhine-
Westphalia; and contracts had been concluded between the 
DWK and the French company Cogema for storing and 
reprocessing approximately 1,705 tons of spent fuel rods 
from German reactors between 1980 and 1984. 
Several domestic critics, however, doubted whether these 
agreements with Cogema would really guarantee the dis-
posal of nuclear waste for the period prescribed. They fo-
cused on two issues. First, they pointed to managerial and 
technical problems at the La Hague facility. Several acci-
dents and strikes had closed the plant down for long periods, 
slowing plans for new expansion required to accommodate 
the spent fuel that had been contracted for. In addition, 
there were questions about the facility's ability to handie the 
arnount of spent fuel from LWRs, which is more radioactive 
than the spent fuel from gas graphite reactors, the type La 
Hague was originally designed to handle. Second, there were 
objections to the provisions of the agreement. Many ele-
ments of the contract were not disclosed, leading some to 
suspect that there was an escape clause allowing Cogema 
not to aecept shipments of spent fuel if, in their estimation, 
significant difficulties or obstacles in the construction of new 
interim storage tanks were encountered.3 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of government offi-
cials, the problems of holding the spent fuel rods until the 
Gorleben center was ready to receive them had been re-
solved. Thus, all barriers to further nuclear power plant 
construction appeared to have been removed. Whether this 
view would be shared by the courts remained to be seen, 
especially since little progress was being made with the 
Entsorgungszentrum itself. 
Originally, plans called for construction to begin the first 
part of 1979; but the June 1978 elections in Lower Saxony 
had come and gone and Albrecht stiil refused to approve 
applications for test drillings. Resistance to the Gorleben 
center had been growing, both among residents of the area, 
traditionally a CDU constituency, and nationwide. Because 
of domestic politics and political ambitions that appeared to 
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extend beyond the borders of Lower Saxony, Albrecht was 
hesitant to take any action as the Gorleben issue had taken 
on the highest priority for nuclear opponents. Only with 
reprocessing could conventional nuclear power fully mature 
and bring about the next step in the development of nuclear 
energy, the fast breeder reactor. Strong, perhaps violent, 
reactions were anticipated to any measure such as test 
drillings that seemed to bring the Entsorgungszentrum 
closer to reality. During this time, Albrecht entered into 
negotiations with residents of the Gorleben area; and these 
resulted in a decision that would further delay any action on 
the center. A group of international scientists and experts 
untainted by association with the nuclear industry would be 
commissioned to evaluate the waste disposal concept of the 
Gorleben Entsorgungszentrum. 
The studies conducted in fall and winter 1978-79 culmi-
nated in a six-day hearing scheduled to begin March 28 in 
Hannover. Just before the meeting, the first permits for 
shallow drillings were issued. Although small demonstra-
tions did take place near the site, they were overshadowed 
by earlier preparations for a five-day march from Gorleben 
to Hannover. It arrived on March 30, two days after the 
hearings began and one day after the nuclear accident at 
Three Mile Island. It represented the largest demonstration 
ever held in West Germany to that time, with estimates of 
participants exceeding 100,000. 
Despite the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, discus-
sion at the Gorleben International Review was purposely 
restricted to the issue under investigation: the safety of the 
Entsorgungszentrum. The participants were divided into 
two groups-the critical scientists (or Kritiker) and the pro-
ponents of the Gorleben project (or Gegenkritiker, composed 
primarily of scientists and officials from the nuclear indus-
try). Discussion centered on two points: first, whether the 
experience gained from smaller, largely experimental repro-
cessing plants could be applied directly to the type of large-
scale reprocessing plant proposed at Gorleben; and second, 
whether, in light of important problems which remained to 
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be solved, a decision on reprocessing should be delayed. The 
Kritiker proposed that numerous interim measures would 
allow time to study alternatives more carefully in light of 
current developments and more experience, thereby avoid-
ing aetions that could prove irreversible later on. 
Albrecht demonstrated the importance that he attached 
to the questions considered in the Review by his presence 
and active participation in the hearings throughout the 
entire six days. Whether he was swayed by the arguments of 
the Kritiker is doubtful. Nevertheless, certain proposals 
made in the International Review seemed to give Albrecht 
an alternative to the stark choice of either beginning imme-
diately on the reprocessing plant or scuttling the Entsor-
gungsgszentrum altogether. The alternative was the possi-
bility of long-term interim storage facilities. 
Approximately a month after the hearings and after over 
two years of delay, Albrecht announced the decision of the 
Lower Saxony government on the Gorleben project-an an-
nouncement carried live over German television because of 
public interest. While praising the Entsorgung concept of 
the federal government, the Minister President said, "It is 
possible to build such a plant without endangering the 
public. But, at the present time, there is such a controversy 
surrounding the project that it isn't feasible."4 In other 
words, while he favored nuclear power in general and the 
Gorleben concept in particular, he opposed broad elements of 
the program as long as political consensus for such measures 
was absent. 
Singled out for particular censure were those in positions 
of political responsibility-specifically the SPD in Lower 
Saxony who had demanded that the CDU government reject 
Gorleben despite support of the project by Chancellor 
Schmidt and the other federal cabinet ministers. Without 
agreement between a Bonn government and its sister par-
ties in Lower Saxony, Al brecht refused permission to pro-
ceed with the reprocessing plant. He did put forward, how-
ever, certain proposals designed to salvage the nuclear pro-
gram. First, the Lower Saxony government would allow 
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shallow test drillings to continue, as well as approve deep 
drillings to test the suitability of the salt domes for final 
storage; and second, the federal government should consider 
the construction oflong-term storage facilities for spent fuel 
rods as an alternative to early reprocessing. 
Th us, in a dazzling display of political acumen, Albrecht 
had been ab le to block construction of the reprocessing plant 
in Lower Saxony and so avoid much of the anticipated 
conflict with anti-nuclear groups, transfer responsibility for 
future initiatives in the area ofreprocessing and power plant 
construction back to Bonn, and at the same time reaffirm his 
basic support for nuclear energy. 
This decision created certain problems for the federal 
government, the greatest being its potential impact on the 
courts. With the integrated Entsorgung concept apparently 
dead for the time being, officials feared that power plant 
construction could be delayed even longer; or worse, that the 
courts could demand a shutdown ofplants already operating 
until the questions coneerning waste disposal were satisfac-
torily resolved. 
Publicly, Chancellor Schmidt directed his anger at fac-
tions in the SPD and FDP that had failed to support gov-
ernment energy policy; at one point, he threatened to resign. 
He peppered his speeches and interviews both at home and 
abroad with apocalyptic visions of energy shortages, in-
creased environmental dangers such as the greenhouse ef-
fect from increased hydrocarbon consumption, and possible 
armed international conflict uniess the nuclear option were 
exercised immediately. 
Privately, however, he was investigating the alternatives 
available to the federal government in the wake of Al-
brecht's decision and in the face of opposition within his own 
party. The strategy finally adopted called for ajoint federal/ 
Laender resolution, side-stepping for the time being any 
initiatives that would require immediate parliamentary ap-
proval. In late September 1979, the text of the agreement 
between Chancellor Schmidt and the Minister Presidents of 
all the Laender was announced. 
West Germany, 1978--1984 117 
Reaffirming the intention to continue working for the 
realization of an integrated Entsorgung concept, the resolu-
tion called for: 
• The construction of interim storage facilities that could 
accommodate spent fuel rods for a minimum of twenty 
years. 
• Gorleben to be the site for the final storage of nuclear 
waste (the government ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia made 
the use of its interim storage facilities contingent upon 
approval ofGorleben); studies of the salt domes were to be 
completed as rapidly as possible in order to enable a 
decision to be taken during the second half of the 1980s. 
• An investigation of the possibility of decentralizing re-
processing through construction of sever al smaller repro-
cessing plants. 
• The consideration of final storage for spent fuel rods 
without reprocessing. Regardless of the technique to be 
used for Entsorgung-whether reprocessing or final stor-
age without reprocessing-facilities were to be in opera-
tion by the late 1990s. 
As a consequence of the joint resolution, the criteria for first 
stage approval had been amended somewhat: 
• A preliminary choice of the site (or sites) for interim 
storage facilities must be made. 
• The plans for these interim storage facilities must receive 
positive safety evaluations. 
• After January 1, 1985, a preliminary choice for either a 
reprocessing site(s) or final storage site for unreprocessed 
spent fuel must be made. 
Having arrived at a formula for dealing with nuclear 
waste, the federal government felt that the final impedi-
ments to further licensing of nuclear power plant construc-
tion had been removed. 
As we saw earlier, the reprocessing issue not only had 
important implications for the immediate efforts of govern-
ment to implement its energy program; it was also central to 
longer-range energy plans calling for full-scale application 
of the fast breeder technology by the 1990s. The government 
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hoped to have FBRs producing up to 5 GW by the year 2000.5 
As the logical extension of current light water technology, 
the FBR promised economical, efficient use of a limited 
resource-increasing the efficiency in the use of uranium 
supplies by approximately sixty times. It represented one of 
the few possibilities of drastically reducing dependence on 
foreign energy sources. Nevertheless, despite this elixir-like 
promise, indications of growing skepticism began to appear 
by 1977, a skepticism that in the course of 1978-79 trans-
lated into a political force sufficient to affect government 
efforts to develop the fast breeder option. 
First suggestions of problems to come surfaced in May 
1977 as several SPD deputies in the Bundestag, threatening 
to break party discipline in the vote on the government's 
budget uniess appropriations for the fast breeder program 
were excluded, were able to put a temporary freeze on 
research and development funds for fast breeder develop-
ment. In August, the court case challenging the constitu-
tionality of the FBR program was referred to the Constitu-
tional Court. And at the November party congresses of the 
SPD and FDP, proposals were introduced that would require 
completely different licensing procedures for the FBR. 
The SPD passed a resolution calling for a vote by the 
Bundestag before the FBR prototype at Kalkar received an 
operating permit and before a final decision was made on 
commercial development of the FBR. At the FDP congress, 
a motion was narrowly defeated (163 to 161) which stipu-
lated that approval for further construction and operation of 
the FBR at Kalkar could only be granted after an Enquete 
Commission had thoroughly studied the technology and its 
consequences-the implication being a long delay in con-
struction. 
But it was the Greens' initial electoral successes in Ham-
burg and Lower Saxony that began the movement toward 
significant change. For the FDP, the electoral outcomes had 
been particularly sobering-in both Laender, they lost rep-
resentation in parliament. It was not surprising, therefore, 
that many in the FDP made special efforts to identify the 
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party with a deep commitment to environmental issues. 
Evidence of this shift was most immediately visible in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, where a decision on the third stage ap-
proval for Kalkar was due. 
Within the SPD-FDP coalition government in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, several FDP members-most impor-
tantly the Economics and Interior Ministers, the key min-
istriesin the licensing process-had become especially ada-
mant in their opposition to the FBR. Their expressed con-
cerns touched on the cost of the program, the possibility of 
accidents, and the more general problems of a plutonium 
economy. As an alternative, they suggested converting 
Kalkar from a plutonium producer (an FBR) into a facility 
that destroyed plutonium (a Vernichtungsanlage)-a pro-
posal greeted rather coolly in Bonn. 
As construction delays at Kalkar extended into fall 1978, 
efforts were initiated at the federal level to overcome the 
impasse. At the urging of Chancellor Schmidt and SPD 
cabinet ministers, fellow FDP cabinet members attempted 
to pressure their party colleagues in the N orth Rhine-
Westphalia government to remove their veto of third stage 
construction at Kalkar, but to no avail. The SPD Minister 
President of N orth Rhine-W estphalia, in turn, called on the 
federal government to assume responsibility for a decision 
on further construction in the FBR project. Thus, a dynamic 
similar to that characterizing the reprocessing issue was 
now emerging in FBR development-increasing tensions 
between federal and Laender governments and widening 
divisions within the parties. 
The FDP party congress held in November 1978 illus-
trated the growing discord. In an attempt to formulate a 
unified party position on the FBR, a sharp, often polemical, 
debate centered on two issues: first, whether to support a 
moratorium or renewed construction on the Kalkar project; 
and second, commercialization of the FBR. 
The federal ministers warned against any resolution that 
they, as cabinet members, could not accept; representatives 
from N orth Rhine-Westphalia or the left wing of the party 
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remained staunchly anti-FBR. Between those factions a 
rather tenuous compromise was struck, which demonstrated 
the strength of opposition to the FBR. The party resolution 
as finally adopted stated that the FDP rejected the commer-
cial use of the fast breeder technology, although it didn't 
directly repudiate the Kalkar project because it wasn't to be 
used commercially; and the FDP demanded the creation of 
an Enquete Commission to evaluate the fast breeder tech-
nology. In conjunction with this second point, third stage 
approval for construction at Kalkar was to be withheld until 
the findings of the Commission were presented to the Bun-
destag; then, on the basis of these findings, the Bundestag 
was to make a decision. 
Thus, the FDP called for measures that would result in 
considerable delay while the Commission made its report 
and would transfer responsibility for licensing of the FBR 
from the Land to the federal level. 
On the face of it, this relatively strong anti-FBR position 
offered little hope for finding a quick solution to the stale-
mate in North Rhine-Westphalia. It did, however, suggest 
potential areas of accommodation. Negotiations between 
SPD and FDP leaders were initiated at the federallevel; and 
by mid-December, an agreement had been worked out and 
adopted by the Bundestag. It called for a parliamentary vote 
on the resolution approving renewed construction at Kalkar 
and the creation of a commission composed of Bundestag 
deputies and scientists to study the FBR. 
Emphasizing the importance attached to the resolution by 
the leadership of both parties-as well as their concerns 
about its passage-it was tied toa vote of confidence. In spite 
of this added pressure to maintain party discipline, six FDP 
deputies abstained, pointing out that they rather than the 
party leaders were the ones adhering to party policy as 
formulated by the full membership the previous month at 
the party congress. That policy called for no decision to be 
made until the study on uses and risks of the FBR had been 
completed. 
Despite this incident, the vote seemed to clear the way for 
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third stage approval of the Kalkar project. With the burden 
of responsibility shifted to the Bundestag, the Economics 
Minister for N orth Rhine-W estphalia declared, "W e will not 
delay. There will be no artificial difficulties."6 
The fragile consensus on nuclear power represented in the 
revised energy program of December 1977 was thus shat-
tered by the forees of electoral politics. With the Green 
parties often able to dictate the content ofpolitical debate-
the desirability of nuclear power in general, of reprocessing 
and FBR development in particular-divisions within the 
established political parties were exacerbated and tensions 
between Laender and federal governments surfaced. Under 
pressure from the grass roots, regional party organizations 
were increasingly coming into conflict with their national 
party leaders over energy policy, and Laender governments 
were continually thwarting the implementation of the gov-
ernment's energy program. Nevertheless, the controversy 
within the Federal Republic over reprocessing and FBR 
development was not attributable solely to the workings of 
domestic politics. 
NUCLEAR POWER AND NON-PROLIFERATION 
In the early 1970s, United States government officials 
undertook a fundamental reevaluation of the nation's ap-
proach to nuclear non- proliferation. With the explosion of a 
nuclear device by India in May 1974 serving as catalyst, the 
U.S. government initiated efforts to revise the international 
rules and norms that had governed non-proliferation since 
the 1960s and that had been institutionalized in the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Believing that de-
tection alone ofunauthorized diversions ofnuclear fuel from 
civil power programs by an IAEA inspection system was no 
longer sufficient to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 
the United States called for "full-scope" safeguards as well 
as a han on the future export of reprocessing technologies. 
Contrasted with earlier arrangements, full-scope safeguards 
required the submission of all a state's peaceful nuclear 
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activities, whether imported or indigenous, to IAEA safe-
guarding and inspection in recipient countries, regardless of 
whether they had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). 
At the international level, U.S. efforts toward more effec-
tive prevention of proliferation first bore fruit with an in-
terim agreement among nuclear supplier states on proce-
dures for safeguarding certain nuclear exports. Original 
members of what came to be known as the London suppliers 
group were the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United 
Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, France, and Canada, with 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland joining later. 
In August 197 4, a "trigger list" of materials and facilities 
was drawn up by supplier countries and submitted to the 
IAEA. This interim agreement was followed the next year, 
1975, by the formulation of a set of guidelines stipulating 
that "government assurance" should be given "explicitly 
excluding uses which would result in any nuclear explosive." 
In addition, suppliers promised to use "restraint in the 
transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-
usable materials" and "prudence" to avoid the production of 
any nuclear material not safeguarded.7 In essence, the 
states agreed not to export specified materials to non-nu-
clear weapon states without prior agreement with the IAEA 
on the application of safeguards, assurances against their 
use for any nuclear explosive device, and the prohibition of 
re-export to non-nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT 
without IAEA safeguards.8 And although U.S. proposals for 
full-scope safeguards anda han on the export ofreprocessing 
technology were not included, these agreements among the 
supplier states did represent significant movement within 
the international community toward the new American po-
sition on non-proliferation. In order to re-enforce its com-
mitment to non-proliferation, however, the United States 
also initiated unilateral measures designed to discourage 
the spread of nuclear weapons. 
In October 1976, the Ford administration announced a 
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moratorium on the commercial reprocessing of spent fuel 
"unless there is a sound reason to determine that the world 
community can effectively overcome the risks of prolifera-
tion."9 That next year, undera new administration, a state-
ment was issued on U.S. nuclear policy which contained the 
following points: 
1. Commercial reprocessing and plutonium recycle 
were to be delayed indefinitely. 
2. The U.S. breeder reactor program was to be re-
structured, and the date for breeder commercial-
ization deferred. 
3. A U.S. inquiry into less proliferative alternate fuel 
cycles was to be undertaken. 
4. U.S. productive capacity for low enrichment fuel 
was to be increased. 
5. Legislation was to be introduced to permit the 
offering of nuclear fuel supply contracts and guar-
anteed delivery. 
6. Embargos on exports of enrichment or reprocess-
ing technology were to continue. 
7. Among other negotiations, the establishment of an 
international fuel cycle evaluation program aimed 
at exploring technologies and arrangements to re-
duce the risk of proliferation was to be sought. 10 
And finally, in conjunction with point five, the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) was signed into law by Pres-
ident Carter on April 7, 1978. Among other things, NNPA 
contained: 
provisions for immediate cessation of U.S. exports to 
any non-nuclear-weapon state that terminates, abro-
gates, or materially violates IAEA safeguards, or that 
engages in any activity of direet significance to the 
acquisition ofnuclear explosive devices. Exports to any 
state may be terminated if it violates agreements on 
nuclear technology transfer, assists a non-nuclear-
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weapon state with activities pursuant to the acquisi-
tion of a nuclear explosive, or enters into an agreement 
for the transfer of reprocessing except in connection 
with an international arrangement to which the U.S. 
subscribes ( uniess the President determines that such 
action would run counter to U.S. non-proliferation pol-
icies). Export licensing criteria indude provisions for 
application of IAEA safeguards, no use of exports for 
explosive-related purposes, provision of adequate phys-
ical security based on U.S. guidelines, U.S. consent for 
retransfers or reprocessing of U .S. supplied material or 
equipment produced through any transferred sensitive 
nuclear technology. 11 
In the wake of this changing American perception on 
non-proliferation and subsequent measures initiated by the 
United States to eneourage other countries to adopt a sim-
ilar orientation, the German government's nuclear program, 
already under fire from internal critics, had become the 
focus of increasing external pressures. The already intrica te 
web of domestic actors and objectives confronting poli-
cymakers was made even more complex with the intrusion of 
foreign actors attempting to influence the content and di-
rection of German energy policy. 
While non-proliferation was not an issue of serious debate 
in the controversy over nuclear power within the Federal 
Republic, at least three elements central to German nuclear 
policy were challenged directly or indirectly by the new 
initiatives of the United States: a commercially strong and 
viable national nuclear industry, reprocessing, and FBR 
development. 
W e have already discussed how government and indus-
trial interests in the Federal Republic collaborated closely to 
develop a German nuclear industry that not only would 
supply domestic demand but also provide a product compet-
itive in the international market. (By 1977, public expendi-
tures on nuclear technology had amounted to over DM 17.5 
billion.) These efforts seemed to be vindicated in 1975, when 
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the largest sale in the history of the nuclear industry was 
concluded between the Federal Republic and Brazil. It was 
the first time a non-American company had successfully 
broken into a world market that, up to that time, had been 
monopolized by Westinghouse and General Electric. 12 How-
ever, the key determinant in KWU's winning out over West-
inghouse-its ability to indude reprocessing and enrich-
ment facilities in the commercial package-was precisely 
what set the German government's intention to promote its 
nuclear export sector at loggerheads with an American gov-
ernment's increasing concern about the implications of these 
technologies for nuclear proliferation. 
Informed by the German government of the impending 
agreement with Brazil, the U.S. government voiced its op-
position. Many West Germans, on the other hand, felt that 
American protestations were based primarily on commercial 
self-interest rather than on non-proliferation concerns. Such 
suspicions were rooted in earlier experiences: American 
industry and government officials had purportedly snatched 
orders from KWU by promises of"unfair" interest rates from 
the Import-Export Bank (in the case of Yugoslavia), warn-
ings that no enriched uranium would be available from the 
United States if American reactors were not purchased (in 
the cases ofYugoslavia and Spain), and threats ofwithhold-
ing economic assistance if a German reactor were bought (in 
the case of Argentina)P 
When subsequent contacts with German officials con-
vineed the Ford administration that the Germans were in-
tent on concluding the deal, however, an American negoti-
ating team was dispatched to Bonn to suggest certain 
changes in the agreement. These suggestions were based on 
earlier U.S. experience with non-NPT countries, as well as 
on the lessons provided by India. 14 And although the extent 
of U.S. influence is difficult to determine, the tripartite 
agreement between the Federal Republic, Brazil, and the 
IAEA was the strictest ever concluded with a non-NPT 
state. 15 
Nevertheless, press criticism was scathing. In an edito-
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rial, the New York Times referred to the aetions of West 
Germany and Brazil as "nuclear madness" and described 
the de al as a "reckless move that could set off a nuclear arms 
race in Latin America, trigger the nuclear arming of a 
half-dozen nations elsewhere, and endanger the United 
States and the world as a whole."16 Congressional reaction 
was equally severe: "Congressmen active in nuclear matters 
were not content with improvements, and Senator Pastore, 
chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, was 
particularly convinced that the transaction was irremedia-
bly detrimental to American and world interests and that it 
had to be stopped. Congress's implacable position was that 
Kissinger and Ford must not shrink from a high-level 
confrontation, and that the United States should even re-
consider its NATO commitment to Germany if this were 
necessary to demonstrate American seriousness."17 Further, 
treatment of the non-proliferation issue during the 1976 
presidential race foreshadowed a renewed American effort 
to have the Erazilian deal canceled. 
During the campaign and before the inauguration, Carter 
had singled out the German-Erazilian deal for special crit-
icism. As evidence of the concern raised by these attacks in 
Bonn, U ndersecretary of State Peter Hermes was dispatched 
to Washington even before the inauguration in an effort to 
forestall any further public pronouncements that would 
commit the incoming administrationtoa position opposing 
the Erazilian deal. 18 Once in office, the Carter administra-
tion immediately began to exert pressures on the German 
government to reconsider the export of reprocessing and 
enrichment facilities. During the first official visit of a 
high-ranking member of the Carter administration, Vice 
President Mondale urgently requested that the Germans 
forego delivery of the sensitive technologies. This was then 
followed up by two rounds of negotiations conducted by 
Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher.19 Neverthe-
less, the German government remained, and has remained, 
adamant. Its position is perhaps attributable to two factors. 
The first is fundamental differences between the two gov-
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ernments over the appropriate approach to non-prolifer-
ation. 
Although both the United States and the Federal Repub-
lic profess strong support for the goal of nuclear non-prolif-
eration, considerable disagreement exists about the means 
of achieving this goal. For the United States, denial of 
"sensitive technologies," such as reprocessing and enrich-
ment facilities, to countries not already possessing them is 
considered the most effective approach. The German gov-
ernment, on the other hand, believes that it is critical to 
indude states in agreements that provide adequate safe-
guards against abuses of these technologies. Bonn considers 
it better to make available the complete fuel cycle to coun-
tries that legitimately seek greater independence in energy 
supply under strictly controlled conditions than to force 
these countries to develop such capabilities on their own, 
outside of effective external controls. Skeptics, however, 
might see this egalitarian view as serving very well the 
commercial interests of the German nuclear industry. The 
ability to offer the complete nuclear fuel cycle gives KWU a 
considerable competitive edge over the American giants in 
the international market, since Westinghouse and GE are 
forbidden by the American government to export such sen-
sitive technologies. 
The second consideration behind German intransigence is 
the commercial importance that the Erazilian sales came to 
assume for domestic industry. Because of the de facto mor-
atorium on nuclear power plant construction in West Ger-
many, the domestic market for nuclear reactors had atro-
phied rapidly. KWU had not received a single domestic order 
between 1975 and 1979, a serious matter for an industry half 
of whose yearly production capacity (four of eight reactors) 
was allocated for the internal market. With declining do-
mestic sales, the foreign market took on an even greater 
importance. Without the foreign orders received by KWU in 
1975 from Erazil and in 1976 for two reactors from Iran, the 
German nuclear industry would have been in great danger 
offolding. 
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Thus, the pressures from the United States to cancel the 
Erazilian deal and to renounce further sales of sensitive 
technologies threatened to limit the competitiveness of Ger-
man nuclear exports internationally and in the process to 
endanger the viability of an important industrial sector. The 
German government had hoped for rapid expansion in the 
nuclear export market to strengthen the country's ex-
tremely important foreign trade position. We have seen that 
government officials viewed the country's ability to compete 
in the international market place as closely linked to the 
success of high technology products such as nuclear reactors. 
Both the BMFT and BMWi were strong supporters ofKWU's 
push into the international market. U.S. non-proliferation 
policy not only focused on the transfer of certain "prolifer-
ating" technologies, however; it directed attention to their 
domestic use as weiL 
In April 1977, President Carter announced an indefinite 
delay in U.S. commercial reprocessing and the long-term 
storage of spent fuel elements. Although the President ex-
plicitly said, "We are not trying to impose our will on those 
nations like Japan, France, Britain, and Germany which 
already have reprocessing plants in operation," his an-
nouncement contained a proposal for discussion of the nu-
clear fuel cycle within an international framework-a clear 
"invitation" for other countries to consider similar mea-
sures.20 
In October 1977, an International Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Evaluation (INFCE) commenced its consideration of ques-
tions relating to the nuclear fuel cycle. Eight working 
groups were established to cover fuel and heavy water, 
enrichment, long-term supply, reprocessing, fast breeders, 
spent fuel, waste management and disposal, advanced fuel 
cycle, and reactor concepts. For the Federal Republic, such 
an initiative could hardly have come at a worse time. The 
question of further power plant construction was being 
linked to the resolution of the waste disposal problem; and 
the controversy over the concept of the central integrated 
Entsorgungszentrum was beginning to heat up. The new 
U.S. policy highlighted the fundamental differences be-
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tween the two countries over reprocessing, and the con-
flict was exploited by the domestic opponents of nuclear 
power. 
The decision by the Carter administration to delay com-
mercial reprocessing was viewed somewhat skeptically by 
officials in Bonn. For one, they pointed out that reprocessing 
had only been delayed in the commercial arena-for mili-
tary purposes, development of reprocessing technology con-
tinued. In addition, Bonn called attention to the presence of 
vast energy resources in the United States-oil, natural gas, 
uranium, coal-which allowed the American government to 
delay a decision on reprocessing. The Federal Republic, 
laeking such abundant energy supplies, had to make the 
most efficient use of its fuel. And finally, the Bonn govern-
ment pointed out that, until very recently, both countries 
had favored reprocessing because of its ecological as well as 
its economic benefits; to separate highly radioactive waste 
through reprocessing and to store it in solidified form was 
environmentally much safer than the long-term storage of 
spent fuel rods. 21 
These differences, among others, were to constitute the 
substance of negotiations conducted within INFCE; and 
although German participation in the conference was never 
really in doubt, it was guaranteed with assurances from U.S. 
officials that all decisions relating to the issues under dis-
cussion at INFCE would be held in abeyance until the 
Evaluation had been concluded, a period of approximately 
two years. With the passage of the aforementioned Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, however, the German nuclear 
program again became a target of U.S. non-proliferation 
policy. 
Unilaterally establishing conditions for the export of nu-
clear material, this new law severely circumscribed the use 
ofuranium enriched in the United States while requiring all 
agreements previously concluded with the United States to 
be renegotiated. If countries were found in violation of the 
NNPA or refused to renegotiate, U.S. exports of nuclear 
materials were to cease immediately. Because the Federal 
Republic received 60 to 65 pereent of all enriched uranium 
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used commercially from the United States and 100 pereent 
of the uranium used in its research reactors, the implica-
tions of this legislation were immense. German decisions on 
such politically sensitive questions as reprocessing, retrans-
fer and storage of plutonium or spent fuel rods, and the 
export ofnuclear material to third states would be subject to 
American approval. 
Understandably, the American action did little to en-
hance relations between the U .S. and German governments, 
especially after the reassurances received by the Germans 
earlier on this issue. The Federal Republic, along with 
certain other W estern European countries, primarily 
France, balked at renegotiating a contract that specified 
U.S. delivery of enriched uranium up to 1995. But owing to 
a special provision in the NNPA, more serious confrontation 
was averted. The law provided a two-year grace period for 
details of a renegotiated agreement to be worked out if 
Euratom-the official broker between members of the Eu-
ropean Community and outside suppliers of nuclear fuel-
affirmed its willingness to enter into negotiations within 
thirty days. And although this deadline lapsed without 
agreement, a modus operandi was finally established that 
postponed, at least until March 1980, any firm aetions stem-
ming from the NNP A. American and German officials 
agreed that the European Community would enter into 
"talks" with the United States which would be more or less 
non-binding, not making an issue over the subtle difference 
between "talks" and "negotiations."22 In the meantime, the 
more controversial questions touching on reprocessing, 
waste disposal, and plutonium technologies were to be dis-
cussed within the framework of INFCE. 
Central to the Carter administration's strategy of non-
proliferation, and closely related to its policy on reprocess-
ing, was the deferring of a decision on commercialization of 
the fast breeder reactor. When weighed against the prob-
lems associated with early commercial use of the FBR, the 
gains-whether of enhanced energy supp ly or economic ben-
efits-were seen as minimal at best. The Aroericans saw 
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anticipation of early FBR commercialization as a major 
motive behind the push for facilities to reprocess spent fuel 
from LWRs. But possession ofreprocessing facilities, it was 
felt, would make possible the quicker acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. Further, because the arnount of plutonium pro-
duced and in circulation would grow appreciably with the 
widespread application ofFBR technology, it could become a 
target of theft for terrorist groups. The FBR technology 
raised issues of health and safety as well.23 
These reservations were not shared by several European 
countries, West Germany included. Once it became clear 
that Carter's FBR policy was to apply beyond U.S. bound-
aries, with FBR technology a major topic at INFCE, the 
issue became another bone of contention between the Amer-
ican and German governments. As in the case of reprocess-
ing, the American initiatives coneerning FBRs came at a 
very inopportune time; domestic opposition was increasing 
substantially throughout this 1977-78 period. 
In response to the newly defined policy of the Carter 
administration, as well as to the growing number of domes-
tic critics, areport was published by the BMFT that detailed 
the government's position on FBR development. The report 
held, in regard to health and safety, that FBRs represented 
no qualitatively greater risks than the L WRs or certain 
other industrial activities using highly toxic substances.24 
Regarding theft, the plutonium from FBRs was a relatively 
ineffective material for use by terrorist groups. There were 
several toxic materials more easily acquired and faster act-
ing; in addition, natural, technical, and organizational bar-
riers militated against the theft and effective utilization of 
plutonium in nuclear bombs.25 
The report pointed out that the large domestic energy 
resources of the United States put it in a much better 
position to postpone the commercial phase of FBR develop-
ment than was the Federal Republic. German officials were, 
in fact, quite skeptical about whether Carter's FBR policy 
actually would result in deferment of commercial use. They 
pointed out that FBR development continued in the United 
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States, to the tune of $450 million in 1978, more than the 
entire 1978 BMFT budget for nuclear energy; Moreover, the 
President's initiative was stiil being disputed in Congress.26 
Whatever the Aroericans thought or did, however, the West 
Germans believed early commercialization of the FBR to be 
crucial, not only for economic but strategic reasons as well. 
Aside from reducing Germany's dependence on oil, one 
strategic consideration-although not often articulated pub-
licly-was lessening dependence on foreign uranium sup-
plies. In 1974, the United States had defaulted on long-term 
supply contracts with Euratom and in 1975 delivery of 
nuclear materials was temporarily halted; in 1977, Canada 
had abruptly imposed an embargo on the export of uranium 
to the European Community; and the NNPA of 1978 threat-
ened an American embargo on uranium supplies. FBR de-
velopment was seen as a way to reduce the Federal Repub-
lic's vulnerability to such embargoes. 
Finally, the BMFT report disputed the American belief 
that commercialization of the FBR would increase the pos-
sibility of nuclear proliferation. The report argued, first, 
that although plutonium was produced in greater amounts 
by the FBR than by other nuclear activities, the problem of 
non-proliferation was not specific to the breeder technology. 
Second, if a country intended to acquire a nuclear capability, 
there were much simpler and faster ways of going about it. 
And finally, proliferation was a problem requiring a political 
solution during the next decade, a period in which the FBR 
would be of little commercial significance.27 
This government report provided documentation of the 
broad and fundamental differences over FBR development 
that marked the American and German positions. However, 
in contrast to the contentious atmosphere that sometimes 
clouded U.S.-German relations because of conflicting nu-
clear export and reprocessing policies, the differences over 
fast breeder technology remained muted and discussion of 
these divergent positions took place primarily within the 
multilateral framework of INFCE. 
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As key elements of German nuclear policy were brought 
into question by U.S. efforts to redefine the rules governing 
non-proliferation, we need to examine the effect of these 
initiatives on the nuclear program of the Schmidt govern-
ment. 
In the case of FBR development, the effect has perhaps 
been more inferential than tangible. The BMFT government 
report, primarily a response to the critique of the German 
fast breeder program implicit in the Carter position, re-
flected considerable concern about the impact of American 
policy on the debate in West Germany. Historically, devel-
opments in the U.S. nuclear sector have had significant 
impact on nuclear policy choices in Western Europe; the 
commercial dominance of the L WR is one example. Official 
U.S. opposition to early FBR commercialization threatened 
to enhance the credibility of domestic critics, strengthening 
the ability ofFBR opponents in West Germany to affect the 
outcome of the internal debate. Indeed, Carter's statement 
in April 1977 reportedly had been a factor that contributed 
to growing reservations about the German FBR program 
when opposition within the coalition parties was starting to 
coalesce. 28 
The effect ofU.S. non-proliferation policy on reprocessing 
was considerable. As in the FBR controversy, Carter's deci-
sion to delay reprocessing seemed to lend greater respect-
ability to domestic critics. Whereas reprocessing had origi-
nally been considered indispensable to the nuclear program, 
the U.S. example provided opponents with proposals for 
what could be regarded as realistic, viable alternatives to 
immediate reprocessing. Proposals such as final storage of 
spent fuel without reprocessing have subsequently been 
given more careful consideration by government officials, 
and, in the instance of long-term interim storage, such a 
proposal is being implemented. In addition, the U.S. Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Act, in the light of past German depen-
dence on American enriched uranium, has given the United 
States great potential leverage over certain policy areas, 
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such as reprocessing, export of nuclear fuel to third coun-
tries, and the like. 
Finally, the impact of American non-proliferation efforts 
on German nuclear export policy has been somewhat mixed. 
On the one hand, while the Federal Republic has refused to 
cancel the Erazilian deal despite intense U.S. pressures, it 
did give a commitment to discontinue the export of repro-
cessing technology "until further notice." On the other hand, 
the West German government has more recently endorsed 
the sale of a heavy water reactor to Argentina without 
requiring full-scope safeguards. 
As originally conceived, the heavy water reactor was to be 
part of a package which included a large heavy water pro-
duction plant. With a Canadian company also bidding for 
the project, the German government supposedly reached an 
understanding with the Canadians that full-scope safe-
guards would be required. The Argentinian government, 
however, split the package, giving the reactor contract to 
KWU and the plant contract to a Swiss firm. And since the 
Swiss weren't demanding a full-scope commitment, the Ger-
mans maintained that they shouldn't be expected to demand 
more, especially since the plant was the much more sensitive 
(proliferative) technology. Some type of collusion was sus-
pected by the Canadians: the German reactor bid was $1.6 
billion, compared to $1.1 billion by the Canadians. Argen-
tine officials, however, said they gave the contract to the 
Germans because of their better performance record in Ar-
gentina. 
It appears that the U.S. non-proliferation policy has had 
an effect on German nuclear policy, but the full impact is at 
present difficult to assess because the domestic debate and 
international dialogue have fused, leaving unresolved the 
major questions in volving the future of nuclear power. 
AN END TO THE NUCLEAR STALEMATE? 
Moving into the 1980s, the future of nuclear power in 
West Germany remains ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
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cumulative effect of several recent developments has led to 
guarded optimism regarding the nuclear sector. 
The administrative courts have lifted the construction 
stops imposed earlier at Grohnde, Brokdorf, and Wyhl. Work 
was resumed at Grohnde in 1978 and Brokdorf in 1981, 
although at Wyhl a new application for the initial construc-
tion permit (1. TEG) has been required because of changes in 
the building plans. 
With oil prices skyrocketing in the wake of the second oil 
crisis and instability continuing in the Gulf region, the 
government's justification of nuclear power, as reflected in 
the Third Revision of the Energy Pro gr am of November 
1981, was much less equivocal. Where the Second Revision 
called for only a limited expansion of nuclear energy, the 
Third Revision urged an increasing role for nuclear power in 
the electricity-generating sector, though the government 
again refused to offer an official target. 
Acting on this renewed commitment, the federal govern-
ment, in consultation with the Laender, approved a cata-
logue of measures designed to streamline the licensing pro-
cess. One of the central simplifications was the standardiza-
tion of nuclear plant designs. Within months-in February 
1982-for the first time in over four years and after a delay 
offive years, construction on three new nuclear power plants 
was authorized by the Interior Ministry in "convoy." That is, 
with the three plants following a standard design, licensing 
was to proceed more or less simultaneously in all Laender, 
with clearance in one state making clearance in the others 
automatic. 
The three construction permits were granted on the basis 
of an assessment by the government that the criteria for 
waste disposal were being satisfied. More specifically, on-
site storage capacity was increasing through the use of 
compact storage of spent fuel rods (Kompaktlager); two in-
terim storage sites, at Gorleben and Ahaus in North Rhine-
Westphalia, had been chosen, with construction beginning 
on both during 1983. In that same year, applications for 
permits had been filed for two reprocessing plants, one at 
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Dragehn in Lower Saxony and the other at Wackersdorf in 
Bavaria; the government gave preliminary approval for the 
Bavarian site in 1985. Finally, although contracted ship-
ments of spent fuel rods to France for reprocessing were 
temporarily halted while a debate on the future direction of 
French nuclear policy was conducted following the 1981 
election victory of the Socialists, deliveries subsequently 
were resumed. 
After detailed study by the Second Bundestag Enquete 
Commission and extended negotiations between the federal 
government, electrical utilities, and industrial firms in the 
nuclear field, the new CDU/CSU-FDP government decided 
in April 1983 to complete the fast breeder at Kalkar. The 
negotiations dealt with the arnount of additional money the 
private sector was willing to commit to the project. The 
funds finally agreed on for completion were: federal govern-
ment, DM 697.5 million; utilities, DM 170 million; indus-
trial firms, DM 180 million. When construction began ten 
years earlier, the estimated cost was less than DM 1 billion; 
by 1983, the figure had risen to DM 6.5 billion. The Enquete 
Commission had recommended that the Bundestag lift its 
reservations on the completion of the Kalkar reactor but it 
also said that the reactor should be commissioned only after 
explicit political approval of the Bundestag. 
Finally, the international pressures to delay domestic 
development of the FBR and reprocessing because of concern 
about nuclear proliferation had abated considerably by the 
early 1980s. The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evalua-
tion (INFCE), with certain qualifications, found that these 
technologies could play an appropriate role in the nuclear 
programs of countries like West Germany. On balance, the 
findings at INFCE appeared weighted in favor of the Euro-
peans. Although acknowledging that reprocessing posed 
proliferation risks, they did not conelude that reprocessing 
should be foregone. In addition, INFCE found that FBRs 
could provide significant economic advantages to countries 
such as West Germany without any greater risk ofprolifer-
ation than existed from the current reactors.29 In addition, 
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non-proliferation was given a lower priority by the incoming 
Reagan administration, which, in any case, supported the 
FBR program and resumption of civilian reprocessing and 
did not oppose similar policies in "reliable" countries over-
seas. 
Despite these positive signs, however, economic, political 
and juridical uncertainties persist, dampening optimism 
about nuclear power in the Federal Republic. 
Doubts remain regarding the viability of the govern-
ment's revised formula for nuclear waste disposal. An ad-
ministrative court ruled in September 1981 that the strat-
egy of increasing on-site starage capacity by the use of 
Kompaktlager, with its closer placement of spent fuel rods, 
violated theAtom Law. Although an upper court registered 
doubt about the permissibility of compact starage under the 
law, it allowed the practice to continue for the time being. 
Regarding the shipments of spent fuel rods to France for 
reprocessing, many are still concerned that confidential 
clauses in the contracts may allow the company to refuse to 
aecept and reprocess German spent fuel at any time in the 
future. Finally, initial results from the studies done on the 
Gorleben salt domes to be used for final starage have report-
edly offered little reason for optimism. 30 
Public opposition to nuclear power appears to remain 
strong. A survey conducted by Allensbach Institute in Oc-
tober 1981 found that 57 pereent of those polled opposed 
nuclear energy, a slight increase over previous polls. In the 
areas ofHesse under consideration as sites for a reprocessing 
plant, strong anti-nuclear sentiment probably persuaded the 
federal government to drop Hesse from consideration. In the 
communal elections of Volksmarsen held in March 1981, a 
group whose only electoral platform consisted of opposition 
toa proposed reprocessing facility received 42 pereent of the 
vote. 
Party politics continues to feel the effect of the anti-
nuclear sentiment. While it was still in government, the 
SPD suffered a widening gap between the national leader-
ship and local membership. In the months preceding the 
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SPD Berlin party congress in December 1979, several party 
organizations had expressed opposition to nuclear power in 
regions such as Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Lower 
Saxony, Hesse, and Baden-Wuerttemberg. The Third Revi-
sion-unequivocal in its support for nuclear energy-ap-
peared to discard much of the party's policy on nuclear power 
that had been articulated at the Berlin Congress. With 
Chancellor Schmidt using all the influence at his disposal in 
an election year, a compromise was struck at the congress 
reservedly in favor of a limited expansion ofnuclear energy, 
but only to close possible gaps in energy supply unable to be 
filled by coal. A large share of the party, nevertheless, 
supported a much more anti-nuclear stance. The Revision 
also downplayed the conclusions of the first Enquete Com-
mission created by the Bundestag to study future nuclear 
energy policy. This commission, appointed by the Bundestag 
and composed of parliamentary deputies and scientists, con-
cluded a year-long study in June 1980, recommending post-
ponement of any further nuclear power development for ten 
years. Chancellor Schmidt's support of the CDU government 
in Schleswig-Holstein on construction of the Brokdorf reac-
tor in the face of regional SPD opposition contributed to the 
resignation of Hamburg's Social Democratic mayor and 
leader ofthe SPD in Schleswig-Holstein. Following approval 
of the 2. TEG by Schleswig-Holstein, the Hamburg SPD 
voted to withdraw the city-owned utility from its 50 pereent 
participation in the Brokdorf project. Federal officials, in 
response, made it clear that V eba would be asked to step in 
if Hamburg pulled out. The FDP, locked in a struggle for 
survival, is loath to advocate policies that would push addi-
tional voters toward the Greens. For example, going into 
March 1984 regional e leetions in Baden-Wuerttemberg, the 
FDP made it clear that a "no" to construction of the Wyhl 
nuclear power plant was required if a coalition government 
was to be formed with the CDU. And even with the CDU/ 
CSU now leading the government, thereis little sign of new 
initiatives that would change the prospects for nuclear 
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power. In fact, a familiar pattern, like that followed by the 
SPD when it was in government, began to reappear. In fall 
1983, leading up to regional e leetions in Baden-Wuerttem-
berg the next year, the CDU Minister President postponed 
indefinitely construction of a nuclear power plant near the 
Wyhl site that was scheduled to begin in 1984. He feared 
that the SPD would make nuclear power the major issue of 
the election. 
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, the private sector has 
yet to manifest·any great degree of confidenee in the long-
run viability of nuclear power. Evaluations of recent eco-
nomic trends have been pessimistic, or at least uncertain. 
For example, demand for electricity has increased at a 
slower rate recently and lower growth for electrical con-
sumption is projected into the 1990s.31 Thereis great uncer-
tainty about the effects of economic slowdown and recovery 
on these figures; but even if demand continues to grow, there 
are questions about how price competitive nuclear power 
will be against oil and natural gas in view of recent trends 
in the world oil market and the direction of energy prices. 
Taken together, the political obstacles and practical ques-
tions raised by nuclear power have resulted in there being 
only one order for a nuclear plant since 1975, with no further 
orders on the horizon. 
Th us, despite the continued support of successive govern-
ments from both the center-left and center-right, the future 
for nuclear power in the Federal Republic of Germany is far 
from assured. The reasons have very much to do with the 
structural features of the German political system itself. It 
is a type of federalism in which substantial power and 
authority reside at the Land level, with noticeable effects on 
the licensing process for nuclear facilities. The provisions in 
the system for judicial review have been used by nuclear 
opponents with notable success. And the electoral and par-
liamentary system has enhanced the influence of the Greens 
both directly, in their ability to affect electoral outcomes and 
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the formation of governing coalitions, and indirectly in their 
impact on intra-party policy debates and positions by their 
appeal to certain constituencies in the traditional political 
parties. When combined, these features offer a wealth of 
aecess points to groups who wish to engage in the political 
process. 
6. Nuclear Power and 
the French State 
As we saw earlier, in both France and West Germany com-
prehensive energy strategies were articulated in responseto 
dramatic shifts in the world energy market. The countries 
were both strongly committed to nuclear power as the prime 
means of reducing their dependence on increasingly expen-
sive, insecure supplies of imported oil. Nevertheless, there 
has been a vast disparity in their ability to translate this 
common commitment into action. In sharp contrast to the 
Federal Republic, where efforts to implement its nuclear 
program were continually frustrated by vigorous anti-nucle-
ar forees within the country, the French state, despite 
comparable levels of domestic opposition throughout much 
of the 1970s, has been undeterred in its policy of rapid 
nuclear expansion. We will see why in this chapter. 
Relative differences in natural resources may partially 
expiain the divergent outcomes. With little in the way of 
indigenous energy resources, the French government has 
few other policy options ifit wishes to become less dependent 
on oil imports. Y et, however important such vari an ees in 
domestic energy sources may be for a country's energy pol-
icy, this alone does not expiain the difference between West 
Germany and France. 
In the previous chapter, we saw how the German situa-
tion demonstrated the importance of political and social as 
well as economic factors in shaping the content and direction 
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of energy policy. In the analysis to follow we will see that the 
institutions and traditions ofthe French polity, too, have left 
their indelible mark on France' s nuclear program. With this 
in mind, let us look, first, at the actual policies undertaken 
by French energy officials in the nuclear sector; second, at 
the domestic and foreign challenges to those policies; and 
third, at certain features of the political system that have 
served to insulate the French state from the pressures of the 
anti-nuclear forces. 
THE FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
As the effects of the oil embargo and four-fold price hikes 
of 1973-74 reverberated through the economies of the in-
dustrialized West, French officials proposed one of the most 
ambitious nuclear programs in the world. The extent of their 
commitment to nuclear power is reflected in the figures 
contained in the program as it evolved through the 1970s: 
• In the mi dst of the energy crisis, March 197 4, the govern-
ment called for a speedup of the nuclear program, with 
construction to increase from 2000 MW in 1973 to 6000 
MW in 1974, 6000MW in 1975, and 6-7000 MW per year 
through 1980. The foundation for this rapid expansion 
was laid in 1971 with the government decision to con-
struct ten LWRs over the next five years. 1 
• In 1975, this decision was formalized in a comprehensive 
program calling for nuclear energy to meet 25 pereent of 
France's total energy needs by 1985-up from only 2 
pereent in 1973. Accordingly, Electricite de France (EDF) 
was authorized in February 1975 to build 12,000 MW 
during 1976-77-approximately six plants per year. 
• In 1976, it was decided to limit construction over the next 
two years (1977-78) to 5000 MW per year for reasons 
largely to do with slower growth in the demand for elec-
tricity. 
• In April 1979, however, in the wake of the second oil 
crisis, the government announced a renewed acceleration 
ofnuclear power construction-an added 5000 MW output 
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every year-followed in 1980 by a revision of the govern-
ment's long-term energy program, reaffirming the role 
nuclear power was to play over the next decade. By 1990, 
nuclear was to provide 30 pereent of primary energy 
consumption, up from the 1978 level of 3.5 percent. 
• Finally, and over the longer term, the fast breeder reactor 
was to assume an ever more important role in nuclear 
power generation; from 1985 to the year 2000, two FBRs 
were expected to be ordered every three years. 2 
While construction on nuclear facilities in most other 
major industrialized countries of the West slackened 
through the second half of the 1970s and the long-term 
viability ofnuclear power remained cloudy, the French gov-
ernment's commitment to nuclear power has never relented. 
In committing itselfto the rapid expansion ofnuclear power, 
however, the government had no desire simply to replace 
dependence on imported oil with dependence on foreign 
nuclear technology and material. Consequently, a wholesale 
restructuring of the nuclear industry was undertaken as 
well, a process having its roots in earlier technological 
choices. 
In 1945 the provisional government had created the Com-
missariat a l'Energie Atomique (CEA), a public body 
charged with the responsibility of developing nuclear en-
ergy.3 Dictated largely by military considerations, the nu-
clear technology chosen for development was the gas-graph-
ite reactor. For several reasons, this was preferable to other 
technologies. It used natural uranium, thereby freeing 
France from any dependence on the United States for en-
riched uranium; and plutonium was produced more easily in 
this type of reactor, thus providing fissionable materials 
which could be used for nuclear weapons. These military 
considerations became less critical, however, by the early 
1960s, when France's force de frappe had become a reality. In 
addition, the French nuclear arsenal was shifting from 
atomic to hydrogen bombs, thereby reducing plutonium re-
quirements. Pressures then began to build within France for 
a reorientation of French nuclear and industrial policy. 
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By the mid-1960s, EDF was becoming increasingly skep-
tical about the prospects of a gas-graphite reactor that could 
compare favorably with the LWR in cost and efficiency. In 
1964, the British government had abandoned the develop-
ment of its natural uranium technology; and in that same 
year, the first commercial sale of a L WR had been made in 
the United States. The CEA, on the other hand, continued to 
push for the development and commercialization of the tech-
nology that it had nurtured from inception. The ensuing 
struggle over the future control of nuclear power in France 
left the nuclear sector in a state of paralysis. Serious tech-
nieal problems encountered in EDF's largest experimental 
gas-graphite reactor almost immediately after its start-up in 
fall 1966 resulted in recriminations from both sides. In 
winter 1967-68, EDF rejected bids for the construction of 
two gas-graphite reactors because of unacceptably high 
costs. Toward the end of the decade, support from French 
industrial groups, along with the influential PEON commis-
sion (Commission Consultative pour la production d'electri-
cite d'origine nucleaire) swung to the light water technology. 
Initially, French industrial interests were favorably dis-
posed to the gas-graphite technology, because its commer-
cial use held the promise of a protected market; however, 
with no domestic orders forthcoming and little prospect of 
sales overseas, support shifted to the L WR-the technology 
expected to dominate the international market. With the 
expansion of W estinghouse and its light water technology 
into several European countries by 1968, the arguments 
that the French nuclear industry had to reorganize to com-
pete in the world market increasingly impressed govern-
ment officials. 
Reflecting this growing support for the L WR, including a 
number of proponents emerging within the CEA itself, the 
PEO N commission--composed primarily of the highest-rank-
ing officials in EDF, CEA, the nuclear industry, the Plan, 
and the Ministries of Finance and Industry-recommended 
the construction of several L WRs, basing their judgment on 
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assessments of electricity produced 15 pereent cheaper than 
in gas-graphite reactors.4 
In November 1969, shortly after the resignation of de 
Gaulle, newly-elected President Georges Pompidou decided 
to abandon the gas-graphite reactor in favor of the American 
L W technology. Following this abandonment, the market for 
LWRs was shared between CGE, a company under license to 
General Electric, and Framatome, the French licensee of 
Westinghouse. Westinghouse owned 45 pereent of Frama-
tome; the French industrial group Creusot-Loire held a 51 
pereent share. In 1975, as the nuclear program began to 
accelerate, the government granted Framatome a monopoly 
for the construction ofLWRs in France. At the same time, it 
initiated efforts to reduce the role of the American company 
in the French nuclear sector: in 1976 an agreement was 
worked out with Westinghouse that transferred 30 pereent 
of its holdings in Framatome to the CEA, the final 15 
pereent to follow in 1982 when the license ran out. The 
purpose was Frenchification of the light water technology, 
although these aspirations to have completely independent 
command of the knowledge needed to construct a light water 
reactor were deflated somewhat as the French government 
subsequently called for an "agreement of cooperation" to 
replace the previous licensing agreement. 
Finally, firmer state control over the nuclear fuel cycle 
itself had become a top priority as demand for nuclear fuel 
increased rapidly. This led to the creation in 1976 of the 
CEA-affiliate Cogema (Compagnie Generale des Matieres 
N ucleaires). 
The prospecting and mining activities of Cogema, both 
with in metropolitan France and overseas (primarily in Franc-
ophone Africa), soon began to show dividends. By the late 
1970s, uranium production from French companies was suf-
ficient to meet domestic needs and was expected to cover 
demand well into the future. In 1980, approximately 3,600 
tons of uranium were required for French plants; domestic 
production met most of this (3,000 tons), while output from 
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mines in which French companies had equity in Gabon, 
Niger, and Canada more than covered the difference (ap-
proximately 3,500 tons). Consumption is expected to peakat 
10,000 tons around 1990, with production in Francetoreach 
4,000 tons and mines in Gabon and Niger to supply the 
difference. In all, French companies claim to have secured 
about 240,000 metric tons of uranium-100,000 tons in 
France, 140,000 tons abroad.5 
For its supply of enriched uranium, France had been 
dependent on the United States (and to a lesser degree on 
the Soviet Union) throughout the 1970s, but French efforts 
to develop and commercialize the gaseous diffusion technol-
ogy began to bear fruit toward the end of the decade. Do-
mestic requirements were increasingly being covered by 
production from Eurodif-a company in which France, Italy, 
Belgium, Spain, and Iran participate (with Iran withdraw-
ing in 1980). The CEA (Cogema) holds the largest share, a 
little under one half. The first plant, located at Tricastin, 
was to reach its full capacity of 10,800 tons by the end of 
1981; a second plant, to be built in stages but with an 
eventual capacity 10,000 tons, was planned for completion 
by 1988. The present worldwide surpius in enrichment ca-
pacity has resulted in its postponement. 
In addition to prospecting, mining, and enrichment, Co-
gema has been active in the reprocessing of spent fuel at La 
Hague, despite persistent labor problems. 
In short, French public officials responded to the energy 
erises of the 1970s with the rapid expansion of nuclear 
power, controlled and directed by the French state. It is not 
surprising that this strategy encountered considerable op-
position within the country. But the small apparent impact 
of this opposition on the conduct of state policy requires 
further investigation. 
OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR POWER IN FRANCE 
With the rapid industrial growth experiencedin postwar 
France came the attendant problems of environmental pol-
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lution. As in most other advanced industrialized democra-
cies, environmental concerns had begun to impinge on the 
political agenda in France by the early 1970s. Environmen-
tal groups had formed, organizations such as the Friends of 
the Earth, societes de protection de la nature, comites de 
defense de la Cõte d'Azur, comites de defense de Bretagne 
(the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil spill was the first of a series of 
oil tanker accidents off the Brittany coast receiving inter-
national attention). Large protests had been held, such as 
the protests in 1973 against the construction of an express-
way along the Left Bank of the Seine in Paris. Institutions 
responsible for environmental issues were created, such as 
the Ministry for the Protection of Nature and the Environ-
ment in 1971. Environmentallegislation was initiated. Not 
until controversy over nuclear power erupted in 1974-75, 
however, did an environmental issue capture the sustained 
attention of high government officials. 
Before the energy crisis, opposition to nuclear power, if it 
existed at all, was limited primarily to local communities 
where reactors were either under construction or planned. 
For example, local opposition to nuclear power had appeared 
as early as 1971 in protests at the Bugey plant. But with the 
government decision to accelerate the French nuclear pro-
graro rapidly, the debate was taken up at the nationalleveL 
By mid-1975, most important French newspapers had car-
ried series of articles discussing questions of radioactivity, 
the risk of nuclear accident, the problems of nuclear waste, 
and the like.6 In February 1975, just days after the an-
nounced decision to construct 12,000 MW over the next two 
years, a group of four hundred scientists declared their 
opposition to the government's nuclear program, at least 
until the risks and advantages of nuclear power could be 
more carefully assessed; they urged citizens "to refuse to 
aecept the installation of nuclear reactors until th ey have a 
clear understanding of the risks and consequences ... "7 
Protests sponsored by national, as well as local, anti-nuclear 
groups have multiplied since 1975; the largest and most 
violent, with a hundred injured and one killed, was a dem-
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onstration against construction of the FBR Super-Phenix at 
Creys-Malville in June 1977. 
The French anti-nuclear movement showed several sim-
ilarities with the one in West Germany during the mid-
1970s. In both countries, protests started with local or re-
gional groups, usually created on an ad hoc basis in response 
to the placing of a nuclear facility in the area. At the 
national level, these groups organized into loose networks 
with relatively few permanent members, but they were able 
to mobilize large numbers for special events. In West Ger-
many, the most prominent national organization was the 
BBU (Bundesverband Buergerinitiativen Umweltschutz); in 
France, Les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth). Anti-
nuclear activists were generally young, well educated, and 
tended toward the left end of the political spectrum, al-
though opposition to nuclear power extended well beyond 
these groups (see Table 12 in Appendix). Finally, in both 
countries, opposition to nuclear power within the general 
population increased during the mid-1970s. In France, sup-
port for nuclear power fell from 74 pereent in 1974 to 47 
pereent in 1978; opposition increased from 17 pereent to 42 
percent. In West Germany, support declined from 60 pereent 
in 1975 to 53 pereent in 1977; opposition increased from 16 
pereent to 43 percent.8 
There were, of course, differences as well. In France, for 
example, opposition to nuclear power has fused at times with 
a more general critique of the highly centralized French 
political system and demands for greater regional auton-
omy. Recent elashes between demonstrators and police in 
Brittany over the siting of a large nuclear plant with four 
1300 MW reactors at Plogoffis illustrative of this: with little 
regard to the strong objections voiced by local authorities 
and the populace, Paris imposed this choice on the region. 
The German anti-nuclear movement, in contrast, gener-
ally formulated its political positions much less ideologi-
cally, thereby hoping to avoid any association with radical 
forees in the country.9 In the ability ofnuclear opponents to 
affect actual policy, however, such differences were of little 
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consequence. The critical factor in this regard is the struc-
ture of the policymaking process itself. 
NUCLEAR POLICY AND THE INSULARITY 
OF THE FRENCH STATE 
As is evident, the energy situations in France and the 
Federal Republic during the 1970s were quite similar. En-
ergy strategies in both countries placed initial emphasis on 
the overriding importance of rapid nuclear power expansion 
and an active anti-nuclear movement arose to contest this 
expansion. In France, the initial government response to 
this growing anti-nuclear movement was the creation of an 
Information Council on Nuclear Energy (Conseil de l'lnfor-
mation sur l'Energie Electronucleaire), headed by Minister of 
Health Simone V eil. As in West Germany, a public infor-
mation campaign was initiated, on the assumption that 
nuclear opposition was based primarily on insufficient or 
inaccurate information. Subsequent provisions were made 
for the Regional Assemblies to debate the location of new 
nuclear plants. It was hoped that this would appease gov-
ernment critics and, at the same time, help to identify 
potential sites least likely to encounter opposition.10 The 
latter objective may have been partially achieved; the 
former was not. And finally, some flexibility was introduced 
into the choice of sites. For example, if EDF met opposition 
ata certain site, it would at times postpone further activity, 
concentrating its efforts at sites where opposition was min-
imal.U 
These largely tactical maneuvers, however, did little to 
diffuse nuclear opposition. Demonstrations continued and 
polls indicated the continuing unacceptability of nuclear 
power to a sizable portion of the French population. As we 
saw earlier, the polls found 47 pereent for and 42 pereent 
against nuclear power in 1978; the Sofres/Le Matin polls 
reported 56 pereent for and 41 pereent against in April1981 
and 65 pereent for and 33 pereent against in April 1982.12 
Yet, exeept for the deeision made in 1976 to eut baek the 
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nuclear program from 12,000 MW to 10,000 MW for 
1977-78, the French government had shown little inclina-
tion to slow down the nuclear program. Even this reduction 
was not due to the impact of nuclear opposition on the 
nuclear program but reflected the effects of slumping indus-
trial activity, an anticipated slow economic recovery, and 
government support for the decision of the Finance Ministry 
to reduce somewhat the level of investment in the nuclear 
sector. 
In other words, the French energy program has encoun-
tered few impediments sufficient to stall its execution, 
whereas efforts of the German government to implement 
major elements of its program have been continually 
thwarted. As we have seen, resistance in West Germany is 
not based on the availability of more attractive energy 
options. Compared to the United States or Great Britain, for 
example, Germany's dependence on imported oil is stiil 
relatively high; and the costs of extracting and processing 
German coal appear so great that extensive exploitation 
would be prohibitive. More compelling than differences in 
resources between the two countries are the differences in 
political structures and proeesses that either facilitate or 
inhibit the realization of government policy. 
POLITICS AND THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS IN FRANCE 
French political institutions have undergone considerable 
change since the Second World War. There has been one 
constant that has lent continuity to the political process, 
however-the French state. In the Fourth Republic, poli-
cymaking in general was characterized by the avoidanee of 
any decision by government. The likelihood was very great 
that any important issue brought before the National As-
sembly would result in the fall of the current government; 
governments, therefore, avoided confrontations with parlia-
ment. Policymaking was carried out by abdicating signifi-
cant power to the bureaucracy. Examples were numerous. In 
1954, the government of Mendes France introduced the loi-
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programme, which allowed planners "to draw on public 
funds for certain purposes independently of the annual bud-
get."13 Planning during the 1950s has been characterized as 
"voluntary collusion between senior civil servants and the 
managers of big business" in which government ministers 
and politicians, as weil as organized labor and small busi-
ness, were usually excluded.14 And various plans important 
in setting post-war policy were "either never brought before 
Parliament, in the cases of the first and third plans, or 
considered by Parliament in conditions which made such 
consideration pointless (after the plan had been in effect for 
over two years) as with the second plan."15 
Stanley Hoffmann has perhaps best summarized poli-
cymaking in the Fourth Republic: 
The Fourth Republic started with a major handicap. A 
multi-party system preserved by proportional repre-
sentation had no chanee of developing stable and co-
herent governments if problems to be dealt with pre-
vented the formation of lasting majorities .... The re-
gime established in 1946 ... was gradually destroyed 
by its incapacity for dealing with issues. The problems 
of economic and social change were handled by the 
bureaucracy rather than by Parliament; what came 
before the nation's representatives were the incidents 
and erises in the process-budgetary or taxation diffi-
culties, claims by special interests. In those cases, 
French parties ... tended to behave more like pressure 
groups and to defend the interests of their principal 
voters. Their incapacity for defining coherent policy 
resulted in multiple cabinet erises and undermined the 
parliamentary system. 16 
With the return of Charles de Gaulle to political power in 
1958, the executive reclaimed much of the control ceded by 
parliament during the Fourth Republic. The de facto impo-
tence of parliament was transformed by the constitution of 
the Fifth Republic into de jure impotence as well. The role of 
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the state bureaucracy in the policy process, however, was not 
similarly diminished. Although de Gaulle and those who 
subsequently occupied the office of President have exerted 
greater executive control through the Council of Ministers 
and various other high-level interministerial committees, 
the bureaucracy remains instrumental in the formulation as 
well as implementation of policies. This condition has been 
re-enforced by a practice which has accelerated during the 
Fifth Republic-one of bringing high-ranking administra-
tors into the government itself. 
We have seen how energy policy in the Federal Republic 
was greatly affected by the decentralizing forees of German 
federalism, with considerable judicial, administrative, and 
legislative power held at the Land level, by a stable parlia-
mentary system featuring a constellation of parti es compet-
ing for the political center, and by active, often effective, 
interest group participation in the political process. In the 
same way, nuclear policy in France has been shaped by the 
political features that, in many respects, are unique to the 
French system. 
Energy policymaking from the late 1950s to the early 
1970s has been described as follows: "With the exception of 
the first plan to decrease coal production (1958) and the 
abandonment of the French nuclear chain (1969), which 
gave rise to lively public reaction, policy making took place 
almost entirely among technocrats (high officials of the 
government and the administration and managers of public 
enterprises). Parliament was hardly consulted except to 
approve the plans, and the Council of Ministers resolved 
conflicts between administrations."17 
In the wake of the energy crisis, the government appears 
to have assumed a more central role in energy policy, the 
final decision on all major elements of France's energy 
program having been taken within an interministerial 
council headed by the President. But this did not reduce the 
power of the bureaucracy appreciably: the issues had been 
discussed beforehand within such consultative committees 
as PEON, where the only serious challenge to the dominance 
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of the CEA and EDF came from the Ministry of Finance. 
PEON was composed of the highest officials from the CEA 
and EDF, the three major direelions of the Finance Minis-
try-Budget, Tresor, Direction de la Provision-the plan-
ning commission, representatives from major companiesin 
the nuclear and oil sectors, and so forth. 18 This participation 
did not open the policy process to a greater range of opinion. 
Dissenting voices, especially any urging caution about the 
rapid expansion of nuclear power, have been conspicuously 
absent. 
Opinion within the government and administration has 
uniformly held that a large nuclear program is indispens-
able for the security of France and that such a program poses 
no unacceptable environmental hazards. If any reservations 
were to be registered, one would expect them from the 
ministry responsible for environmental affairs, originally 
the Ministry for the Protection of Nature and the Environ-
ment, which, after several reshuffles, has been dubbed the 
Ministry for Culture and the Environment; but the ministry, 
being extremely low on the ministerial pecking order, has 
virtually no clout in the cabinet and, although it was even-
tually granted a seat on the PEON commission, its presence 
has largely been ignored by the other members. 19 The con-
flicts arising in the government over the nuclear program 
have been primarily over the rate of expansion, the prime 
example being the 1976 decision to cut back nuclear con-
struction. It reflected the contrasting interests of the Min-
istry of Finance, which wanted to limit public investment, 
and EDF, which required massive amounts of capital for its 
construction program but was unable to acquire this money 
by means of self-financing because the government had 
granted electrical rate increases substantially lower than it 
had requested. 
Throughout the 1970s, parliament too has remained far 
removed from the conduct of energy policy. The govern-
ment's energy program wasn't even brought before the Na-
tional Assembly until May 1975, where a perfunctory debate 
ensued. During the entire nine hours of discussion, no mem-
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ber seriously challenged the government's heavy reliance on 
nuclear power to meet France's future needs. In any case, 
the debate was more or less a formality: the day before, a 
member of the government majority in parliament had tol d 
Le Mondethat "France's energy choices have already been 
made."20 Nevertheless, at one point, the possibility was held 
out of a fundamental reevaluation of French energy policy, 
if the parliamentary elections held in March 1978 resulted 
in a change in government. 
While the lack of real debate in the National Assembly to 
some degree reflected its lack of real power, it also was the 
result of a general consensus among virtually all political 
parti es on the major thrust of French energy policy. Both 
major parties on the right-the Gaullists (RPR) and the 
Republicans (PR)-were strong advocates of nuclear power; 
and only minor points differentiated the parties on the left 
from their opposition. The reservations of the Commuuists 
(PCF) were limited to the government's preference for a 
"foreign" (American) technology, whereas the Socialists (PS) 
advocated greater diversification of energy supply and more 
energy conservation in order to allow the development of 
nuclear power "at a pace compatible with safety and energy 
requirements."21 But this general agreement across the en-
tire spectrum of France's party system left the concerns of 
nuclear critics unrepresented. Finding both the government 
and established political parties unresponsive to environ-
mental concerns, ecologists formed their own parties in 
preparation for the municipal elections in March 1977. Pre-
cedent for environmentalist participation in the electoral 
process had been set in 1974 when, with the sponsorship of 
Les Amis de la Terre, Rene Dumont received almost 3 
pereent of the vote in the Presidential election. 
With nuclear power an important issue in several regions 
of the country, the ecologists found a surprising degree of 
support, receiving over 10 pereent of the vote. The ecologists 
were especially strong in Paris and the Paris region, receiv-
ing up to 15 pereent in some arrondissements, as well as 
several large cities such as Mulhouse (13.7 percent), Gr-
enoble (9.1 percent), and Lyons (8.6 percent). In the wake of 
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their successes at the local level, they organized nationally 
in preparation for the parliamentary elections the next 
year. 
The party most likely to be affected by the ecologists in 
the national election was the PS. According to a poll pub-
lished in Le Point on September 1, 1977, ecologist voters 
were more likely to come from the left, specifically from the 
Socialists, than from the right, especially from the Gaullists. 
In addition, the CFDT-the second largest trade union in 
France, the largest union in the nuclear sector, and the one 
most closely aligned with the PS-was beginning to voice 
certain reservations about the government's nuclear pro-
gram because of its concern about the working conditions of 
its members. Despite CFDT's overall support for nuclear 
power, the union took several actions. It had: 
• Raised questions about the possible risks of rapid, large-
scale nuclear expansion.22 
• Staged a six-month strike at the La Hague reprocessing 
plant in an effort to force management to adopt more 
stringent safety standards. 
• Demanded a three-year moratorium on the construction 
of new power plants. 
• Opposed the expansion of reprocessing facilities at La 
Hague. 
• Called on the government to refrain from signing new 
reprocessing contracts with other countries as well as 
cancel those already concluded. 
• Sponsored a strike at the Gravelines reactor over the 
loading of the reactor ordered by EDF after small hairline 
fissures in the pipes had been discovered. 
The largest trade union in France (the Communist CGT), on 
the other hand, remained a strong proponent of rapid nu-
clear power expansion. 
Pressures to modify its stance on nuclear power began to 
mount within the PS; but the PS held its ground until the 
electoral alliance between it and the PCF broke down com-
pletely in September 1977. Pre-election polis had given the 
unified left a good chanee of winning. It was also probable, 
however, that in the event of such a victory, the PS would 
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become the largest party on the left-a condition unpalat-
able to the PCF, which had dominated the left throughout 
the post-war period. The occasion used to subvert the alli-
ance was the negotiation of a common program. The PCF 
made demands totally unacceptable to the PS--specifically, 
the parties split over the issue of nationalization and the 
control of nationalized industries in a future government of 
the left. Following the breakdown, the PCF declared elec-
toral war on the PS, often making Socialists rather than the 
parties of the right the object of its attack. 
The Socialists now publicly re-evaluated their position on 
nuclearpower. In October 1977, while stiil affirming general 
support for nuclear power, the PS called for an eighteen to 
twenty-four month moratorium on nuclear plant orders and 
the immediate suspension of construction on the Super-
Phenix FBR. 
In the wake of these developments, it was asserted that 
a "socialist success in the 1978 parliamentary election 
would probably lead to drastic modification of the nuclear 
program."23 This was perhaps overstated, because the So-
cialists most likely would have had to govern in coalition 
with the Communists. The outcome of the March 1978 
elections reduced such a discussion to idle speculation, 
however, as the Right won a majority of seats in the Na-
tional Assembly on the second round of balloting, with the 
theme of anti-communism and stability dominating the 
last weeks of the campaign. In the first round, the Right 
received 48 pereent of the vote as opposed to 49.7 pereent 
by the Left-22.8 pereent for the Socialist candidates, mak-
ing the PS the largest single vote-getter but stiil far below 
the total anticipated. The Ecologists polled 2.1 percent. In 
the second round, however, the Right received 51.5 pereent 
and the Left 48.5 percent, with no ecologist candidate sur-
viving past the first round. 
The presence of the ecologists did have some effect on the 
campaign. For one, they forced a discussion of environmen-
tal issues previously avoided or ignored by political parties 
in national elections. In addition, positions on energy policy 
Nuclear Power and the French State 157 
within certain parties, most notably the PS, changed per-
ceptibly when the ecologists entered the picture. 
The poor showing of the ecologists, especially in contrast 
to the previous year's election results, indicated that envi-
ronmental issues such as nuclear power were largely over-
shadowed by the traditional Left-Right dichotomy running 
through the French electorate. The major issues concerned 
each side' s ability to cope with the problems of high unem-
ployment, high inflation, and low economic growth. 
In the Presidential campaign three years later, the So-
cialists and their candidate Fran~ois Mitterandagain voiced 
reservations about nuclear power. They charged that Gis-
card d'Estaing's concerted pushing of nuclear energy was 
imprudent. This stand attracted much of the ecologist vote 
and helped swing the final election to Mitterand. In the first 
round, Giscard d'Estaing received 28 percent, Mitterand 26 
percent, and the environmental candidate, Brice Lalonde, 
3.87 percent. In the second round, Mitterand, receiving most 
of the ecologist vote, polled 51.8 pereent to Giscard's 48.2 
percent. Yet, as we will see later, the Mitterand victory and 
subsequent election of a PS majority to parliament has not 
signaled a dramatic change in the course of nuclear policy. 
Thus, uniike the situation in Germany, where the 5 per-
eent clause enhanced the influence of the Greens, electoral 
politics in France offered little opportunity for nuclear op-
ponents to affect the conduct of government nuclear policy. 
The electoral system and constellation ofpolitical partiesin 
France served to dissipate the influence of the Ecologists. Of 
all the major parties, only the PS felt directly menaced by 
the ecologist vote, and this threat was diminished consider-
ably by the two-round voting system. 
THE LICENSING PROCESS 
It was the same story in the other major area where 
anti-nuclear forees have been active, and in Germany quite 
successful: the licensing process for nuclear reactors. To say 
that nuclear licensing procedures in France have been un-
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affected by the anti-nuclear movement would not be accu-
rate. We have already noted the government's decision to 
make public proposed plant sites where previously the 
choice and licensing of nuclear plants had occurred with 
little public discussion; and we have considered the flexibil-
ity demonstrated by EDF in the choice of sites. In addition, 
court appeals instigated by environmentalists after site ap-
proval have sometimes slowed the licensing process. Y et, 
despite such developments, the ability of the government to 
implement its nuclear program has remained unimpaired. 
Let us examine some of the reasons. 
First, the vast majority of sites required to accommodate 
the rapidly accelerating nuclear program of the mid-1970s 
had been approved before the rise in anti-nuclear activity in 
1975. Since most sites were planned to house four reactors, 
only nine sites were needed for the first thirty blocks con-
structed. When the government decided again to accelerate 
the nuclear program in 1979, one of the initial steps taken 
was the construction of two additional reactors at a site 
already approved and containing four plants. 
Second, although the licensing process had slowed, no 
application for construction permits on new sites, as yet, has 
been denied. In contrast to the Federal Republic, France has 
a unified, centrallicensing procedure; the Ministry oflndus-
try is the license-granting agency. Hearings are held at the 
site (enquete locale) where local officials, as weil as affected 
individuals, have an opportunity to voice their opinion, 
although only in written form. The major participants, how-
ever, are always the same-EDF and Ministry of lndustry 
officials-and, as a consequence, they have developed a 
well-practised routine. 
Third, attempts by anti-nuclear groups to appeal the 
granting of certain construction permits have proved uni-
formly unsuccessful. There have been only two iustanees of 
administrative courts suspending construction permits-
Flamanville, where several irregularities in the licensing 
process were discovered, and Belleville-sur-Loire, where the 
environmental protection report was ruled unsatisfactory. 
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The only avenue of appeal, however, leads directly to the 
Conseil d'Etat which, in both cases, lifted the construction 
stops within three to six months. 
We can see that French energy officials have not had to 
deal with many of the forees that frustrated the efforts of 
their counterparts in the Federal Republic. They were 
spared the debilitating effects of intra-party-as well as 
federal-state-divisions. They were subjected to virtually no 
constraints by parliament, and they were able to neutralize 
efforts of environmental groups to impede implementation 
of the energy program. Consequently, French policymakers, 
confronted with a considerably less socially complex situa-
tion, showed little of the uncertainty that characterized 
German authorities. Rather than continual delays or post-
ponements, the energy program was, if anything, marked by 
accelerated implementation. Rather than attempts to shift 
responsibility, strenous efforts were made to guard policy 
prerogatives in the energy field. And rather than continual 
hedging on policy options, clear priority was given to rapid 
nuclear power development. In short, decisiveness charac-
terized the response of French officials to domestic energy 
problems, a decisiveness underpinned and reinforced by a 
commonly held set of values or Weltanschauung among 
those in positions of political power. 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ELITE 
Much has been written about the administrative elite 
who inhabit the highest offiees of the French state and who, 
increasingly, have moved into government as well as indus-
try.24 Made up exclusively of members from the Grands 
Corps, it is an elite "united by a common educational back-
ground, common career horizons, and common corporate 
interests."25 Membership in the Grands Corps is restricted 
to the very top graduates of either the Ecole Polytechnique 
(Corps des Mines, Corps des Ponts et Chausees) or ENA 
(Inspections des Finances, Cour des Compts, Conseil d'Etat). 
Most officials central to the formulation and implementa-
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tion of energy policy in France came from this administra-
tive elite: President Giscard d'Estaing, a graduate of both 
Ecole Polytechnique (EP) and ENA, was an Inspecteur des 
Finances; Minister oflndustry Andre Giraud, former head of 
CEA, was a graduate of EP and member of Corps des Mine s; 
the highest officials in CEA similarly graduate from EP and 
belong to Corps des Mines; in EDF, EP and Corps des Ponts 
et Chausees are the traditional career paths; and for the 
Ministry of Finance it is ENA and Inspections des Finances. 
Out of this milieu has emerged a distinctive view of the 
state: 
The training ... also has a moral objective. It is not 
one of the missions of the school [ENA] to play politics 
or to impose a particular doctrine. But the school must 
also teach its future civil servants "le sense de l'Etat", 
it must make them understand the responsibilities of 
the Administration, make them taste the grandeur and 
aecept the servitudes of the metier.26 
The higher civil servants see themselves as represent-
ing the general interest .... The State is the embodi-
ment ofthe general interest; its purpose is to serve that 
general interest .... The hauts fonctionnaires act for 
the State and the State acts for the general interest. If 
their conception of what the general interest demands 
happens to clash with the views of some other groups, 
their job is to act, if need be over the objections of that 
group.27 
The elite believes that people rarely know what their 
long-term interests are. This clearly creates a gap 
which so me members of society need to fill. Because the 
position it occupies and because of the way it came to 
occupy this position, the elite regards it as its duty to 
show the nonelite what its interests really are.28 
These interests-when applied to energy policy-have 
found expression in the protection of national "indepen-
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dence," with nuclear power assigned a vital role in its main-
tenance. Whether articulated in relation to reducing French 
dependence on imported fuel or maiutaining the competi-
tiveness and vitality of the French economy, the search for 
national independence has been the underlying theme and 
unifying rationale throughout the definition and execution 
of French energy policy.29 This has not meant that disputes 
are unknown among the administrative elite who dominate 
the policymaking framework. There was the conflict be-
tween EDF and CEA during the 1960s over the choice of 
reactor types, the differences in the mid-1970s between the 
Ministry of Finance and EDF over the rate of nuclear con-
struction, and recent disputes between EDF and the CEA 
over control of the sale and costs ofuranium. Nevertheless, 
officials have been unified in their responseto criticism and 
opposition f<·om outside groups. Examples have been numer-
ous. 
In response to public concerns over nuclear safety after 
the accident at Three Mile Island, the government simply 
stated that such an accident was not possible in French 
reactors, and then proceeded to accelerate the nuclear pro-
gram. When controversy arose after hairline eraeks were 
found in the pipes of several reactors either under construc-
tion, in operation, or ready to be started up, EDF officials 
roaintained that these eraeks did not constitute a serious 
danger, although special monitaring procedures would be 
set up for those reactors containing such pipes. In the cases 
of the Tricastin and Gravelines reactors, where the CFDT 
struck in responseto EDF's unwillingness repair the eraeks 
before loading, the loading of the two reactors was carried 
out despite the strikes. 
To inquiries precipitated by the resignation of the Seere-
tary-General in the lnter-Ministerial Committee for Nu-
clear Safety because of obstruction by the lndustry and 
Health Ministriesthat prevented him from doing hisjob, the 
government respanded that there was nothing wrong with 
the French safety system.30 
Following initial efforts to keep quiet a fire at the La 
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Hague resprocessing plant in January 1981 in which several 
employees were contaminated by high-level radiation, offi-
cials reassured the public that the radioactivity that escaped 
was well within safety limits. 
These reactions retleet the conviction held by French 
energy officials that nuclear power is less of a risk than other 
energy sources, that in any event some activities in modern 
society entail risk, and that fear of nuclear power is irratio-
nal and based primarily on poor information. 31 
Thus, the insularity built into the French political pro-
cess, an insularity bred by the concentration of political 
power and the self-assured exercise of that power by a 
governing elite, has greatly simplified the execution of nu-
clear policy. This has not meant, however, that energy 
officials have been spared the strains and pulls of powerful 
competing interests. But the most notable decisions and 
events that have complicated the lives of those responsible 
for energy policy have come from outside the French 
polity. 
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE, NUCLEAR POWER, 
AND NON-PROLIFERATION 
As we saw earlier, the rapid expansion of nuclear power, 
including concerted efforts to develop and integrate fully 
each phase of the nuclear fuel cycle, was part of an overall 
long-term design to reduce France's energy dependence. At 
the same time, however, these efforts were part of more 
immediate commercial and economic considerations associ-
ated with French industrial policy. 
With the government decision to abandon its gas-graphite 
technology in favor of the LWR because of the former's 
poorer export prospects and the industrial restructuring 
necessitated by such a move, the French nuclear industry 
felt sufficiently well-placed to pursue foreign sales actively. 
By the mid-1970s, orders were beginning to come in; Frama-
tome sold two LWRs to South Africa and Iran contracted for 
at least another two. In addition, research reactors were sold 
Nuclear Power and the French State 163 
to lran and lraq; Pakistan and South Korea each had con-
tracted for the construction of a reprocessing plant; and 
reprocessing services were becoming a major growth indus-
try. Having invested approximately $1 billion to double the 
capacity of its La Hague plant, Cogema had received enough 
orders by 1979 to close its books through 1985. Among the 
customers contracting for reprocessing services were W est 
Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Nether-
lands.32 Finally, France enjoyed a worldwide technological 
lead in development of the FBR with a 250 MW demonstra-
tion fast breeder reactor, the Phenix, in operation, the con-
struction of the 1200 MW Super-Phenix prototype well un-
derway and scheduled to go critical in 1985, and orders for 
two FBRs every three years expected from 1985 through the 
year 2000.33 Expectations for the future commercial success 
of the French technology overseas were high. 
Thus, the nuclear program not only represented deliver-
ance from an untenable long-term dependence on foreign 
states, it contributed directly to the amelioration of certain 
economic problerus confronting France, not the least being 
serious strains on the French halanee of payments resulting 
from large oil imports. For these reasons, France was no 
more ready than was Germany for fundamental revisions of 
the rules and norms governing nuclear exports and the use 
of certain nuclear technologies. 
Throughout mu ch of the post-war period, French govern-
ments displayed little interest in the international regula-
tion of nuclear proliferation (beyond the question of nuclear 
weapons for West Germany). France refused to sign the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, although it affirmed its 
support for non-proliferation provided that its domestic nu-
clear program remained unaffected.34 Nevertheless, in-
creased French activity both domestically and in the world 
market, in combination with a re-evaluation of non-prolif-
eration policy precipitated by lndia's nuclear explosion, 
brought France into the vortex of a growing international 
debate over nuclear proliferation. 
We have already discussed the international consulta-
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tions among supplier countries-the so-called London Sup-
pliers Group-on tighter safeguards and stricter nuclear 
export guidelines in the wake of events in India. The domes-
tic effect of these discussions in France was to exacerbate 
relations within the coalition cabinet resulting, until sum-
mer 1976, in a near-paralysis of French nuclear export 
policy. For their part, the Gaullists, under the leadership of 
Prime Minister Chirac, opposed any attempt to revise 
France's policy, interpreting such efforts as acquiescence to 
American pressure. Not only had the United States spear-
headed the initiatives in the suppliers group but also French 
nuclear export policy increasingly had come under pressure 
from the Ford administration. The sale of reprocessing fa." 
cilities to South Korea and Pakistan, as well as the sale to 
Iraq of the research reactor that required highly enriched, 
weapons-grade uranium, were singled out for special criti-
cism. 
The supporters of President Giscard d'Estaing, on the 
other hand, apparently wished to exert firmer control over 
nuclear export policy but were for the most part thwarted by 
the Gaullist presence in government.36 With the resignation 
of Chirac in August 1976, however, a series of measures 
were initiated by Giscard, signaling major revisions in 
French policy: 
• On September 1, 1976, a council designed to formulate 
France's nuclear foreign policy (Conseil Nucleaire de Po-
litique exterieure) was established under the chairman-
ship of the French President. 
• Following the October 11, 1976, meeting of the Council, a 
communique was issued from the President' s office laying 
out, in general terms, France's new foreign policy. 
• On December 16, 1976, the Council issued an order to 
suspend the further export of reprocessing facilities. 
The October communique said, in part: 
France intends to keep control of its nuclear export 
policy with due respeet for its international commit-
ments in this field. 
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In its policy ofnuclear exports France will strength-
en all relevant regulations and guarantees in the field 
of equipment, materials and technology. 
France will ensure safeguards for supplies ofnuclear 
fuel for the nuclear power stations it provides and it 
will meet legitimate needs for aecess to technology. 
France will also furnish fuel-cycle services ... 
The French government is ready to discuss these 
problems with both the producer countries and the 
non-producer countries engaged in major programs for 
nuclear power stations. 36 
Thus, by the advent of the Carter administration, the 
central tenets of both French and American nuclear export 
policy appeared to be in basic agreement, although some 
differences remained. While French officials supported the 
tightening of safeguards, they opposed the "full-scope" safe-
guards being pushed by the United States; and in suspend-
ing the export of reprocessing plants, France did not pre-
clude the export of sensitive technologies in the future. 
Certain issues also remained outstanding, such as the sale of 
the reprocessing plant to Pakistan. But once the French 
government had decided that the sale of the reprocessing 
facility to Pakistan was not in France's best interest, the 
primary task facing Giscard was how to stop delivery with-
out appearing to cave in to U.S. pressures, which had again 
increased with the change of administrations. Refusing to 
abrogate the agreement unilaterally, French officials appar-
ently hoped that, as in the case of South Korea, American 
pressures on Pakistan would result in the cancellation of the 
contract by the Pakistani government; the French govern-
ment privately made clear that it wouldn't object to such 
actions. But Pakistan remained unmoved by the exhorta-
tions of the Aroericans and the hints of the French, ada-
mantly demanding fulfillment of the agreement. The French 
government therefore took another tack, proposing a series 
of changes that, if adopted, would have resulted in long 
delays as well as significant alterations in the reprocessing 
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process. Finally, in late 1978, the French government an-
nounced its decision to cancel the contract, a decision which 
by this time was met with considerable indifference by the 
Pakistanis. (This indifference is perhaps expiained by the 
apparent success of an alternative strategy being pursued at 
the same time by Pakistan: the acquisition of an enrichment 
technology through industrial espionage by a Pakistani na-
tional employed for a time at the URENCO enrichment 
project in Almelo, the Netherlands.) 
Another unresolved issue was the delivery of uranium 
enriched to 93 pereent for the Osiris research reactor under 
construction in Iraq. In conjunction with France's newly 
enunciated non-proliferation policy, French government 
officials attempted to revise the agreement signed with Iraq 
in 1975. By 1980, however, the government had abandoned 
efforts to persuade Iraq to substitute a low-enrichment fuel 
being developed and tested in France (caramel, a fuel en-
riched to only 7-8 percent, substantially below the threshold 
for use in nuclear explosive device). Following the Israeli air 
strike against the Iraqi reactor, France and Iraq negotiated 
an agreement calling for the construction of a new reactor, 
but this time to be fueled by uranium enriched to around 20 
percent, a much lower level than previously contracted for, 
although not the caramel earlier proposed. 
It is not entirely clear how greatly the United States was 
responsible for this reorientation in France's export policy 
and for the efforts to revise the agreements with Pakistan 
and Iraq. The truth possibly lies somewhere between the 
position of Giscard's critics, the Gaullists, who roaintained 
that he had acquiesced to American pressures, and that of 
his supporters, who naturally denied the influence of the 
United States, declaring that French nuclear export policy 
did not arnount to an "alignment with Washington's 
views."37 That is, U.S. exhortations probably had the great-
est effect during the initial phase of the non-proliferation 
debate in 1974-76 by making explicit the implications of 
France's recently concluded nuclear export agreements; but 
these pressures, in and of themselves, were not sufficient 
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cause, especially in view of the French tendency to resist 
foreign policy initiatives from across the Atlantic. Of equal 
or greater importance for changes in policy were certain 
domestic considerations that allowed French and American 
interests regarding the control of nuclear exports to come 
together. One such consideration was that the French did 
not see attempts to limit competition for export contracts as 
overly compromising of their interests, since the American 
and German nuclear industries, among others, were equally 
constrained by agreements reached within the suppliers 
group. Further, the need for foreign sales was not nearly so 
great for the French nuclear industry because of its rapidly 
expanding domestic market. Another consideration was 
that, with France's near-monopoly in the area of commer-
cial reprocessing, the sale of reprocessing services to Third 
World countries was potentially much more lucrative than 
the export of such facilities. Reprocessing contracts con-
cluded by Cogema earned approximately 12 billion francs in 
1977 ($2.5 billion), whereas the contracts with South Korea 
and Pakistan totaled $10 million and $200 million respec-
tively.38 
Thus, shared concerns over the spread ofnuclear weapons 
to politically sensitive areas of the Third World had devel-
oped into a general consensus that some controis had to be 
exerted over the export ofnuclear technology. Nevertheless, 
French and American positions began to diverge sharply 
when, by 1977, new elements were introduced into the 
non-proliferation debate-the Carter administration's initi-
atives against plutonium-producing technologies. 
Although the United States did not explicitly demand 
that other countries follow its lead in delaying indefinitely 
commercial reprocessing and deferring untillater any deci-
sion on the commercialization of the FBR, the proposed 
discussion of the nuclear fuel cycle within an international 
framework (INFCE) and the subsequent passage by the U.S. 
Congress of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act of 1978 made 
clear the intention of the Carter administration to eneour-
age similar aetions by others. These policies, however, 
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struck directly at the heart of France's energy strategy, 
threatening both its independence and economic viability. 
Not surprisingly, the French vigorously defended the neces-
sity of the fast breeder option and of reprocessing in unilat-
eral declarations as well as in intergovernmental discus-
sions through INFCE. Like their West German counterparts 
(as detailed in Chapter 5), French officials argued that, 
laeking the enormous energy reserves of the United States, 
they were impelled to pursue early commercialization of the 
FBR and the concomitant capture of plutonium through 
reprocessing in order to significantly reduce France's depen-
dence on imported oil. In addition, they emphasized that 
reprocessing, aside from making much more efficient use of 
energy resources, was ecologically sounder than long-term 
storage of spent fuel rods: high-level radioactive waste could 
be separated from the less hazardous material, solidified in 
glass, placed in stainless steel containers, stored in concrete 
pits, and then permanently isolated from the environment. 
(As yet, no decision has been made on the method of final 
disposal; under most serious consideration are burial in salt 
domes, clay, or granite.) 
The American policies posed lingering questions for the 
viability of France's nuclear strategy, although, uniike the 
German situation, the French strategy is not so dependent 
on nuclear exports. The French nuclear industry actively 
sought export business, but it could survive on domestic 
orders. This contrasts with Germany, where international 
sales were imperative because the domestic market had 
virtually disappeared. Nor did the U.S. opposition to repro-
cessing and the FBR bolster the anti-nuclear forees in 
France as they did in West Germany; policy in France was 
in the hands of officials insulated from the pressures of 
nuclear opponents. 
The major problem posed for the French nuclear program 
by the Carter administration's anti-plutonium crusade was 
one ofscale. Ifthe United States were successful in persuad-
ing other major industrialized nations, as well as Third 
World countries, to forego reprocessing and early commer-
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cialization of the FBR, would such a program still be viable 
in a country the size of France? Further, despite France's 
being largely self-sufficient in enriched uranium by 1981, 
the United States retained some leverage over French re-
processing. Not only had a high pereentage of enriched 
uranium been purchased earlier from the United States but 
most of the customers contracting for French reprocessing 
services at La Hague had been supplied primarily by the 
United States. In both instances, reprocessing was subject to 
American approval because of the NNPA. 
As for the fast breeder reactor, analogies were inevitable 
with the Concorde supersonic airliner-a technological 
achievement but a commercial disaster, in part because the 
aircraft was excluded from major markets by the United 
States. French officials discount this comparison, but ques-
tions persist about the economic feasibility of the FBR in the 
absence of a larger market and with the possible loss of West 
Germany and other crucial partners in developing and mar-
keting such an expensive and controversial technology. The 
government may have signaled its own doubts about eco-
nomic feasibility: there are recent reports that plans to move 
beyond the Super-Phenix have been suspended until other 
nations assume more of the costs in research and applica-
tion.39 
THE NUCLEAR FUTURE IN FRANCE 
As France entered the 1980s, two questions hovered over 
the political landscape, clouding the otherwise optimistic 
future of its nuclear program. The first question concerned 
the international debate over nuclear proliferation and its 
possible effect on domestic policy options; the second related 
to the role of nuclear power under a Socialist government. 
Subsequent developments, however, indicate little threat 
from either source. 
The findings at INFCE, as we saw in the previous chapter, 
combined with a new American administration more favor-
ably disposed to reprocessing and development of the FBR, 
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have reduced potential constraints on nuclear power from 
external sources. 
In the domestic arena, initial measures undertaken by 
the new Socialist government in 1981 raised concerns 
among proponents of nuclear power. The controversial Plo-
goff plant was canceled outright, construction on five other 
reactors was frozen, and a general debate was initiated over 
the future direction of French nuclear policy. Under discus-
sion were the rate of construction on new nuclear power 
plants, the future of the FBR, and the expansion of the 
reprocessing plant at la Hague. But once the debate was 
concluded in October 1981 with a parliamentary vote, little 
had changed in the fundamental direction and content of 
French nuclear policy: 
• Six new LWRs would be ordered over 1982-83 rather than 
the nine planned by the previous government over the 
same period. This ra te of expansion has not been realized 
because of forecasts of lower increases in energy demand 
and projections of at least 13 pereent excess generating 
capacity by 1990; for 1983-84, a cutback from three to two 
reactors per year was ordered; for 1985-86, one per year.40 
• By 1990, the share of domestic energy consumption to be 
covered by nuclear power was set at 27 percent, down only 
slightly from the 30 pereent projected in the 1980 program 
of Giscard. 
• The Super-Phenix FBR was to be completed, with a deci-
sion on startinga series of FBRs to be reserved for later. 
• Reprocessing capacity was to be expanded. 
Thus, despite considerable public opposition to nuclear 
power through the 1970s, recent significant changes at the 
highest levels of government, and the growing prospect of 
surpius electrical generating capacity by the end of the 
decade, the French nuclear program, although slowing down 
owing to lower demand, has continued on course with only 
slight shifts in emphasis. This is perhaps a testimony to the 
structure of the policymaking process in France and the 
more persistent and powerful position of state agencies and 
their officials in that process. 
7. Consensus Politics 
in the Netherlands 
As our examinations of French and German energy polici es 
have demonstrated, a country's response to recent dramatic 
shifts in the world energy market is not governed only by its 
indigenous energy resources but by political, economic, and 
social factors as well. Dutch policy, as we would expect, 
reflects a unique combination of elements present in the 
Netherlands. 
As in France, a sophisticated state planning apparatus 
has been developed in the Netherlands to influence various 
economic activities; in addition, ownership of major energy 
sources is shared by the public and private sectors. As in 
West Germany, government intervention in the market-
place has been quite limited and very discreet throughout 
much of the post-war period despite the presence ofplanning 
and public ownership. Moreover, the parliamentary system 
of government has remained remarkably open and stable, 
despite long-enduring and deep-seated divisions within 
Dutch society. It is most strikingly Dutch that, despite these 
divisions, public officials have traditionally placed a pre-
mium on achievinga broad political consensus in the poli-
cymaking process. 1 In the following pages, we will assess the 
effect of this rather exceptional combination of factors on the 
shaping of nuclear policy in postwar Holland. 
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GOVERNMENT NUCLEAR POLICY 
In fall1974, an energy White Paper was submitted by the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs to parliament, a major compo-
nent ofwhich was nuclear power. (For the composition of the 
government at this time, see Chapter 3.) 
The report cited the various benefits to be derived from 
the introduction of nuclear power-diversification of energy 
supplies, a less expensive means of generating electricity, 
beneficial effects on employment, favorable impact on the 
country's halanee of payments, slower depletion of the 
Slochteren natural gas field, and the absence of air pollu-
tion-and proposed a gradual expansion of nuclear energy. 
To be more precise, the construction of three 1,000 MW 
reactors was to be completed by 1985. With the inclusion of 
two reactors already operating whose combined output was 
500 MW, this would represent 20 pereent of the Netherlands' 
electricity. 
Following publication of the Economic Ministry's White 
Paper, it was decided to make this proposal conditional on 
the completion ofseveral studies covering health, siting, and 
safety aspects of nuclear power. The Ministries of Economic 
Affairs, Public Health and Environment, and Social Welfare 
and Employment were subsequently commissioned to carry 
out these studies; and by fall 1975, the reports had been 
completed.2 
Interpreting the studies as permitting the planned expan-
sion ofnuclear power, Economics Minister Lubbers proposed 
the expansion of nuclear capacity by 3,000 MW in October 
1975. As in both West Germany and France, public opposi-
tion to nuclear power began to build. In contrast to both 
other countries, however, adoption by the Council of Minis-
ters, let alone approval by parliament, increasingly ap-
peared problematic. 
A CALL FOR REFLECTION 
The nationwide debate over nuclear energy largely began 
in 1974 with publication of the White Paper. The seeds of 
Consensus Politics in the Netherlands 173 
opposition in the Netherlands were planted by the Reflection 
Group on Energy Policy (Bezziningsgroep Energiebeleid), a 
small group of between twenty and thirty members com-
posed of prominent journalists, members of parliament, and 
scientists, including several from industry. Believing that 
the White Paper contained serious shortcomings, the group 
prepared a "reflection" paper highly critical of the Economic 
Ministry's analysis of the proposed nuclear program. The 
group charged that the risks to population or the environ-
ment were not given sufficiently serious discussion. It 
faulted the failure to make any socio-economic quantifica-
tion of the alternatives to nuclear power and the avoidanee 
of any clear articulation of socio-economic priorities, other 
than becoming less dependent on the oil producers. Al-
though the group did not present an alternative energy 
program, its paper did recommend a five-year reflection 
period to reconsider the Netherlands' energy future. In the 
following year, responding to Minister Lubbers's move to 
seek cabinet approval for the nuclear program in October 
1975, the group published a Second Reflection Paper, again 
arguing that a period of reflection was necessary for careful 
analysis of other options-which, in contrast to the first 
paper, were now discussed in considerable detaiP 
The Reflection Group was among the first, the most ar-
ticulate, and most highly publicized groups to voice concerns 
over the nuclear program. The First Reflection Paper, for 
example, was released at a press conference scheduled to 
coincide with the discussion of the White Paper in the 
Council of Ministers. Receiving considerable attention in 
the mass media, it was even given credit for a delay in the 
official publication of the energy paper (evidently, an earlier 
draft had been leaked to members of the Reflection Group). 
Similarly, just before the February 1976 cabinet meeting 
where a final decision on the nuclear power program was to 
be made, an abstract of the Second Reflection Paper was 
made into a full-page advertisement paid for and signed by 
1,200 concerned scientists, which appeared in several major 
newspapers. The most prominent among them were Profes-
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sor Casimir, President of the Dutch Royal Academy of Sci-
ence and President of the European Physicists Society; Dr. 
Beck, Managing Director and Research Coordinator ofUni-
lever; Professor Tinbergen, Nobel Laureate in Economics; 
Dr. Mansholt, former President of the European Commis-
sion; and Professors Schillebeeckx and Verkuyle, well-
known Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed theologians. 
The Reflection Group was not alone in its opposition to 
nuclear power. The debate was soon joined by various other 
organizations, both public and private, throughout the coun-
try. Cities and provinees designated as possible sites for 
nuclear reactors came out publicly in opposition to the con-
struction of nuclear power plants in their districts. In 1974, 
the provincial council of South Holland voted 42 to 19 for a 
resolution expressing regret that the provincial executive 
supported plans of the SEP to construct a nuclear plant near 
Rotterdam; it said that it was not yet desirable for such a 
plant to be built because the safety of the population and the 
environment was not sufficiently guaranteed. In January 
1975, the city council ofRotterdam passeda resolution, 23 to 
1, declaring that under no condition should a nuclear power 
plant be built on a proposed industrial site near the city. 
Trade union organizations gradually took positions op-
posing the nuclear program, demanding a five-year morato-
rium on the expansion of the nuclear power sector. The 
central organ for the three largest unions had published an 
"alternative" energy report in 1975, although the protestant 
labor union later issued a statement that supposedly under-
mined the effect ofthe report. 4 Nevertheless, by 1977-78 all 
major trade unions in Holland appeared to be in general 
agreement in their opposition to nuclear power, with the 
FNV -a federation of the Socialist NVV and Roman Cath-
olic NKV, representing 80 pereent of organized labor-again 
declaring in September 1977 that the expansion of nuclear 
power must be delayed, and the protestant CNV expressing 
considerable reservations about the further construction of 
nuclear power plants. 5 
Finally, several political parties belonging to the govern-
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ing coalition increasingly distanced themselves from the 
proposed expansion of nuclear power. The most adamant in 
its opposition was the PPR; although small, this left-wing 
party was crucial to maintaining the coalition. Mare signif-
icantly, many of the leading members of the largest party in 
parliament, the PvdA, were vigorously opposed to nuclear 
power. Once out of government, the entire Labor Party came 
out strongly against any nuclear expansion. 
Th us, while nuclear power enjoyed the official sanction of 
the Ministry ofEconomic Affairs, major political, social, and 
economic groups were increasingly opposed to the Ministry's 
nuclear program. Equally significant was the hesitation 
within government as well: after threats of resignation by 
two ministers, the government announced in February 1976 
that a decision on nuclear power would be postpaned until 
after the parliamentary elections scheduled for May 1977. 
The final vote within the cabinet reportedly was close to a 
deadlock; and while it is difficult to gage the actual impact 
of the public debate on the outcome, it was noted that at least 
two members of the Council of Ministers-F.H.A. Trip 
(PPR), Minister of Science, andIrene Vorrink (PvdA), Min-
ister of the Environment-were in close contact with the 
Reflection Group throughout the cabinet deliberations. Per-
haps mare telling, however, was the Economic Affairs Min-
ister's having to respand in detail during cabinet meetings to 
questions that had been raised by the Reflection Group. 
The postponement averted an immediate government cri-
sis, because the formation of a new coalition would have 
been virtually impossible with the party divisions then 
present within parliament. The langer-term effect, however, 
was a delay that extended well beyond the May 1977 elec-
tions, although the elections brought the VVD into the 
government in coalition with the CDA-parties much mare 
favorably disposed toward nuclear power than were the 
PvdA and the PPR. 
In deferring a final ruling on nuclear power until after an 
election over a year away, the cabinet acknowledged the 
substantial influence of the well-orchestrated nuclear oppo-
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sition, boistered by a generallack of enthusiasm for nuclear 
power within the public at large. In a 197 4 public opinion 
poll, 58 pereent opposed an immediate start ofnuclear power 
development, up from 35 pereent in 1973; and 62 pereent 
believed that the technology was not yet able to guarantee 
safe use.6 The Second Reflection paper reported in 1975 that 
54 pereent of the public had expressed opposition to nuclear 
power. A 1980 poll showed public opposition continuing 
high, with 53 pereent of those polled speaking against nu-
clear energy.7 And, uniike West Germany with its powerful 
industrial interests, the Netherlands had no strong nuclear 
proponents to halanee public doubt; such support as there 
was came primarily from the SEP, parts of Dutch industry, 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs itself. 
The delay on a final ruling was also a strategy to defuse 
controversy over the nuclear issue in order to construct the 
broad-based consensus customarily sought in Dutch politics. 
Rather than gaining respite by the decision to defer judg-
ment on the nuclear program, however, Dutch policymakers 
remained embroiled in nuclear controversy over the next 
few years, largely because of the association of virtually all 
important nuclear-related industrial activities in Holland 
with international programs. 
NUCLEAR POWER AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR DEBATE 
The size of the Dutch energy market and the arnount of 
funding required for independent development of competi-
tive advanced reactor types more or less dictated the options 
available to the Dutch government. It could either partici-
pate in international projects or remove the Netherlands 
from any future commercial activities in the advanced re-
actor area. The Dutch government chose the former. 
In 1967, the Netherlands, through its principal nuclear 
firm, Neratoom, joined the German fast breeder project at 
Kalkar. At the time, the action received little public atten-
tion, but by 1973 controversy surrounded the project. The 
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trigger was the so-called Kalkar Surtax-a 3 pereent levy 
on all electrical bills to finance the Dutch participation. 
Thousands of individuals refused to pay the tax, with over 
seventy municipalities declaring their unwillingness to 
hand over the 3 pereent that they had collected on electrical 
bills if the money went to Kalkar. Several groups--espe-
cially the trade unions, particularly NVV --called for the 
termination of Dutch participation in the project. 
Economics Minister Lubbers made a hurried attempt to 
defuse the issue by allowing diversion ofthe 3 pereent tax on 
individuals' utility bills to a special fund for the develop-
ment of alternative energy sources if the person declared a 
conscientious objection to supporting the Kalkar project. 8 
This ploy failed, however, as pressures for withdrawal from 
the Kalkar project mounted. More significantly, the antip-
athy to Kalkar began to fuse with the general opposition to 
the nuclear program proposed by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. 
Despite the pressures, the government remained resolute 
in its intention to stay in the program, arguing that with-
drawal would result in the payment of extremely high dam-
ages to its German and Belgian partners. A modus vivendi 
was finally reached in 1976 when, in conjunction with a 
governmental declaration renouncing participation of the 
Netherlands in a projected second phase of the Kalkar 
project, parliament approved a government proposal to abol-
ish the Kalkar Fund on January 1, 1977. During 1976, the 
controversy over FBR development also was aggravated by 
the decision ofSEP tojoin the French Super-Phenix project. 
Participation in the Super-Phenix project was particu-
larly attractive to Dutch authorities as they didn't have to 
take part in the financing of the "unprofitable top." In 
addition, Minister Lubbers held that if the Netherlands 
didn't participate, Holland would be kept outside FBR de-
velopment, thereby diminishing the possibility that Dutch 
industry would be able to export nuclear reactor compo-
nents. As a consequence, Lubbers instructed the Ministry's 
representative on SEP's board to approve the plan, which 
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translated into an expenditure ofFl23 million. This decision 
encountered strong opposition in parliament, the VVD being 
virtually the only party to back the Minister's move. Con-
sequently, the Second Chamber passed a resolution which 
required that cooperation in the Super-Phenix project be 
made contingent upon the right of co-decision on safety 
requirements-requirements relating to guarantees against 
proliferation of nuclear materials and know-how as well as 
internal safety. In September 1976 the SEP board of direc-
tors approved the proposal for participation but stipulated 
that the construction of Super-Phenix should be subject to 
European Community safety requirements and that fission-
able material used or produced by the reactor should be duly 
supervised. 
The second area of dispute to feed the fires of nuclear 
controversy before the 1977 elections involved the export of 
nuclear reactors to South Africa. In spring 1976, an inter-
national consortium composed ofGE, Brown-Boveri, and the 
Dutch group Rijn-Schelde-Verlome was chosen to build two 
nuclear reactors in South Africa. The project represented 
nearly Fl 1 billion in sales and approximately 5,000 jobs for 
a year; the Dutch government was asked to provide export 
credit facilities. While the left of center parties, along with 
the unions, strongly opposed the deal, the confessional par-
ties favored the extension of export credits, maintaining that 
the guarantee and apartheid were two entirely separate 
questions. The dispute, however, never reached the floor of 
the Second Chamber. 
Division within the cabinet ran very deep; resignations 
had been threatened both if credits were approved and if 
they were refused, so that any ruling threatened dissolution 
of the governing coalition and the fall of the government. 
The cabinet therefore repeatedly postponed a decision al-
though South Africa had specified a deadline of May 21, 
1976. With passing of the deadline, the outcome that the 
government leaders probably wanted was produced: South 
Africa awarded the contract toa French consortium, remov-
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ing this extremely divisive issue from the Dutch political 
agenda. 
During the course of 1976, the officials in the N etherlands 
had made every effort to depoliticize the nuclear question. 
They had postponed consideration of domestic nuclear power 
expansion indefinitely; Dutch participation in FBR develop-
ment, although not terminated, had been substantially reg-
ulated; and the dispute over nuclear exports to South Africa 
dissipated quickly after government procrastination had 
lost the contract. But just when the issues fueling the nu-
clear controversy seemed to have been taken offthe political 
agenda, the international debate over nuclear proliferation 
flared, spilling over into the domestic arena. The Dutch 
government was caught up in the debate because of the 
delivery of enriched uranium to Brazil. 
The Netherlands had become directly involved in the 
controversy over the German-Erazilian deal because of its 
participation in Urenco, an enrichment project founded in 
1971 with the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, 
and Holland. Included in the German agreement with Brazil 
was a provision for the supply of enriched uranium from 
Urenco facilities located at Almelo in the Netherlands. In 
July 1976, the Dutch government approved the export to 
Brazil of uranium enriched by Urenco, but this decision 
increasingly came under fire from domestic critics concerned 
about the implications of such deliveries to a country that 
had refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Linked to the export of enriched uranium to Brazil was 
the planned expansion of the productive capacity at the 
Almelo plant. By 1982, approximately Fl 700 million was to 
be invested by the Netherlands through UCN (Ultracentri-
fuge Netherlands), the state-owned company originally com-
posed of the Dutch government, with a 55 pereent share, and 
five private companies, among them Philips and Shell, each 
with 10 percent. In October 1976, the companies terminated 
their financial participation in UCN. This made it into a 
totally state-owned company, requiring the government to 
180 Politics and Nuclear Power 
come up with the entire Dutch share of the arnount to be 
invested in the expansion of Almelo. Subsequently, the La-
bor party hinged its approval of Urenco enlargement on a 
"satisfactory" solution of the Erazilian supp ly question; the 
PPR opposed deliveries to Brazil altogether. It therefore 
opposed plans to expand Almelo. 
In December 1976, the question came to a head in the 
Dutch cabinet when ministers from the PPR threatened to 
resign if expansion of Almelo were approved. The other 
government parties were at least reservedly in favor of 
expansion, because of the danger of losing as many as 2,000 
jobs at the Almelo plant and because they felt that expan-
sion would allow greater influence over the use of uranium 
enriched by Urenco and thereby restrict the spread of nu-
clear weapons. The cabinet met the dilemma by provision-
ally agreeing to expansion but with certain conditions at-
tached. Final consent would be contingent on discussion by 
the Foreign and Economics Ministers with their German 
and British counterparts on various financial, organiza-
tional, and economic questions; and on guarantees govern-
ing supplies by Urenco to other countries in the interest of 
non-proliferation. This meant that Brazil must agree to 
international and IAEA controls. 
In January 1977, at the PvdA congress held in prepara-
tion for the parliamentary elections in May, the party 
adopted a position very close to that of the PPR and that 
directly contradicted the policy of the Labor ministers in the 
cabinet: expansion of the Almelo plant was to be opposed. In 
the subsequent months leading to and following the national 
elections, little progress was made toward resolving the 
question. But with the formation of a new government in 
December 1977, agreement within the cabinet finally 
seemed possible: the VVD was a strong supporter of expan-
sion and the confessional parties, now consolidated into the 
CDA, had favored approval, even if more conditionally. 
In January 1978, Brazil exchanged letters with the three 
Urenco partners. It was agreed that all four countries would 
try to negotiate the establishment of a worldwide plutonium 
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storage system run by the IAEA or, ifthis proved impossible, 
to negotiate on their own an ad hoc storage regime, again 
including the IAEA. 
Deciding that this commitment by the Erazilian govern-
ment was sufficient, the new cabinet decided to go ahead 
with the enlargement of Almelo. But parliament, in voting 
for expansion, again attached conditions. Left-wing members 
of the CDA, supported by the Labor party n ow in opposition 
and staunchly opposed to expansion, stipulated that delivery 
of uranium to Brazil, scheduled to begin in 1981, would be 
permitted only if satisfactory safeguards had been worked 
out in the interim. The so-called van Houwelingen motion-
named after one of the rebel CDA members in parliament-
committed the Dutch government to "persuade" its Urenco 
partners and Erazil to complete nuclear safeguard negotia-
tions by 1981, whereas the exchanged letters permitted 
negotiations to last until 1985 when uranium delivery and 
reprocessing were scheduled to begin. 
Not surprisingly, little success followed from the efforts of 
the N etherlands to pry further concessions from German 
and British officials, who were increasingly exasperated by 
the long delays and seemi ng ly unending demands for revi-
sions. The German government made clear that it was not 
prepared to provide funds for the extension of the Almelo 
plant on the basis of the van Houwelingen amendment and 
threatened more extreme actions. Chancellor Schmidt 
warned in April 1978 that failure to observe contractual 
commitments would lead to "extremely stiffpenalties."9 The 
German and British partners let it be known that Erazil 
would be supplied, regardless of Dutch opposition. The ura-
nium could come either from the British enrichment plant at 
Capenhurst or from new facilities being considered in Ger-
many. German government officials had announced the pos-
sible early construction of enrichment facilities if the Dutch 
continued to delay; relatedly, the German partner in the 
Urenco consortium applied for a government permit to build 
an enrichment plant at Gronau. Further, there were hints 
that the Netherlands would be excluded from further par-
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ticipation in Urenco if the Dutch were not interested in a 
"further intensification of cooperation" in the area of enrich-
ment.10 
In June 1978, parliament finally agreed to the export of 
enriched uranium to Brazil, following a three-day debate in 
which the government argued that continued opposition 
would not improve the conditions of delivery to Brazil but 
would only result in the exclusion of Dutch industry from 
the Erazilian deal at the cost ofthousands ofjobs tied to the 
Almelo plant. The maverick CDA members relented in the 
end, although they did manage to extract one concession 
from the Prime Minister: the Second Chamber would be ab le 
to review the export permit in 1981 to determine whether, 
according to its members, the existing security guarantees 
were sufficient. 
Thus, despite considerable opposition, the Netherlands 
continued to participate in the various multinational ar-
rangements involving FBR development and the export of 
nuclear materials. The sale of reactors to South Africa was 
one exception. Nevertheless, the effect of the opposition 
should not be minimized. The questions raised by Dutch 
participation in these projects operated to sustain the do-
mestic controversy over nuclear power at a time when the 
government was attempting to place the nuclear issue on the 
political back burner. 
THE UNENDING SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS 
Reflecting the continuing reservations in the country 
about nuclear power, the government that was formed in 
December 1977-although more favorably disposed to nu-
clear expansion than its predecessor-announced that the 
construction of new nuclear power plants would not be 
considered until certain problems related to nuclear energy 
had been satisfactorily resolved, among them the storage of 
nuclear waste and reactor safety. This decision was taken 
despite a projected increase in oil consumption-as much as 
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47 pereent ofprimary energy demand by the mid-1980s, up 
from 41 pereent in 1978. 
Only after a prolonged hiatus extending over several 
years were the next tentative stepstaken toward a political 
decision on the longer-term direction ofDutch energy policy. 
In the course of 1980 two government White Papers on 
energy policy were published by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. 
The first memorandum, released in February 1978, rec-
ommended a dramatic increase in coal use as one element of 
the government's strategy to diversify Dutch energy sup-
plies over the next decades. 11 Coal consumption was to 
approach 26 million tons per year by the year 2000 (up from 
the current level of 1.5 million tons), which would represent 
40 pereent of electricity production and 20 pereent of total 
energy requirements (both currently at 5 percent). Reflect-
ing this general commitment to greater coal use, the two 
power plants under construction in 1980 were coal-burning, 
with approximately 2500 MW of coal-fired capacity slated 
for construction after 1986.12 Yet, despite such increases, the 
overall target advanced in the White Paper-a decline in the 
share of oil and gas from the current 90 pereent of total 
energy needs to 20 pereent by 2000-could not be ap-
proached without further diversification or considerably 
higher levels of coal consumption. 
The second government White Paper, appearing in July 
1980, specified nuclear power as the preferred alternative. It 
concluded that nuclear power was environmentally neither 
more nor less advantageous than coal and that nuclear 
waste could be safely stored above ground pending the con-
struction of disposal facilities either underground or on the 
seabed. Accordingly, it proposed that parliament approve 
the construction of three nuclear power plants, so that 40 
pereent of electrical production would come from nuclear 
power in the year 2000. 
The Second Chamber, however, was not to act immedi-
ately on the revived proposal for nuclear power expansion; 
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the final decision was to come only after an extensive two- to 
three-year public inquiry into the energy options contained 
in the White Papers. As in West Germany, the issue of 
increased nuclear power generation became linked with the 
question of nuclear waste management, any expansion be-
ing made contingent on finding a practical solution to the 
disposal problem. Salt domes in the northern provinees of 
Groningen and Drenthe were considered the most likely 
means of disposal, but local opposition has been so strong 
that parliament forbid exploratory drillings pending the 
outcome of the public debate on nuclear energy. 
In the intervening years, there had been a quick succes-
sion of governments, each holding differing degrees of com-
mitment to nuclear energy. The government established 
after the May 1981 election-a left of center coalition con-
sisting of the PvdA, CD, and D'66-appeared much less 
favorably disposed to nuclear power: within six months of its 
entering office in September 1981, areport was to be made 
on the possible consequences of a elosure of the two nuclear 
plants currently operating in the Netherlands. Over the 
next several months, however, the coalition collapsed twice, 
necessitating a new election in September 1982. The results 
eventually led to the return of a CD/Liberal coalition, this 
time under the leadership of Rudi Lubbers, former Minister 
ofEconomic Affairs and, as such, author of the 1974 White 
Paper. In January 1984, results of the extended public in-
quiry were submitted to the Economics Ministry. The report 
was based on approximately 42,000 questionaires filled out 
by participants at over 3,000 meetings, as well as on more 
representative polis of the general public. Among the find-
ings: 
• A vast majority of the population opposed further nuclear 
expansion. 
• Only a small majority supported the continued operation 
of the two existing nuclear power plants. 
• A large minority favored a complete withdrawal from 
nuclear power. 
Accordingly, the report called for no further nuclear power 
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plants, as well as limits on the expansion of coal-burning 
plants. At the same time, the report recommended an am-
bitious program of energy conservation and development of 
renewable energy sources as an alternative. Along with the 
strong opposition to nuclear power, the study found little 
public support for coal, which was considered dirty, or for oil, 
which was believed too expensive and was controlled by 
foreigners. About the only energy source finding widespread 
support throughout the Dutch populace was windmills. 13 
POLICY PARALYSIS 
Nuclear policy in the Netherlands is very much the prod-
uct of a relatively open political system that places a pre-
mium on the widest possible consensus. It is clear from 
events of the past decade that the political uncertainties 
surrounding nuclear power have made a workable consen-
sus on the nuclear issue nearly impossible to achieve. 
The publication of the energy White Paper in 1974 and 
subsequent initiatives by the Economics Ministry to expand 
the nuclear program did not draw the desired support. 
Rather, they alerted diverse groups in the Netherlands to 
government involvement that directly affected such highly 
valued interests as environmental preservation, economic 
growth and welfare, and the possible spread of nuclear 
weapons. As a result, pressures mounted from local govern-
ments, from important parts of the trade union movement, 
and from environmental groups. Opposition also came from 
a majority of the general public, from prominent scientists 
and theologians, and from certain political parties as well as 
from divisions within others. This negative consensus has 
left the government paralyzed. No government, regardless 
of the combination ofpolitical partiesin the often delicately 
halaneed coalitions, has felt in a position even to place the 
nuclear program before parliament. The findings from the 
most recent public inquiry make the likelihood of renewed 
government initiatives in the nuclear sector extremely re-
mote. 
8. Nuclear Politics 
and Policymaking 
In contrast to early expectations of government leaders in 
West Germany, France, and the Netherlands, the contro-
versy over nuclear power has not been the transitory phe-
nomenon once hoped for. Reassurances coneerning the 
safety of nuclear power notwithstanding, the issue has re-
mained central to the energy debate for a decade. Explana-
tions for the concerns over nuclear power most commonly 
focus on the nature of the technology itself and the fears it 
engenders. The release of low-level radiation is part of the 
normal operation of the reactor; there is the possibility of a 
large-scale accident; heat released from the plant impacts on 
the surrounding environment; difficulties are inherent in 
the permanent disposal ofhighly radioactive waste; and the 
creation of a plutonium economy has implications for nu-
clear proliferation. 
Further, observers have found explanations for the con-
tinuing controversy in certain aspects of building and oper-
ating nuclear power facilities that are difficult for modern 
political procedures to manage. Because of the long lead 
times involved in the construction of plants, the huge re-
quirements of capital and expertise, and the extensive gov-
ernment involvement in development and regulation of the 
technology, nuclear power now embodies many of the prob-
lems of advanced, industrialized societies-rapid technolog-
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ical change, centralization of decision-making power, the 
intrusion of government bureaucracy. 1 
There can be little doubt that such factors are important 
in any explanation of the nuclear controversy. The foregoing 
studies of German, French, and Dutch energy policies, how-
ever, suggest the presence of an additional element. This 
element is not related directly to nuclear power but rather to 
the overall strategy used in the formulation of energy policy. 
More specifically, as political units move from a more lim-
ited, ad hoc approach to energy policy that relies primarily 
on the market to a comprehensive, long-term energy strat-
egy in which government plays a more central role, the 
nuclear controversy changes from a scattered, localized phe-
nomenon to a national debate that engages the major polit-
ical, social, and economic institutions of the country. A brief 
explication of certain paradigms in the literature on deci-
sion-making may suggest why. 
The more limited, market-oriented approach that typified 
energy policy in the 1960s corresponds closely to what or-
ganization theory would call "disjointed incrementalism."2 
When considered in relation to an alternative decision-
making strategy-labeled "synoptic" or "rational-analytic"-
disjointed incrementalism is characterized, among other 
things, by 
• The blurring of means and ends rather than the explicit 
separation of objectives and the means to achieve those 
objectives. 
• A disaggregated, limited, reactive approach to the anal-
ysis of a problem rather than a comprehensive approach 
in which every relevant factoristaken into account (often 
with the aid of systems analysis, cost-benefit analysis, 
and the like). 
• The reliance on empiricism based on a succession of sim-
ilar comparisons rather than on "theory," or the produc-
tion of"theoretical" information (which is necessitated by 
comprehensive demands for information and analysis). 
The advantages attributed to the trial-and-error method, 
or "muddling through," derive largely from its being the way 
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that the political process actually works. "Muddling 
through" acknowledges the limited human capacity for com-
prehensiveness; intellectual capabilities are only finite and 
it is impossible to possess total information. There is also an 
important normative argument made for incrementalism, 
however. That is, it reduces conflict and keeps social cleav-
ages to a minimum, thus facilitating agreement on policy 
decisions. This is done in three ways. First, whereas an 
explicit separation of fact and value-means and ends-
exacerbates disagreement over policy, the fusion of means 
and ends disposes the various parties to consensus. Second, 
the remedial nature of incrementalism avoids many diffi-
culties raised by the formulation of long-term goals. It is 
often much easier for differing parties to agree on situations 
or ills that they wish to avoid or remedy than on goals 
toward which to move. Third, increments of change reduce 
the areas where social disagreement is possible. When only 
politically relevant issues are considered, the parties avoid 
additional differences over extraneous issues that are often 
brought to the surface by demands for comprehensiveness. 
Incrementalism, hoever, has not been without its detrac-
tors. At least three general critiques have been leveled at 
the incrementalist strategy of decision making. First, it has 
difficulty in responding to situations of rapid change. Sec-
ond, its short-term orientation often leads to stagnation, 
drift, or possibly exacerbation of problems. Third, it tends to 
permit powerful groups within the system to exercise dis-
proportionate influence on the decision-making process.3 It 
should perhaps be noted that the market, as metaphor, has 
served as a major source for the theoretical assumptions 
underpinning the incremental strategy. Responsibility is 
widely dispersed, fragmented, and decentralized, with ag-
gregate public welfare resulting from the pursuit of narrow 
self-interests. Similarly, many of the critiques of the market 
parallel those of incrementalism. Monopoly positions de-
velop in the market, which cause serious distortions in the 
economy; "externalities" have resulted from the inability of 
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the market to retleet certain costs; and short-range goals are 
often pursued to the negleet of the future. 
In any event, to the strategy of disjointed incrementalism 
has been ascribed the ability to minimize social conflict. To 
do this would be no insignificant accomplishment, in view of 
the complex problems confronting advanced industrial soci-
eties today. Regardless of the virtues of incrementalism, 
however, the foregoing case studies have illustrated the 
efforts of policymakers in three countries to deal with a 
myriad of interlinked energy-related problems by means of 
a more synoptic, comprehensive energy strategy. 
In West Germany throughout much of the post-war pe-
riod, energy policy mirrored many of the characteristics of 
incremental decision making. Policy was limited in scope, 
being primarily concerned with the coal sector; it was reme-
dial in nature, being designed to ameliorate the problems of 
the decHning coal sector; and it was reliant on a trial-and-
error approach, taking the market as final arbiter. By the 
mid-1970s, this approach to energy issues had undergone 
fundamental transformation. Policy proposals were now 
largely anticipatory rather than remedial, government in-
tervention in many areas associated with energy supply was 
now the rule rather than the exception, attempts at compre-
hensive analysis had displaced empiricism as the basis of 
policy choice, and political objectives had become very com-
prehensive in nature. 
In France, the pattern of energy decision making diverged 
in certain respects from the German experience. In the years 
immediately following the Second World War, French en-
ergy policy represented a limited rational-analytic ap-
proach. Planning in the energy sector, although laeking a 
certain degree of comprehensiveness and more medium-
than long-term in nature, manipulated or restricted the 
market from prejudicing energy policy objectives; this was 
accomplished through pervasive state intervention-for ex-
ample, the development of national, but more expensive, 
energy resources. But as France' s economy began to open up 
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with the creation of the Common Market, policymaking 
became more incremental as increasingly it began to rely on 
that most incremental of policy instruments, the market. 
While the state remained extremely active in the energy 
sector, its activities were guided less by a "plan" than by 
developments in the international energy market. With the 
international competitiveness of French industry supplant-
ing energy independence as the major concern of public 
officials, market forees increasingly dictated the patterns of 
French energy consumption throughout the 1960s. 
The effects ofrapidly rising energy consumption through-
out the 1960s, when combined with dramatic changes in the 
structure of the world energy market during the early 1970s, 
precipitated a fundamental reorientation of French energy 
policy. lnstead of pursuing international competitiveness 
through reliance on the international oil market, public 
officials began to consider the longer-term implications of 
such reliance for the political and economic viability of the 
French polity. In contrast to the 1960s strategy, French 
energy policy in the 1970s was characterized by active state 
intervention in almost all energy-related activities with the 
express purpose of controlling energy production and con-
sumption patterns rather than allowing the international 
energy market to create them. Policy in the 1970s was 
oriented toward the future; it attempted to anticipate the 
problems that resulted from dependence on a resource in-
creasingly subject to arbitrary manipulations as supplies 
declined. Finally, policymaking was marked by the increas-
i ng salience of comprehensive analysis required to inform 
such choices. 
French public officials, in responding to the energy-rela-
ted problems that emerged in the 1970s, moved to a consid-
erably more rational-analytic approach than had marked 
the nation's energy policy during the 1960s. 
For the Netherlands, the energy White Paper represented 
a significant departure from the incremental approach to 
energy policy that had prevailed throughout the post-war 
period. Rather than all ow the discrete decisions of the mar-
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ketplace to determine the country's energy patterns, signif-
icant government intervention was foreseen across a broad 
range of issues. Moreover, rather than focusing exclusively 
on economic and market criteria, the environmental and 
social implications of various energy technologies were ac-
knowledged as important in future energy policy choices. 
Finally, instead ofbeing preoccupied with immediate energy 
concerns (the Netherlands, after all, had just become a net 
energy exporter), policy began to give major consideration to 
future energy production and consumption patterns in the 
N etherlands. 
The studies in this hook show that it was not by chanee 
that anti-nuclear forees became national movements to be 
reckoned with in the mid-1970s. Although opposition to 
nuclear power had existed earlier, it had been a scattered, 
localized phenomenon with largely parochial concerns. To 
use the incremental argument, the application of a more 
comprehensive, rational-analytic strategy to the articula-
tion of energy policy pushed energy-related concerns onto 
the national political agenda. Energy policy became highly 
politicized, with the focus being primarily, but not exclu-
sively, on nuclear power. Contrary to the other point argued 
in the incremental literature, however, this politicization 
did not necessarily result in political stalemate, as we have 
seen in the varying degrees of success enjoyed by govern-
ments in the execution of their energy policies. In other 
words, although analysis of overall decision-making strat-
egies helps to expiain why nuclear power was pushed to the 
top of the political agenda, it is less useful in accounting for 
the different outcomes. Here, the structure of the policymak-
ing process itself is critical. 
The preceding analysis points to the intimate link be-
tween a country's political structure and the policy options 
available to its energy officials. The relatively pluralistic 
political systems of West Germany and the Netherlands 
have allowed diverse groups in both countries to participate 
in the policymaking process and, in so doing, to place con-
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siderable constraints on the aetions of government. In con-
trast, the French system-highly centralized and domi-
nated by state agencies and their offieiais-is so structured 
that aecess to the policymaking process is quite restricted. 
The state as a consequence has been relatively unencum-
bered in pursuit of its favored energy policy objectives. 
In conclusion, energy policy is not simply a matter of 
economic choice, ecological necessity, or geological fortuna. 
Politics is central to the analysis of energy policy. It is not 
my purpose in this study to propose a set of recommenda-
tions for a "better" energy policy. Such an exercise would 
tend to reflect only my personal values. What I have hoped 
to show in my analysis is that any reform, regardless of its 
normative intent, must be based on a sound understanding 
of the political process. 
Nevertheless, the study of energy policy in West Ger-
many, France, and the Netherlands does possess certain 
normative implications. If the three countries continue 
along their present courses-France pursuing a thorough-
going nuclear strategy, West Germany taking a middle road, 
and the Netherlands shunning the nuclear power option-
their experiences may provide a concrete basis upon which 
to evaluate the nuclear option. 
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Table 1. Primary energy consumption in the FRG, 1950-1975 In mtce (percentage .... cc 
of total) ~ 
1950 1955 1957 1958 1960 1965 1968 1970 1972 1973 1975 
Hard coal 98.7 131.3 136.4 124.9 128.4 114.4 98.0 96.8 83.4 84.1 66.5 (72.8) (71.7) (69.8) (65.5) (60.7) (43.2) (34.0) (28.8) (23.6) (22.2) (19.1) 
Soft coal 20.7 27.3 29.0 28.8 29.2 30.0 28.7 30.6 31.0 33.1 34.4 
(lignite) (15.3) (14.9) (14.8) (15.1) (13.8) (11.4) (9.9) (9.1) (8.7) (8.7) (9.9) 
Oil 6.3 15.5 21.5 27.8 44.4 108.0 142.4 178.9 196.4 209.0 181.0 (4.6) (8.5) (11.0) (14.6) (21.0) (40.8) (49.4) (53.1) (55.4) (55.2) (52.1) 
Natural gas .4 .6 .6 .8 3.5 9.3 18.3 30.6 38.6 48.7 (.2) (.3) (.3) (.4) (1.3) (3.2) (5.4) (8.6) (10.2) (14.0) 
Hydro 6.2 6.1 5.6 6.4 6.6 5.2 5.4 5.7 4.1 4.7 (4.6) (3.3) (2.9) (3.4) (3.1) (2.0) (1.9) (1.7) (1.2) (1.3) 
Nuclear .6 2.1 3.1 4.0 7.1 - - (.2) (.6) (.9) (1.1) (2.0) 
Other 3.6 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.0 3.5 4.1 4.4 5.7 5.0 10.0 (2.7) (1.4) (1.2) (1.1) (1.0) (1. 7) (1.4) (1.3) (1.6) (3.4) (2.9) 
Total 135.5 183.2 195.5 190.7 211.5 264.6 288.5 336.8 354.3 378.6 347.7 
Net imports (%) - 6.0 12.2 34.8 42.5 50.0 55.0 56.6 > 
't:l 
Sources: Julius Kruse, Energiewirtschaft (Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt, 1972), pp. 36-37; Erste 't:l ('!) 
Fortschreibung des Energieprogramms der Bundesregierung (Bundesministerium fuer Wirtschaft, Nov. 
= 1974), Anhang 1; Energy Policy Program, Second Revision (BmWi, 14 Dec. 1977), p. 43; Martin Meyer- ~ .... 
Renschhausen, Energiepolitik in der BRD von 1950 his heute (Cologne: Pahl-Regenstein Verlag, 1977), p. ~ 
23. 
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Table 2. Primary energy production in the FRG, 1950-
1972 In mtce (percentage of total) 
1950 1955 1957 1960 1965 1970 1972 
Hard coal 126.2 149.1 150.8 143.3 135.5 112.2 103.6 (79.8) (79.6) (77.9) (77.2) (77.3) (64.4) (60.0) 
Soft coal 20.9 24.8 26.6 26.3 27.7 29.7 29.9 
(lignite) (13.2) (13.3) (13.9) (14.2) (15.0) (17.1) (17.3) 
Oi! 1.6 4.5 5.0 8.0 11.4 10.8 10.2 (1.0) (2.4) (2.9) (4.3) (6.2) (6.2) (5.9) 
Natural gas 0.1 0.6 0.8 1.1 3.6 14.3 20.1 (0.1) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6) (1.9) (8.2) (11.6) 
Hydro 5.6 5.5 5.3 4.9 5.2 6.2 7.0 (3.5) (2.9) (2.8) (2.6) (2.8) (3.6) (4.1) 
Other 3.6 2.6 2.4 2.0 1.9 1.1 0.9 (2.3) (1.4) (2.1) (1.1) (1.0) (0.6) (0.5) 
To tal 158.1 187.1 191.5 185.6 185.2 174.1 172.6 
Sources: Meyer-Renschhausen, Energiepolitik, p. 20; Kruse, Energie-
wirtschaft, pp. 36--37. 
Table 3. Coal mining in the FRG, 1950-1973 
Pro- Employ- Productiv- Stock- To tal Exported 
duction me nt ity piles sa! es sale s 
(mt) (1000) (kg/man) (mt) (mt) (mt) 
1950 126.2 536.8 1405 
1957 150.8 604.0 1599 1.0 
1959 142.6 17.8 
1961 142.7 465.0 2207 11.7 117 28 
1963 142.1 412.0 2521 3.8 126 30 
1965 135.1 377.0 2705 15.4 106 24 
1966 126.0 334.0 2926 20.4 98 25 
1968 112.0 264.0 3526 9.5 103 30 
1970 111.3 253.0 3755 1.2 113 26 
1973 97.3 205.0 4068 14.9 98 24 
Sources: Erste Fortschreibung, Anhang 5; Kruse, Energiewirtschaft, pp. 
106, 111; Meyer-Renschhausen, Energiepolitik, p. 161. 
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Table 4. Coal and oil prices (DM per ton) m the FRG, 
1957-1966 
German Coal Freight Rates U.S. Coal (cif) 1000 CE 
at Pit Head U.S.-North Sea North Sea Fuel Oi! 
1957 63.29 29.20 76.50 95.20 
1958 64.53 13.30 58.20 80.22 
1960 62.70 15.10 58.40 54.74 
1963 63.87 15.50 58.90 42.25 
1966 67.00 12.70 58.80 37.36 
Source: Meyer-Renschhausen, Energiepolitik, p. 51. 
Table 5. French energy consumption, 1954-1974 In mtce 
1954 1960 1964 1970 1973 1974 
Coal 
Production 56.3 58.3 55.8 40.6 29.1 26.8 
Imports 10.9 12.0 18.5 16.6 16.6 20.1 
Petroleum 
Production 0.6 2.8 4.0 3.2 1.8 1.5 
Imports 24.8 37.5 63.0 127.8 172.7 165.9 
Natural gas 
Production 0.4 4.5 7.6 10.0 10.6 10.6 
Imports 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 11.8 13.5 
Primary electricity 
Production 8.0 13.4 12.5 20.4 19.4 23.3 
Total production 65.3 79.0 79.9 74.2 60.9 62.2 
Net imports 35.7 49.4 81.5 148.3 201.2 199.5 
Covered by national 
resources% 64.6 62.0 49.1 33.4 23.6 23.8 
Source: EDF compilation of data from French Committee for World Energy 
Conference and Commission de l'energie du plan (Paris: La Documentation 
Francaise, 1975); reprinted from Dominique Saumon and Louis Puiseux, 
"Actors and Decisions in French Energy Policy," in The Energy Syndrome, 
ed. Leon N. Lindberg (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977). 
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Table 6. Economic performance of advanced industrial 
democracies 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
GDP growth (%) 
United States 5.5 5.4 -0.6 -0.9 5.4 5.4 4.4 2.8 -0.2 
Japan 8.8 8.8 -1.0 2.3 5.3 5.3 5.0 5.5 4.2 
West Germany 3.7 4.9 0.5 -1.8 5.2 3.0 3.3 4.6 1.8 
France 5.9 5.4 3.2 0.2 5.2 3.1 3.7 3.5 1.3 
Great Britain 2.2 7.5 -1.2 -0.6 3.6 1.3 3.3 1.4 -1.8 
ltaly 3.2 7.0 4.1 -3.6 5.9 1.9 2.7 4.9 4.0 
Inflation (%) 
United States 2.3 6.2 11.0 9.1 5.8 6.5 7.7 11.3 13.5 
Japan 4.5 11.7 24.5 11.8 9.3 8.1 3.8 3.6 8.0 
West Germany 5.5 6.9 7.0 6.0 4.5 3.7 2.7 4.1 5.5 
France 6.2 7.3 13.7 11.8 9.6 9.4 9.1 10.8 13.6 
Great Britain 7.1 9.2 16.0 24.2 16.5 15.8 8.3 13.4 18.0 
ltaly 5.7 10.8 19.1 17.0 16.8 18.4 12.1 14.8 21.2 
Unemployment (%) 
United States 5.4 4.7 5.4 8.3 7.5 6.9 5.9 5.7 7.0 
Ja pan 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 
West Germany 0.8 0.9 1.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.1 
France 2.7 2.6 2.8 4.1 4.4 4.7 5.2 5.9 6.3 
Great Britain 4.1 3.0 2.9 3.9 5.5 6.2 6.1 5.7 7.4 
Ita ly 6.3 6.2 5.3 5.8 6.6 7.0 7.1 7.5 7.4 
Ba!. of payments 
(billion $) 
United States -9.9 -0.4 -5.0 18.3 4.6 -14.1 -13.9 1.4 3.7 
Ja pan 6.6 -0.1 -4.7 -0.7 3.7 10.9 16.5 -8.8 -10.7 
West Germany 0.8 4.3 9.7 3.5 3.4 4.2 8.7 -6.2 -16.5 
France 0.3 -0.7 -6.0 -0.1 -6.1 -3.3 4.1 1.2 -7.8 
Great Britain 0.4 -1.8 -7.9 -3.6 -1.5 0.5 2.0 -3.7 7.4 
Ita ly 2.3 -2.5 -8.0 -0.6 -2.9 2.3 6.3 5.5 -9.7 
Petroleum imports 
(tbd) 
United States 6256 6056 7295 8808 8228 6519 5220 
Ja pan 5576 5008 5235 5454 5347 4846 4373 
West Germany 3046 2509 2809 2768 2848 2147 1953 
France 2875 2278 2598 2514 2494 2520 2182 
Great Britain 2738 2067 2052 1691 1596 1157 893 
Italy 2669 2121 2268 2302 2363 2292 1860 
Sources: Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand, eds., Global lnsecurity (Boston: 
Houghton Miffiin, 1982), appendix; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of 
Intelligence, Economic and Energy lndicators (21 Jan. 1983); U.S. Department of 
Commerce, International Economic lndicators (Nov. 1975, March 1978, Dee. 1979). 
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Table 7. First FRG energy program, 1973 
1972 1975 1980 1985 
%of %of %of %of 
mtce to tal mtce to tal mtce to tal mtce to tal 
Oi! 196.4 55.4 230 57 275 54 330 54 
Co al 83.7 23.6 72 18 58 11 50 8 
Natural gas 30.6 8.6 48 12 82 16 92 15 
Lignite 31.0 8.7 35 8 39 8 38 6 
Nuclear 3.1 0.9 12 3 45 9 90 15 
Other 9.6 2.8 9 2 11 2 10 2 
To tal 354.3 100.0 406 100 510 100 610 100 
Source: Die Energiepolitik der Bundesregierung (Bundesrat, Drucksache 
607173, 3 Oct. 1973). 
Table 8. First revision of FRG energy program, 197 4 
1973 1980 1985 
%of %of %of 
mtce to tal mtce to tal mtce to tal 
Oi! 209.0 55 221 47 245 44 
Hard coal 84.2 22 82 17 79 14 
Natural gas 38.6 10 87 18 101 18 
Lignite 33.1 9 35 7 38 7 
Nuclear 4.0 1 40 9 81 15 
Other 9.7 3 10 2 11 2 
To tal 378.6 100 475 100 555 100 
Source: Erste Fortschreibung. 
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Table 9. French energy program, 1975 
1973 1985 
mtpe % oftotal mtpe %of total 
Oi! 116 66 96 40 
Coal 30 17 30 13 
Gas 15 9 37 15.5 
Nuclear 3 2 60 25 
Hydro 11 6 14 5.5 
New energies 0 0 3 1 
To tal 175 100 240 100 
Source: Ministere de l'Industrie et de la Recherche, Conseil Central de 
Planification (Paris, 3 Feb. 1975). 
Table 10. Gas revenues in the Netherlands 
Share in 
Revenue Share in Total National 
(Fl mn) Sales Abroad Revenue (%) Income (%) 
1974 2,368 911 4.4 1.4 
1978 8,642 3,956 9.9 3.4 
1979 8,457 3,679 8.8 3.1 
1980" 12,061 5,568 11.3 4.2 
1981" 16,745 8,227 14.5 5.5 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Re-
view of the Netherlands (Fourth Quarter, 1980). 
"Estimated. 
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Table 11. Election results in the FRG (percentage) 
CDU/CSU SPD FDP Greens 
Hamburg 
1974 40.6 44.9 10.9 
June 1978 37.6 51.5 4.8 4.5 
June 1982 43.2 42.8 4.8 7.7 
December 1982 38.3 51.3 2.6 6.8 
Lower Saxony 
1975 48.8 43.1 7.0 
June 1979 48.7 42.2 4.2 3.9 
March 1982 50.7 36.5 5.9 6.5 
Hesse 
1974 47.3 43.2 7.4 
October 1978 59.6 31.3 6.0 1.7 
September 1982 45.6 42.8 3.1 8.0 
September 1983 39.4 46.2 7.6 5.9 
Bavaria 
1974 62.1 30.2 5.2 
October 1978 59.6 31.3 6.0 1.7 
October 1982 58.3 31.9 3.5 4.6 
Berlin 
1975 43.9 42.6 7.1 
March 1979 44.4 42.6 8.1 3.7 
May 1981 47.9 38.4 5.6 7.3 
Rhineland-Palatinate 
1975 53.9 38.5 5.6 
March 1979 50.1 42.3 6.4 
Schleswig-Holstein 
1975 50.4 40.1 7.1 
April 1979 48.3 41.7 5.8 2.4 
Bremen 
1975 33.9 48.8 13.0 
October 1979 31.9 49.4 10.7 5.1 
September 1983 33.3 51.4 4.6 5.4 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 
1976 56.7 33.3 7.8 
March 1980 53.4 32.5 8.3 5.3 
March 1984 51.9 32.4 7.2 8.0 
Saariand 
1976 49.1 41.8 7.4 
April1980 44.0 45.4 6.9 2.9 
N orth Rhine-W estphalia 
1976 47.0 45.0 7.8 
May 1980 43.2 48.4 4.986 3.0 
Bundestag 
October 1980 44.5 42.9 10.6 1.5 
March 1983 48.8 38.2 6.9 5.6 
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Table 12. Attitudes toward nuclear power m West 
Germany and France 
West Germany 
Question: Do nuclear power plants represent a threat to the safety of the 
population, or is there no reason to be concerned about safety problems? 
A threat No threat No opinion 
Total population (1,196) 41% 37% 22% 
Sex 
Me n 41% 42% 17% 
Women 42% 33% 25% 
Age 
18--24 years 55% 28% 17% 
25-34 years 44% 40% 16% 
35--49 years 37% 43% 20% 
50-64 years 41% 38% 21% 
65 years and above 37% 32% 31% 
Occupation 
Farmers 28% 72% 0% 
Professionals 19% 51% 30% 
Civil service, employees, 
(white collar) 40% 42% 18% 
Skilled blue collar 42% 45% 13% 
Unskilled blue collar 56% 29% 15% 
Education 
Primary 43% 32% 25% 
Primary and apprenticeship 39% 39% 22% 
Primary and professional 41% 42% 17% 
High school and university 47% 37% 16% 
Production unit 
-lOO 41% 36% 23% 
101-2000 44% 38% 18% 
2000 + 35% 47% 18% 
Union affiliation 
Labor union members 40% 43% 17% 
Nonunion members 42% 36% 22% 
Religion 
Catholic 37% 37% 26% 
Protestant 44% 38% 18% 
None or other 54% 35% 11% 
Source: Poli INFAS, May 1977 
202 Appendix 
Table 12, continued 
France 
Question: Are you for or against the development of nuclear power 
plants? 
Against For No opinion 
Total 42% 47% 11% 
Sex 
Me n 39% 54% 7% 
Women 46% 42% 12% 
Age 
18--24 years 54% 38% 8% 
25-34 years 55% 38% 7% 
35-49 years 37% 49% 14% 
50-64 years 33% 55% 12% 
65 years and above 37% 54% 9% 
Occupation 
Farmers 42% 41% 17% 
Small business 44% 43% 13% 
Professionals and big business 29% 64% 7% 
White collar 44% 49% 7% 
Blue collar 48% 39% 13% 
Retired, nonworking 40% 53% 7% 
Education8 
Primary 33.5% 51.0% 15.5% 
Primary-superior 32.0% 62.0% 6.0% 
Secondary 33.0% 62.0% 5.0% 
Technical-commercial 30.0% 63.0% 7.0% 
Higher education 40.0% 55.5% 4.5% 
Source: SOFRES; reported in Figaro, Dee. 1978. 
aThis item is from 1976 survey, asking the same question (SOFRES, 
1976; reported in F. Fagnani and A. Nicolon, eds., Nucleopolis: Materi-
aux pour l'analyse d'une societe nucleaire [Grenoble: PUG, 1979]). 
Both surveys are reprinted from Dorothy Nelkin and Michael Pollak, 
TheAtom Besieged (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 110, 112. 
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